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Abstract 
 
The study carried out in this dissertation aims to problematize the possibility of a 
correlation between the (in)success of a takeover attempt and the individual characteristics 
of a Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). Thus, it is sought to understand whether certain 
individual characteristics (age, tenure, academic background, nationality and gender) of a 
target firm’s CEO have any influence on a greater or lesser resistance to a takeover 
attempt.  
This study is meritorious because it allows to conclude that some takeover attempts made 
by any acquirer firm, in relation to a target firm, do not occur due to personal decisions of 
the target firm’s CEO, meaning that the concept of rational markets may be scientifically 
insufficient to explain certain occurrences in the financial world. In fact, psychological 
factors seem to play a central role in the topic of this study: mergers and acquisitions. In 
practical terms, there are evidences that stress an increase in the target firms’ CEOs 
resistance to any type of takeover, depending, for example, on the age of the CEO, of their 
tenure, or even of their gender. In order to achieve a response to the questioning initially 
posed in this dissertation, a limited number of hypotheses based on specific individual 
characteristics were stipulated, which were in turn subjected to statistical tests using 
binomial regression models, used by previous relevant studies. Through actual and 
potential transactions between 2006 and 2016, with European companies as the main 
players, and whose observations were divided into three scenarios, it was possible to 
conclude that, regarding greater or lesser resistance to acquisitions attempts, the age of the 
CEOs present a curvilinear behavior, and their tenure a decreasing behavior. In addition, a 
male CEO tends to outreach less than a female CEO. 
 
Key-words: Chief Executive Officer, Individual Characteristics, Takeover. 
JEL-Codes: G34, G41. 
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Resumo 
 
O estudo realizado na presente dissertação tem como objetivo problematizar a 
possibilidade de uma correlação entre o (in)sucesso de uma aquisição e as características 
individuais de um Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). Procura-se, assim, perceber se 
determinadas características individuais (idade, os anos em função, formação académica, 
nacionalidade e género) de um CEO de uma empresa-alvo têm alguma influência numa 
maior ou menor disposição para resistir a uma tentativa de aquisição por parte de uma 
empresa adquirente. 
Este estudo mostra-se meritório pois permite perceber que algumas tentativas de aquisição 
por parte de uma empresa adquirente, em relação à empresa-alvo, não se concretizam 
devido a decisões pessoais do CEO dessa mesma empresa-alvo, significando que o 
conceito de mercados racionais pode ser cientificamente insuficiente para explicar certas 
ocorrências no mundo financeiro. Com efeito, fatores de ordem psicológica parecem 
desempenhar um papel fulcral na área de estudo das fusões e aquisições. Em termos 
práticos, existem evidências e padrões que provam um aumento da resistência a qualquer 
tipo de aquisição, dependendo, por exemplo, da idade do CEO, dos anos em que se 
encontra em funções, ou mesmo do seu género.  
De forma a alcançar uma resposta à problematização inicialmente colocada no presente 
estudo, foi estipulado um número limitado de hipóteses, baseadas em características 
individuais específicas, que foram, por sua vez, submetidas a testes estatísticos, usando-se, 
para tal, modelos de regressão binomial, anteriormente utilizados por estudos equiparáveis. 
Através de efetivas e potenciais aquisições ocorridas entre 2006 e 2016, com empresas 
Europeias como principais intervenientes, e cujas aquisições foram divididas em três 
cenários, foi possível concluir que, relativamente a uma maior ou menor resistência a 
tentativas de aquisições, a idade do CEO apresenta um comportamento curvilíneo, e os 
seus anos de mandato um comportamento decrescente. Ademais, um CEO homem tende a 
resistir menos vezes que um CEO feminino. 
Palavras-chave: Chief Executive Officer, Caraterísticas Individuais, Aquisições. 
JEL-Codes: G34, G41. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The international “Merger and Acquisitions” (“M&A”) market greatly impacts the world 
economy. Indeed, this is a topic with a great weight in the financial environment nowadays. 
More precisely, it also characterizes itself as a considerable variable in the performance of 
the international financial market, both in macroeconomic (ex., employment) and 
microeconomic (ex., prices) terms. On the other hand the impact in the international 
financial market demands a problematization to understand how it leads us to a possible 
success of many M&A transactions.  
A practical proof that the M&A field represents a great weight in the financial environment 
nowadays, as well as causing a huge impact in the world economy, is that the major 
international banking and consulting/auditing firms - unique pillar players in the financial 
system - have departments solely focused on merger and acquisitions transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to an empirical evidence, all of us can notice that the success or failure of many 
M&A transactions could not be explained by the rational reason of shareholders value 
maximization or, in other terms, by the assumptions that support the classical theory of 
efficient markets. 
Figure 1. Global M&A Activity (source: J.P. Morgan, Deologic and IMF GDP forecasts as of 
January 10th, 2017; M&A as a % of GDP is rounded to the nearest decimal)  
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Yet, this does not mean that the classical theory of efficient markets is wrong or it should 
be abolished. In spite of being the reason of many crises, the market must still be viewed as 
a self-corrected mechanism because it can correct its mistakes/errors. Nonetheless, we 
should be open to accept that the market can be inefficient in the short-term, on account 
of irrational decisions made by not fully rational agents. As Barberis and Thaler state 
“Behavioral finance (...) argues that some financial phenomena can be better understood 
using models in which some agents are not fully rational”. (2003:1053). 
Regarding stock market behavior in which there was no rational explanation to base the 
market price’s pattern, the Behavioral Finance steam has shown us that the market is not 
always efficient. This happens because the market was not absorbing all the information 
available. If it were efficient it would lead to “optimal” prices, i.e., to the market 
equilibrium. And, thus, we can verify the existence of these numerous errors or failures 
made by the market system on a regular basis. This also fits for any M&A possible 
transactions. 
Nowadays, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) among the many listed and unlisted 
companies is one of the most important economic agents, which exists in the financial 
market. His/Her profile may be an explanatory variable to understand some economic 
decisions.  
The human capability to make choices leads to the consequent logic of one path and one 
ending. We must be aware that choices have an opportunity cost, and thus we must decide 
in order to maximize our utility or wealth.  
Unfortunately many of our decisions are not rational. In fact, mostly of them follow 
emotional reasons. Like any other human/consumer/economic agent, a CEO can decide 
irrationally, but with a peculiarity: his/her choice or decision can affect the market in his 
whole, for better or for worst. 
There are many studies that have proposed some interesting conclusions regarding CEOs 
influence on a firm’s performance. For example, in reference to the research study lead by 
Quigley and Hambrick (2015), Frick (2014)1 regarded the interesting occurrence that is 
“known as the ‘CEO effect’, which is the portion of company performance that is 
associated with who’s in charge”. The conclusions state that the CEO of a company is a 
more significant predictor of that company’s performance than at any time since the mid-
                                                
1 Source: 
 https://hbr.org/2014/03/research-ceos-matter-more-today-than-ever-at-least-in-
america?referral=03759&cm_vc=rr_item_page.bottom (visited on 26/08/2018) 
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twentieth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quigley and Hambrick (2015) reached to these conclusions when pursuing the CEOs as 
the major representatives of a company, and consequently, they took the reins in a 
representative sample of the United States of America public companies. With this 
tracking, the authors proceeded to measure whether different CEOs presided over 
significantly different levels of performance, even after taking into account industry, firm, 
and year (accounting for macroeconomic changes). It was found evidence that CEOs 
performance have an impact on the average of three metrics: return on sales, return on 
assets, and market-to-book ratio (see Figure 2). In fact, the authors also compared the 
prediction capability between different periods of time:  
Figure 2. The Impact of U.S. CEOs Has Increased Over Time (source: “Has the ‘CEO’ effect increased in recent 
decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America’s attention to corporate leaders”, https://www.hbr.org) 
 4 
“In the period from 1950 to 1969, for instance, just knowing the industry a company 
was in predicted 38.7% of differences in performance. By contrast, from 1990 to 2009 
industry predicted only 3.7% of the difference. That gap is telling, and the authors see 
it as evidence that what has changed goes well beyond CEO leadership. A 
combination of forces (...) made business more dynamic and less predictable. It’s 
against that backdrop that CEOs have been empowered to pursue new strategies and 
markets, often across the globe. The result has been an increase in CEO impact”. 
(Frick, 2014)2. 
Moreover, a CEO cultural identity, or his/her nationality, can represent a supporting force 
to influence the management’s outcomes as Meyer (2015) states: 
 “…in today’s global economy you could be negotiating a joint venture in China, an 
outsourcing agreement in India (…), you might find yourself working with different 
norms of communication. What gets you to ‘yes’ in one culture gets you to ‘no’ in 
another”3. 
As we can see, there are works in which we may find interesting assumptions that can, in 
fact, present alternative explanations to economic decisions. Therefore, it can be said, that 
economic agents, like CEOs, with a high level of probability, can decide and make choices 
based on personal reasons instead of rational financial assumptions (e.g., wealth 
maximization). 
Regarding the work that will be presented here, those personal motivations could directly 
affect any M&A transaction, more precisely, the probability to resist or not resist a takeover 
attempt. Yet it is important to point out that there are already some studies that defend a 
correlation between some individual characteristics of a CEO and his/her willingness to 
resist any M&A attempts. 
In fact, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) found empirical evidence that the age of a CEO reflects 
direct influence on the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt. Their study claims that the 
higher the CEOs’ age is, namely the one of the target firm in an acquisition attempt, the 
more is the probability to happen a successful takeover bid, more precisely, higher when 
they reach the age of sixty-five.  
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) also state that the effect of CEOs’ age on takeover 
                                                
2 Source: https://hbr.org/2014/03/research-ceos-matter-more-today-than-ever-at-least-in-
america?referral=03759&cm_vc=rr_item_page.bottom (visited on 26/08/2018), referring to the work of 
Quigley and Hambrick (2015). 
3 Source: https://hbr.org/2015/12/getting-to-si-ja-oui-hai-and-da# (visited on 26/08/2018) 
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resistance is curvilinear. They have determined that takeover resistance increases with 
CEOs’ age until the age of fifty-six, where it reaches his maximum, and then starts to 
decrease (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, there are studies whose efforts found evidence that some companies 
acquisition activity (mostly characterized as takeovers) are highly influenced by the actions 
and the perceptions of the target firms’ CEOs (Graham et al., 2013; Shefrin, 2010), leading 
us to the conclusion that managerial motives rather than shareholder value maximization 
motives might be inherent in acquisition activities (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, there 
are some emotional and singular reasons somewhat attached with the choices the CEOs 
make, and consequently do not always correspond to the rational and efficient objective of 
wealth maximization of the firm they manage or of the individual interest of other 
economic agents, especially and particularly of the shareholders.  
Effectively the personality of the major senior executive of any company affects clearly the 
organizational performance of the Chief Executive Officer (Peterson et al., 2003). In other 
words, it clearly has a direct impact on the occurrence of any merger, acquisition or 
Figure 3. Effect of CEO's Age on the Likelihood to Resist a Takeover Attempt 
(Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994:570) 
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takeover attempt, considering his/her function in any company as Farkas and Wetlaufer 
(1996) stated: 
“The CEO’s job is like no other in the organization. It is infinite. Senior executives 
are, by definition, ultimately responsible for every decision and action of every 
member of the company, including those decisions and actions of which they are not 
aware”4. 
The fundamental difference between the proposal brought by this dissertation and the 
previous studies about this topic it is related with the variables submitted to statistical tests. 
Instead of analyzing compensation variables (e.g. golden parachutes, stock ownerships, 
etc.) as the major reason to justify the resistance by CEOs to takeover attempts and even to 
enhance their resistance due to certain individual characteristics, this dissertation only tests 
the effects of some individual characteristics on the likelihood to resist takeover attempts. 
Thus this work only focuses on a psychological approach, testing the effects that the age, 
tenure, academic background, nationality and gender of the target firm CEO could have on 
the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt, using the values referent to the deal as control 
variables.  
It can be said that this is straightforward to the field of behavioral finance, in which it 
assumes that there are irrational managers operating in efficient or inefficient markets 
(Baker & Nofsinger, 2010).  
This study will, thus, enhance and complement the literature, regarding M&A transactions, 
searching for a correlation between the individual characteristics of the target firms’ CEOs 
in a takeover attempt, and his/her likelihood to resist that takeover.  
Could it be that a CEO has more personal reasons instead of financial doubts to impeach 
an attempt of a takeover? There are already studies that defend that CEOs characteristics 
like age affect not only their general attitude but also their need for financial security and 
career perspective. As already stated here, we all know how important is the CEO’s role in 
modern companies. For this reason, the future of any firm is affect by the Chief Executive 
Officer behavior, which is directly connected to his/her individual characteristics, the ones 
that are the object of study here.  
It can be asked: does the utility (or willingness to resist) of a CEO (or the equivalent senior 
position) has any connection with the (un)success of some important takeovers, 
                                                
4 Source: https://hbr.org/1996/05/the-ways-chief-executive-officers-lead (visited on 26/08/2018) 
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acquisitions or other kind of transactions? Do some individual characteristics lead to a 
higher or lower resistance to takeover attempts? 
There is little empirical evidence that can support this last question. Thus, considering that 
there is a gap of literature regarding the effects that specific CEOs profiles may have on the 
success of a M&A transaction, this research wants to be both an extension of prior studies, 
and also a groundwork for future ones, representing a key contribution for this subject. 
This study focuses on the particular question: will specific characteristics of a CEO have 
any influence on the probability that he/she will have a higher or lower willingness to resist 
any takeover attempt? To answer this question this dissertation explores selected 
characteristics (age, tenure, academic background, nationality, culture and gender) of the 
CEOs from the target firm in a takeover attempt as the explanatory variables of a higher or 
lower resistance to takeover attempts. 
Analyzing individual characteristics of the target firms’ CEOs as the main variables to 
explain a higher or lower resistance to a takeover attempt, we try to find answers to fill 
some gaps which domain the treatment of this aspect in the current literature. 
Additionally, it will be possible to justify that some M&A transactions may fail because 
there are psychological and individual reasons which play an important role, thus 
enhancing the fact that some decisions and transactions made in the financial world are 
based on irrational motives, which may justify why the market is not always efficient. 
In order to accomplish what was stated, this dissertation will be divided in four major 
sections: Section 2 will present a literature review; Section 3 will present the data and 
methodology that will be used for the treatment of our data; Section 4 will present the 
results of our research, and Section 5 the conclusions or a summary of the main findings. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This section covers the previous studies, the main theories and definitions, which regard 
this same field as this dissertation, namely the higher or lower likelihood that the CEO of a 
target firm will resist a takeover attempt based in his/her profile.  
2.1. Overview 
This dissertation is not focused in the study of assumptions to sustain the behavioral 
finance stream. In spite of explaining that many financial phenomenon occur due to 
psychological motives of the economic agents, it is a good starting point to argue that some 
M&A acquisitions may go or not go ahead because of the target firms CEOs profiles.  
The studies lead by Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Kilian and Schindler (2014) play an 
important role in this dissertation due to their two major conclusions: specific CEO 
characteristics influence short-term M&A performance, and non-value creation of 
acquisitions might be explained by the overconfident behavior of CEOs. 
These previous studies reached conclusions that established a pattern between some CEOs 
individual characteristics and their willingness to resist a takeover attempt. Thus, it has 
been reached a clear defiance to the classical finance theory, because they justify the 
success or failure of some M&A transactions based in explanations in addition to the 
logical and expected reason of wealth maximization. In simpler terms, there are some 
decisions affected by psychological factors that can lead to different outputs in the 
decision-making process (Ritter, 2003), i.e., outputs based on rational or irrational 
decisions.  
The two works presented above were a fundamental key in the search for good 
bibliographical source and to find out what kind of methodology should be followed here. 
Considering that those research’s studies reveal a level of correlation between individual 
characteristic of a CEO (or equivalent top senior manager) and the performance or 
occurrence of M&A transactions. 
The major difference of this research study, comparing the previous ones, will consist on 
four major aspects: 
• Individual characteristics of the target firm’s CEO in analysis; 
• Non-addressing any attention to compensation variables; 
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• Different data (geographical area and period of time); 
• Purpose, i.e., to find a connection between selected individual characteristics of the 
CEO and the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt. 
The following subsection will describe the main relevant definitions, theories/models and 
the principal similar studies, related to the theme of the present dissertation. This will allow 
a critical analysis of the literature reviewed and the construction of our hypothesis that will 
be tested and analyzed in order to show the existence of a connection between the 
individual characteristics of the target firms’ CEOs and their willingness to resist a takeover 
attempt. 
2.2. Relevant Concepts 
This study will try to test hypothesis that connect certain characteristics of the profile of a 
CEO, particularly of the target firm in a takeover process, which reduce the likelihood to 
conclude or fulfill the agreement proposed from one part (the acquirer) to the other (the 
target). 
Kilian and Schindler (2014) made a summary of the many previous researchers that 
focused on individual CEO characteristics and their influence on M&A activities and M&A 
performance (Aktas et al., 2007; Ferris et al., 2013; Levi et al., 2010; Malmendier & Tate, 
2005; Yim, 2013). However, they underline, just as it was mentioned before, that the 
existing studies present a lack of important references, i.e., former studies are limited on 
certain aspects: 
• They use CEO characteristics as control variables or only focus in one individual 
characteristic (Lucey et al., 2013; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Yim, 2013); 
• They only focus on influences of CEO characteristics on M&A decisions in the North 
American or United Kingdom market (Aktas et al., 2007; Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994; 
Jenter & Lewellen, 2015; Kilian & Schindler, 2014; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008); 
• They do not consider crisis periods, like the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, 
leading to a non-consideration of the possible impacts that might have on the extent 
the CEO characteristics affect M&A deals (Ferris et al., 2013; Yim, 2013). 
In order to solve one of these gaps in the research literature it is necessary to understand 
some main definitions or concepts that are related to the present research study: 
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“Decision-Making Process”, “Value Creation of M&As”, “Role of a CEO” and 
“Takeovers”. 
2.2.1. Decision-Making Process 
Fama (1980) accents that the “separation of security ownership and control can be 
explained as an efficient form of economic organization within the ‘set of contracts’ 
perspective” (289). A firm is disciplined by the fierce competition laid down by other firms 
present in the market, forcing the creation of mechanism that provide a valuable evaluation 
of the management team performance, and of each individual member. A manager must 
booth looking for the opportunities offered by the market and the discipline intrinsic to the 
same (within his firm and outside the same). Nonetheless, every senior executive must, 
above all, represent the interest of the company’s shareholder. 
Decision-Making Process is simply a problem-solving activity, where the CEO, who makes 
the choices and collects data and information, studies the diversified possibilities in order 
to reach a solution. However, due to the fact that takeovers can be seen as individual 
decisions, the psychological domain of an individual must not be neglected in the decision-
making process when looking for reasons to the non-value creation of an M&A transaction 
(Roll, 1986). 
The CEO is ultimately the one who has the last word, and it can have different forms of 
strategic decision-making. It could be the only one to decide or need the approval of others 
in order to reach a rational and beneficial solution for all (Arendt et al., 2005). 
The more influences the firm and managers are open to, the more different will be the 
consequences which result from the decision-taking process (Isen & Means, 1983). 
Papadakis et al. (1998) studied the influence of the types of Decision-Making on certain 
aspects like rationality, pointing out that decision-specific characteristics and the internal 
context of a firm influence the rationality of the decisions made by the CEO or by the top 
managers. In other words, the behavior of a CEO or a top manager could alter their 
behavior due to the possibility of changes in the context of the firm, eventually leading to 
specific conduct, when facing an eventual attempt of takeover.  
Papadakis and Barwise (2002) have studied to what extent the CEO and the top-
management teams influence the making of strategic decisions. By referring to the studies 
lead by Lewin and Stephens (1994) and Rajagopalan et al. (1993), Papadakis and Barwise 
assert that “two important themes of strategy research over the last (...) years have been the 
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(...) the role of top management (...) [and] the process of making strategic decisions” (83), 
even though there is little empirical work that links these two themes. They concluded 
about the existence of grounded evidence that the CEOs and top-management teams’ 
characteristics would indeed affect strategic Decision-Making “over and above the 
influence of a broader context (external environment, firm, size, decision’s characteristics 
etc.)” (90).  
2.2.2. Role of a CEO 
The role of a CEO in any firm has increased and modified along the years. A CEO is, 
indeed, the major responsible for leading the development and execution of the company’s 
long term strategy with the ultimate goal to create shareholder value, being today the major 
asset that a company can have.  
The CEO has not only one role, but in fact multiple ones that must be connected, obliging 
the CEO to make them work at the same time - they all must be tuned to each other.  
The CEO is like the maestro of an orchestra it is the major responsible for the 
functionality of the employees social network without existing conflicts, the main image of 
the firm, the one that must adapt the firm to the external environment and focus on the 
management of internal operations (Zuckerman, 1989). 
There is strong evidence that top managers power play a fundamental role in strategic 
decision-making (Finkelstein, 1992). Focusing in the present research, variables like CEO’s 
age, tenure, level of education, or even companies of different industries, have, in fact, a 
profound influence in the decisions taken by the CEO or the manager, thus leading to a 
complexion of the decision-taking process (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hitt & Tyler, 
1991). 
Gong and Guo (2014) state that the more power a CEO wields in a firm, the more likely 
the M&A decisions will reflect the CEO’s preference, rather than the interest of the 
shareholders (or their representatives). However, and in the M&A context, a high visible 
major failure in an acquisition can even potentially endanger the position of entrenched 
CEOs (Lehn & Zhao, 2006), thus leading powerful CEOs to avoid risky acquisitions in 
order to protect their jobs, future compensation, and other private benefits.  
Moreover, Lehn and Zhao (2006) concluded that firms with powerful CEOs are less likely 
to announce any type of deals, and, by contrast, firms with less powerful CEOs (stronger 
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management boards) are more likely to announce deals with large synergistic gains and 
losses. Powerful CEOs prefer a “quiet life” (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). 
2.2.3. Value Creation of M&A 
Alexandridis et al. (2017) states that M&A deals create more value for acquiring firm 
shareholders post-2009 than ever before (see Figure 4).  
Bösecke (2009) says mergers can be viewed first of all as a result of rational choice. 
Management decides to undertake an acquisition in order to increase company value (to act 
in the interests of shareholders) or to increase their’ own utility (deviating from 
shareholders’ interests). The theories dealing with shareholders’ gains can be distinguished 
according to the postulated source of merger gains. 
Mergers and Acquisitions can be seen as a market control mechanism because companies 
where resources are not used efficiently are likely to be a takeover target. This guarantees 
that major departures from maximization of shareholder wealth are only temporarily and 
will be solved by the market and management teams, competing for the rights to manage 
the company’s resources (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Masulis et al., 2007). 
Kilian and Schindler (2014) summarized numerous studies regarding value creation on 
M&A. They found that, on average, acquisitions do not create substantial value for 
acquirer’s shareholders. Besides the inefficient use of companies’ resources, additional 
factors have to be identified in order to explain the result of M&A deals worldwide. 
As Gong and Guo (2014) state in their abstract to “CEO Power and Merger Acquisitions”, 
“(...) CEO power in acquiring firms can explain the occurrence of both large value creation 
and destruction deals in M&A”. On the other hand, they go on stating that “(...) the more 
power a CEO wields in a firm, the more likely the M&A decisions will reflect the CEO’s 
preferences rather than that of the shareholders (or their representatives, the board of 
directors)” (1). They also concluded that firms with powerful CEOs make fewer deals and 
the returns are less dispersed. Firms with powerful CEOs are also less likely to do all cash 
deals, and they use, instead, a larger proportion of stocks as payment. 
As Gong and Guo (2014) very well pointed out, managerial actions, which are taken to 
decrease the probability of takeovers (i.e., implementation of antitakeover strategies, 
standstill agreements and targeted block repurchases), lead to negative abnormal stock 
returns (Gompers et al., 2003; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Masulis et al., 2007; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
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Figure 4. Number & Value of M&A Worldwide (source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances 
(IMAA)5) 
 
 
2.2.4. Takeover 
DePamphilis (2009) states that a takeover may be viewed as a process or an M&A 
transaction regarding a firm’s operational restructuring, and can be divided into two kinds: 
friendly takeover of control, when the target’s board and management are receptive to the 
idea and recommend shareholder approval, and hostile takeover that occurs when the 
initial approach was unsolicited or the target was not seeking a M&A process at that time.  
Along with the process of takeover comes the definition of tender offer, which is an offer 
to buy shares in another firm, usually for cash, securities, or both. In fact, after 
understanding the meaning of tender offer, we were able to collect the acquisitions, which 
were used as the data sample to test the statistical importance of the hypothesis that are the 
aim of analysis in this dissertation. 
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) distinguished the definition of takeovers between two 
different views: empirical and theoretical. Empirical studies viewed takeovers as a 
homogeneous phenomenon. Theorists defended that the role of a CEO (or equivalents) is 
to respect the desire of the shareholders, and must not resist a takeover attempt if these last 
ones do not desire it (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981). The contrary can be seen as 
managerial opportunistic behavior. Nonetheless, a possible resistance of the CEO or the 
                                                
5 Source: https://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/ (visited on 26/08/2018) 
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management board, cannot be seen as opportunism, but as the best interest of the firm’s 
shareholders (Turk, 1992). 
The point here is that a CEO behavior, and according to his/her specific individual 
characteristics, can indeed change the decisions and acceptance of important deals, for 
better or worse. 
2.3. Main Theories 
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) explained that the concept of takeover resistance could be 
viewed according to two perspectives: an “Upper Echelons Theory” view or an “Agency 
Theory” view. Agency problems arise when the desires of managers differ from the desires 
of firm’s shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). The “Upper Echelons Theory” suggests that the 
strategic decision-making of CEOs (or similar top management positions) is based on 
rational analysis or on idiosyncratic preferences that steam from their profile (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). 
In fact, Kilian and Schindler (2014) state that “CEOs are likely to crucially influence M&A 
activities and specifically, short-term M&A performance” (p. 4), and that “decisions made 
by managers are likely to have a large impact on the company’s performance and 
profitability depending on their degree of influence on corporate decision-making (...), 
[meaning that] the more power a CEO has in this process, the less objective is his/her 
judgment scope regarding corporate decision-making” (6-7). Appropriating the works lead 
by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Jensen (1986), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Roll (1986) and 
Tricker (2012), Killian and Schindler constructed an interesting theoretical framework for 
their research. These authors affirm that both individual managers and CEOs often play a 
significant role in corporate decision-making processes.  
This dissertation adapts the framework constructed by Killian and Schindler, in order to 
present an overall perspective of the research study and its linkages (see Figure 5). 
There are some theories that influence our research, due to their explanation regarding the 
connection between a CEO profile and any type of an M&A deal, namely “Agency 
Theory”, “Hubris Theory and Managerial Overconfidence”, “Upper Echelons Theory”, 
“Management Entrenchment Theory” and “Shareholders Interest Theory”. 
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Figure 5. Conceptual Guidance Framework of this Dissertation (based on Killian and Schindler, 2014) 
 
 
2.3.1. Agency Theory 
When we refer to the Agency Theory we are addressing to the problems which come upon 
when the shareholders’ interests do not coincide with the ones of the management (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), and, in particular, with the CEOs desire and vision.  
This comes along with the competition for market control. There are studies claiming hard 
to find managerial actions that can negatively affect the interest of shareholders (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). But this does not for itself show the existence of passive CEOs on takeover 
attempts, and it is important questioning if a CEO profile may indeed affect the path of a 
company.  
An agency problem arises in this research because of interest conflicts, and turns the 
attention mainly to the forms to prevent takeovers. Defensive measures, like golden 
parachutes or stock ownership, should function as mechanisms to lessen the likelihood of 
resistance on takeover attempts (Lambert & Larcker, 1985).  
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) defended that there is no clear evidence that golden 
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parachutes affect the resistance of takeovers. In contrast, CEOs stock ownership had some 
weight on lowering the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt.  
However, agency problems can be reduce by aligning shareholders and management 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The more the stock hold, the more similar the interest 
will be, meaning that there is no need for further incentives like golden parachutes (Wade 
et al., 1990). Not only management, represented by the CEOs, are less likely to resist 
takeover attempts, but also have a lower desire to engage in conglomerate acquisitions that 
could increase their managerial power (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
2.3.2. Hubris Theory 
“Hubris Theory” was defined firstly by Heaton (1997), as a description of a personal 
quality of extreme pride or overconfidence. This theory can be seen as an alternative view 
for the “Agency Theory” of corporate finance, allowing an explanation for a CEO’s 
behavior in a M&A decision-making. Considering the behavior of any CEO the decision-
making process will differ. Thus, each CEO, with his/her unique profiles, can take 
decisions or actions that are not always rational and can affect the company they manage.  
Hubris can also be caused when the CEO believes that he/she is acting according with the 
interest of shareholders but overestimates his/her abilities to value the target correctly as 
well as the potential synergies, and underestimating the risk associated with the acquisition 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Shefrin, 2005).  
Furthermore, overconfidence is often accompanied by excessive optimism, meaning that 
managers overestimate the possibility of experiencing favorable outcomes and 
underestimate the likelihood of facing unfavorable outcomes (Shefrin, 2005). 
As a consequence, overconfident managers are more likely to pursue and complete 
acquisitions as well as engage in diversifying mergers compared to rational CEOs (Doukas 
& Petmezas, 2007; Kolasinski & Li, 2013; Shefrin, 2005). However, empirical evidence 
suggests that overconfident CEOs materialize lower announcement returns and poor long-
term performances compared to acquisitions undertaken by rational CEOs (Doukas & 
Petmezas, 2007; Kolasinski & Li, 2013). On the other hand, Kaplan et al. (2012) emphasize 
that better overall performance of companies is positively related to a CEO’s resoluteness 
and overconfidence.  
Moreover, Kilian and Schindler (2014) suggest that CEO’s overconfidence might increase 
during his/her life due to the self-attribution bias, i.e., higher age means higher 
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overconfidence. This bias describes the tendency of CEOs to take the credit for successful 
acquisitions and deny taking (personal) responsibility for failures, enhancing the confidence 
about their abilities over time (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Shefrin, 2005).  
Although we can take studies that advocate that managerial over-optimism can improve 
firm’s welfare (specifically, firms’ profitability and market value), and it can emerge 
dynamically in a rational economic framework, other studies defend the contrary.  
Baker and Nofsinger (2010) bring up an all set of works that endorse the idea that 
managerial overconfidence has nothing to do with any creation of value, or even any 
positive effect on an M&A deal.  
Roll (1986) said that bidder managers are influenced by “hubris” and are overoptimistic 
about deal synergies, and the evidences of his studies support the hubris hypothesis as 
much as other explanations such as taxes, synergy, and inefficient target management, 
when regarding mergers and tender offers.  
Other researchers present cases in which hubris or overconfidence explain some takeovers 
(Aktas et al., 2007; Hietala et al., 2003; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). For example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), under an empirical point of view, concluded that 
overconfident managers complete more acquisitions. This happens more frequently when 
they have access to internal financing and when the merger is diversifying. Nonetheless, 
this has driven the market to react negatively when those bids are made, i.e., when more 
acquisitions or attempts of acquisitions are made, the market always reacted badly. 
Other studies, like the one of Goel and Thakor (2010), went even further, suggesting that a 
bidder CEOs’ envy causes merger waves which result from the CEO compensation 
increases based on firm’s size (and any M&A deal will lead to larger firm size). This means 
that envy can cause merger waves even in the absence of real economic shocks or market 
misevaluation. 
Indeed, the behavior of any CEO, where we include a possible managerial overconfidence, 
can, in fact, threat corporate activities. There are studies, which are supported by empirical 
evidence, that suggest that CEO’s behavior threat a wide range of corporate decisions, 
including M&A (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). Depending on the profile of each CEO (like 
age, culture, etc.), he/she will be more or less confident to resist a takeover attempt. 
2.3.3. Upper Echelons Theory 
The “Upper Echelons Theory” states that a firm’s decision-making process may be 
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significantly affected by the individual characteristics of their executives. This implies that 
actions and decisions are, on the one hand, not based only on rational reasons, and on the 
other, they are affected by individual characteristics, leading to an axiomatic evidence of a 
company, which in this way reflects its CEO or its top manager(s) (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). 
In fact, as Papadakis and Barwise (2002) stated, since the work of Hambrick and Mason 
(1984), a lot of emphasis “(...) has been placed on the influence of top management on 
corporate strategy, innovation, performance, organizational structure and planning 
formality” (83). 
A CEO’s firm may try to construct the path and the image of the firm based on their own 
self-portrait, which leads to information asymmetry and to act an opportunistic action 
against shareholders interest, only to protect their work and position.  
Herman and Smith (2015) stated that CEOs, top managers or management teams 
members’ characteristics, including past experiences, values, and personalities, affect the 
way they make strategic and organizational decisions.  
Ultimately, the age of the CEOs is in complete connection with this theory, and in many 
aspects it can take the problems and paths that arise: corporate growth (Child, 1974), 
strategic decisions (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), the job mobility along active life (Veiga, 
1983), psychological attachment (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Stevens et al., 1978) among 
other factors and reasons studied by diverse academics. 
2.3.4. Management Entrenchment Theory 
This theory suggests that managers use a variety of takeover defenses (like golden 
parachutes or poison pills) to ensure they can stay more time in their position (i.e., an 
higher tenure). Hostile takeovers are the main reason to the creation of these defensive 
measures, instruments or strategies, used by the target firms’ CEOs when there is a 
takeover attempt. In fact, financial incentives that result from defensive measures 
encourage CEOs or managers to resist takeover attempts. The implementation of these 
defensive measures can be associated to CEOs and managers individual characteristics.  
CEOs and managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments, 
making them expansive to replace. These same actions derive from managerial behavior 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), and consequently are linked to the CEOs and Managers 
individual characteristics.  
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Younger and recently appointed CEOs are given golden parachutes in order to maintain 
their loyalty to the firm, and as a compensation for the risk taking for accepting this new 
position.  
These instruments and the threat of a takeover attempt also played a useful role in 
maintaining good corporate governance by removing bad managers and installing better 
ones, which covers all ages (Morck et al., 1988). 
2.3.5. Shareholders Interest Theory 
The Agency Theory points out for the same target as the Shareholders Interest Theory. It 
suggests that management resistance to proposed takeovers may be a good bargaining 
strategy to increase the purchase price to the benefit of the target firm’s shareholders 
(Franks & Mayer, 1996; Schwert, 2000). Of course, this may be affected by age: the near 
the age to retirement, the lower or no resistance there will be, leading to the possibility of 
lower price deals. 
2.4. Similar Research 
There are already some interesting studies regarding this topic here. Some of them will be 
very synthetically explained, namely the most important. 
 
Table 1. Previous Studies that Concluded about the Influence of CEOs’ Age, CEOs’ Tenure and CEOs’ 
Academic Background on M&A 
Authors 
(years) Methods Dependent Variables Independent Variables Sample Period 
Jenter and 
Lewellen 
(2015) 
Multiple 
Regression 
- Bid announcement 
return; 
- Takeover premium; 
- Price Run-Ups before 
the First Bid 
Announcement; 
- Acquirer Gains. 
- CEO age; 
- CEO tenure; 
- CEO retirement age; 
- Hostile offer; 
- Tender offer; 
- Etc. 
- Firms form the United 
States; 
- Names and ages of the 
CEOs retrieved from 
“Compustat Research 
Insight”; 
- Firms with at least $10 
million in book assets; 
- Acquisition data come 
from “Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database”. 
1989-2007 
Kilian and 
Schindler 
(2014) 
Multiple 
Regression 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) observed 
over a three-day event 
window around the 
acquisition 
announcement date. 
- Age of the CEO at the 
announcement date of the 
acquisition; 
- Tenure of the CEO holds 
until the announcement of 
an M&A; 
- CEO has executed three 
or more acquisitions in the 
ten-year sample period; 
- CEO has a business and a 
technical educational 
background; 
- Board positions of a CEO 
in other companies; 
- Previous CEO experience 
- M&A deals obtain from 
“Thomson Reuters 
Eikon”; 
- Firm-specific control 
variables for each 
company obtain from 
“S&P Capital IQ”; 
- Acquirer’s return data 
over a three-day window 
around the acquisition 
announcement date and 
the market returns for the 
FTSE-All Share Index 
obtain from “Thomson 
Reuters Datastream”. 
2004-2013 
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Serfling 
(2014) 
Multiple 
Regression 
- Firm R&D expenses 
divided by book value of 
assets; 
- Operating leverage; 
- Book leverage; 
- Segment sales-based 
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index; 
- Natural logarithm of the 
number of segments in 
which the firm operates; 
- Ratio of the number of 
diversifying acquisitions 
made to the total number 
of acquisitions made 
during a fiscal year; 
- Ratio of the dollar 
amount spent on 
diversifying acquisitions 
to the dollar amount 
spent on all acquisitions 
during a fiscal year  
- Total risk, Idiosyncratic 
risk, and R&D Intensity; 
- Segment HHI; 
-Number of Segments; 
CEO's total portfolio 
vega, and CEO's vega of 
options granted during 
the fiscal year, CEO's age, 
etc. 
- CEO Age; 
- Young CEO & Old 
Executive; 
- Old CEO & Young 
Executive;  
- Old CEO & Old 
Executive; 
- Successor is Younger; 
- Successor is Much 
Younger; 
- New CEO is Younger; 
- Etc. 
- Financial statement data 
from the “Compustat” 
files; 
- Stock return data from 
the “Center for Research 
in Security Prices” 
(CRSP); 
- Files, and institutional 
ownership data from 
“Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings 
(13F) Database” 
- 20.973 firm-years, 2.356 
unique firms, and 4.493 
unique CEOs.  
1992-2010 
Yim (2013) Multiple Regression 
- CEO leaves office for 
any reason excluding 
death; 
- Firm announces an 
acquisition whose deal 
value exceeds 5% of the 
firm’s market 
capitalization; 
- CEO compensation. 
- CEO age; 
- CEO tenure;  
Log (assets); 
Prior year returns;  
ROA. 
- CEOs and the 
acquisitions that they 
announce retrieved from 
“ExecuComp”;  
- 9.219 observations and 
respective CEOs. 
1992-2007 
Buchholtz 
and Ribbens 
(1994) 
Multiple 
Regression 
Resistance to a takeover 
attempt 
- Golden Parachute 
existence; 
- CEO stock ownership; 
- CEO age; 
- CEO tenure; 
- Interaction between 
golden parachute existence 
and stock ownership. 
406 firms submitted to a 
tender offer, for the north 
American market using 
sata from “Mergerstat”. 
1986-1989 
Hill and Phan 
(1991)  
Multiple 
Regression 
Change in CEO 
compensation: change in 
deflated cash 
compensation and 
absolute deflated cash 
compensation 
- Change in pay; 
- Pay; 
- Size; 
- Abnormal Returns; 
- Risk; 
- Tenure; 
- Industry Average 
- Total cash 
compensation paid to the 
CEOs of firms included 
in a survey of executive 
compensation conducted 
by Forbes magazine; 
- 104 firms from seven 
industries 
1977-1988 
Hitt and Tyler 
(1991) 
Multiple 
Regression Acquisition decisions 
- Industry; 
- Age; 
- Type od education; 
- Level of education; 
- Amount of work 
experience; 
- Etc. 
Survey instrument mailed 
to 122 top executives 
(chosen randomly using a 
random-number 
generator from a list of 
950 top executives in the 
southwest United States)  
1991 
 
Age has already been discussed as a variable that can explain increases in the probability of 
CEOs of target firms to resist takeover attempts. There are studies that have concluded 
about the existence of a curvilinear behavior in the age of a CEO (see Figure 1 in Section 
1): on the one hand, as the age goes up the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt increases, 
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on the other, when it is near retirement age the likelihood to resist a takeover attempt starts 
to decrease. Moreover, age has influence on risk-taking, strategic decisions, having more or 
less financial incentives, among other aspects.  
Regarding tenure, previous studies could not found relevant evidence that suggest any 
correlation between CEOs tenure and higher or lower willingness to resist a takeover 
attempt. Nevertheless, it can be considered a variable that explains the increasing influence 
power of a CEO: his/her power increases along with his/her tenure. 
Jenter and Lewellen (2015) studied the impact of target CEOs retirement preferences on 
the frequency and pricing of takeover bids. Most target CEOs careers suffer when their 
firms are acquired, and if incentive pay does not fully compensate CEOs for their private 
costs, any takeover decisions from the target firm can be distorted. Consistent with the 
private merger costs hypothesis, they have shown that takeovers are substantially more 
frequent for target firms CEOs close to age sixty-five. This is due to a discrete drop in 
CEOs private merger costs around age sixty-five, caused by the same preference shift that 
also underlies the age sixty-five.  
Kilian and Schindler (2014) stated that different CEO characteristics/personal aspects 
influence short-term M&A performance. By analyzing the acquisition announcements of 
companies of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 share index (focus their set on 
FTSE 100 companies which act as a buyer in an M&A transaction)
 
in the United Kingdom 
within the period from 2004 to 2013, they have found that CEO characteristics have a 
crucial influence on short-term M&A performance. In fact, they have found that “(...) 
young CEOs have significantly weaker short-term performances then acquisitions 
undertaken by older CEOs” (p. 56). In contrast, “(...) acquisitions undertaken by long-
tenured CEOs are negatively perceived by the stock market whereas the overall tenure of a 
CEO in a company has a positive (...) effect” (p. 56). Serfling (2014) reached very 
interesting conclusions, allowing us to state that CEOs age has an impact on his/her risk-
taking behavior. The most important conclusions were:  
• Risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs age; 
• Older CEOs invest less in R&D and in manage firms with more diversified operations; 
• Firms award older (younger) CEOs less (more) risk-taking incentives and that less 
(more) risky firms tend to hire older (younger) CEOs.  
Yim (2013) documented that a firms’ acquisition propensity is decreasing in the age of its 
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CEO: a firm with a CEO who is 20 years older is 30% less likely to announce an 
acquisition. 
Using a logistic regression analysis and recurring to seven control variables (firm size, firm 
performance, premium, stock concentration, institutional stock ownership, proportion of 
outsiders on board, and directors’ stock ownership), Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) 
stressed some interesting evidences: 
• Golden parachutes do not have significant effect on the likelihood that a target firm 
will resist a tender offer; 
• The more stock a CEO holds the lesser will be his/her likelihood to resist a takeover 
attempt; 
• There is no evidence that golden parachutes and CEOs stock ownership interact, in 
order to affect target firms resistance to takeover attempts; 
• The effect of CEO age on takeover resistance is curvilinear increasing until the age of 
fifty-six, starting to decreasing from that age; 
• There is no evidence that the length of CEOs tenure in a position affects takeover 
resistance. 
Other studies have also analyzed the influence of CEOs and managers’ age and tenure on 
different topics. Hill and Phan (1991) suggest that tenure has influence on the strength of 
the relationship between absolute pay and firm size, absolute pay and firm risk, and 
changes in pay and stock returns. Hitt and Tyler (1991) strategic decision models vary 
according to industry and executive characteristics of age, educational degree type, amount 
and type of work experience. 
Additionally, it can be said that every CEOs academic background, either his/her level of 
education or subject of specialization, has influence on M&A deals decisions. Definitely a 
CEO with no qualifications could have a less/higher resistance to a takeover attempt then 
a CEO with any kind or level of qualifications.  
Furthermore, cultural differences have a positive or negative impact on M&A performance 
depending on the outcome. Examples of outcome are the capacity of the CEOs to manage 
cultural differences and their own culture/nationality, which can result in a major factor of 
impact in the performance of a company. Clearly, this will affect the outcome of a M&A 
process, and particularly the outcome of a takeover. 
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Table 2. Previous Studies that Concluded about the Influence of CEOs’ Cultural Aspects on M&A 
Authors 
(years) Methods Dependent Variables Independent Variables Sample Period 
Tosi and 
Greckhamer 
(2004) 
Multiple 
Regression 
- CEO total pay (TC), 
indicative of the average total 
wealth that the CEO obtains 
from a firm in each culture; 
- Ratio of CEO pay to the 
lowest level employees 
(CEO/Worker), measure of 
the extent to which 
performance risk is transferred 
to the CEO; 
- The ratio of CEO pay to the 
lowest level employees 
(CEO/Worker), being an 
indicator of pay inequality. 
- Power distance; 
- Uncertainty avoidance; 
- Individualism-collectivism; 
- Masculinity-femininity. 
23 countries 
comprising 115 data 
points 
1997-2001 
 
Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) examined how cultural values are related to different elements 
of CEO compensation in different countries. The data for the dependent variables were 
obtained from the Towers Perrin Worldwide Total Remuneration Reports for the period 
of 1997–2001. These authors were interested in the relationship between the cultural values 
and the CEO compensation. Once Tosi and Greckhamer controlled macroeconomic 
variables and other variables, which represent proxies for corporate governance and may 
be related to CEO compensation, they concluded that cultural dimensions can contribute 
to understand cross-national CEO compensation. Nevertheless, particular forms of CEO 
compensation do not mean the same thing in different cultures, but rather carry different 
symbolic connotations depending on the dominant values in a society. 
Additionally (not mentioned in table 2), Stahl and Voight (2004) concluded that, whether 
cultural differences have a positive or negative impact, M&A performance depends on the 
outcome variable under investigation, namely the nature and extent of cultural differences, 
the integration approach taken, and the interventions chosen to manage cultural 
differences. In order to reach this conclusion, they had stock market-based performance 
measures, accounting-based measures and social-cultural integration outcomes, as 
dependent variables for a sample of 8.993 M&A deals. The observations occurred between 
1970 and 2002. 
As stated before, managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment 
distortions because managers overestimate the returns of their investment projects.  
There are studies suggesting that overconfidence matters more in firms which are equity 
dependent, leading to the need of the board of directors to employ alternative disciplinary 
measures, such as debt overhang, and which can suffice to constrain overconfident CEOs 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
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Table 3. Previous Studies that Concluded about the Influence of Behavioral Bias on M&A 
Authors 
(years) Methods Dependent Variables Independent Variables Sample Period 
Croci et al. 
(2012) 
Multiple 
Regression 
- Log of the total CEO 
compensation, which is 
measured by the sum of 
the cash compensation;  
-  Structure of CEO pay, 
and it is measured as the 
ratio of equity-based 
compensation to total 
compensation  
 
- Family control; 
- Firm performance; 
- Corporate Governance; 
- CEO compensation 
- CEO compensation 
data for Continental 
European firms from 
“BoardEx”; 
- Ownership data obtain 
from the “Thomson One 
Banker Ownership” 
module; 
- Financial drawn from 
“Datastream” / 
“Worldscope”; 
- 754 listed firms with 
3731 firm-year 
observations from 14 
countries 
2001-2009 
Long and 
Walkling 
(1984) 
Multiple 
Regression Managerial Resistance 
- Bid Premium; 
- Bid induced increments in 
existing share and option 
wealth; 
- Conglomerate; 
- Controlled company; 
- Etc. 
105 tender offers resisted 
on the Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
1972-1977 
 
Thus, the background history of M&A deals, in which a specific CEO was involved, can 
indeed lead to patterns in regarding its characteristics. 
This enhances the assumption that the strategic decisions made by top executives or CEOs 
are based not only on rational decisions but can also stem from their “heads”. 
Furthermore, the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are undoubtedly 
a proof that a CEOs way of thinking leads to more or less agency problems, leading this, 
consequently, to a market for corporate control (Coffee, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983). 
There is a relationship between managerial actions and bid premium size, bidder 
nationality, conglomerate offers, among others aspects. It is a fact that the stock owned by 
executives has an empirical proven influence on the lower likelihood to resist takeover 
attempts. 
2.5. Critical Analysis of the Literature Review 
In the last years, some interesting studies with relevant information and conclusions have 
been published. Nonetheless, the hypotheses that will be tested in the present research 
have been only partially analyzed by previous studies (namely, age and tenure).  
There are few researches that focus their aim on the European market. Furthermore, they 
majorly concentrated on financial incentives or quantitative measurable variables, rather 
then in specific individual characteristics in order to find variables that can affect the 
decision-making process and the higher or lower willingness of target firms’ CEOs to resist 
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takeover attempts.  
Nowadays there is still a lack of studies, which result in an empirical evidence of behavioral 
aspects that can influence economic agents, like the CEOs, that could explain certain 
processes or transactions that happened throughout history.  
Characteristics like a CEOs’ age, tenure, nationality, academic background and gender, 
have, in fact, something to do with the willingness to resist a takeover attempt, leading 
consequently, for example, to the failure of many M&A transactions or changes in the 
strategic course of a company.  
In turn, the cultural difference impact (where nationality and academic background can be 
considered as cultural and social status aspects) cannot be solely addressed after the 
transactions are successfully concluded. The merger between Daimler and Chrysler, for 
example, did not work out because of cultural aspects. Nonetheless, could it be that by 
analyzing and studying evidences that address the role of the leader who takes the decisions 
in a company, we would conclude about the impact of the leader decisions in the success 
of any M&A transaction? Clearly, this addresses the job of the CEO. 
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3. Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
 
This section starts with the formulation of the hypotheses that will be later submitted to 
statistical analysis. Additionally, an analysis of previous similar studies that have great 
relevance to this research will be made, which, in turn, will allow us to construct and 
explain the methodology used in this dissertation. On a last topic, the data used in this 
dissertation will be explained (the database, the sample chosen, the criteria for our sample, 
and the source of our data). 
3.1. Hypotheses  
As a result, and based upon the literature review, some studies found evidence of the 
likelihood to resist a takeover attempt due to a CEO profile (according with some pre-
defined characteristics). However, in order to fill the gap in the literature, this dissertation 
defines five different hypotheses to test:  
• Hypothesis 1: The likelihood to a target firm’s CEO to resist a takeover attempt 
increases until the retirement age, decreasing, on the contrary, from that moment on; 
• Hypothesis 2: The likelihood to a target firm’s CEO to resist a takeover attempt 
increases with his/her tenure; 
• Hypothesis 3: Different academic backgrounds will lead to different percentages on the 
likelihood to resist takeover attempts; 
• Hypothesis 4: Different nationalities or cultures will lead to different likelihood to resist 
takeover attempts; 
• Hypothesis 5: Gender of the target firm’s CEO influences the likelihood to resist a 
takeover attempt. 
Age and tenure have already very often been used as explanatory variables to test, not only 
the probability of a CEOs to resist a takeover attempt, but also their effect on the 
compensation that top managers would receive in the case of a successful M&A 
transaction. This is connected to the existence of defensive tools or tactics (like golden 
parachutes or even the target firm’s stock owned by the senior executives), which enhance 
the probability to reduce the occurrence of takeover attempts. For example, Jenter and 
Lewellen (2015) found strong evidence that target firms’ CEOs preferences affect merger 
activity by using retirement age as proxy for CEOs private merger costs. 
 27 
Yim (2013) examined the incentives that CEOs face to undertake acquisitions, concluding 
that following an acquisitions process, they experience permanent and substantial gains in 
compensation. However, the author states that “(...) with respect to one dimension of their 
job - undertaking acquisitions - prevailing compensation practices create stronger 
incentives for younger CEOs than for older ones” (271), and that those incentives “(...) can 
lead to overinvestment and value destruction” (271). Nevertheless, the researcher 
demonstrated that “(...) acquisitions are accompanied by large, permanent increases in 
CEO compensation, which create financial incentives for CEOs to pursue acquisitions 
earlier in their career” (250). 
In what concerns the academic background of the target firms’ CEOs, this was a topic of 
many studies in order to explain some organizational structures and some of the senior 
executives decisions. For that reason it is very interesting to know if different CEOs act 
differently according with non-identical academic backgrounds. Thus, it is important to 
understand if target firm’s CEOs with different academic backgrounds have a higher or 
lower resistance when facing a takeover attempt. 
Regarding the aspect of the CEOs nationality, it will be analyzed if target firm’s CEOs with 
different nationalities show a different behavior when facing a takeover attempt. 
Nevertheless, considering the high number of nationalities, these ones will be grouped into 
cultural groups. For example, CEOs with American and British citizenship are considered 
in the same cultural group, due to cultural similarities and historical ties.  
It is well know the importance that culture has in the business world. Katzenbach and 
Aguirre (2013) state “recognizing the importance of culture in business is not the same 
thing as being an effective cultural chief executive”6. This means that, on the one hand, the 
nationality or culture of a CEO is important, and, on the other, his/her capability to lead 
and control a firm with people from different cultures is crucial in order to prevail the best 
working environment. This last observation has a higher importance when working with 
top executives from different cultures. In addition, Katzenbach and Aguirre (2013) stated, 
in reference to the work of Kotter and Heskett (1992), that there are studies that stress 
consistent correlation between robust, engaged cultures and high-performance business 
results. 
Finally, the Gender variable is, indeed, an important issue to be analyzed, considering there 
are no studies addressing this issue on a higher or lower willingness from a target firms’ 
                                                
6 Source: https://www.strategy-business.com/article/00179?gko=6912e (visited on 26/08/2018) 
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CEOs to resist a takeover attempt. 
 
 
3.2. Methodological Aspects of Similar Studies 
Table 4. Methodological Aspects of Similar Studies 
Studies Jenter and Lewellen (2015)  Yim (2013) Aktas et al. (2012) Croci et al. (2012) 
Buchholtz and 
Ribbens (1994) 
Objective 
Impact of target CEOs’ 
retirement preferences 
on takeovers 
The acquisition 
behavior regarding 
the CEO age 
CEO narcissism 
affects the M&A 
process 
Impact of family 
control and 
institutional investors 
on CEO pay packages 
in Europe 
Influence of 
CEOs profile and 
financial 
incentives in 
takeover 
resistance 
Sample - 
Size 
56,183 firm-years (7,992 
firms)  
7,999 of 29,219 
observations 
146 deals  (292 
CEOs)  
754 listed firms with 
3731 firm-year 
observations 
406 firms 
Sample - 
Country United States Market S&P 1500 firms 
United States 
Market European Market 
North American 
Market 
Sample - 
Years 1989-2007 1992-2007 2002-2006 2001-2008 1987-1989 
Industry Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple 
Statistical 
Analysis Regression  Regression Regression  Regression  Regression 
Database 
- Panel of CEOs for 
U.S. public firms from 
Fee, Hadlock, and 
Pierce (2013); 
- Names and ages of the 
executives for U.S. 
listed firms extracted 
from Compustat  
- Acquisition data from 
Securities Data 
Corporation’s U.S. 
Mergers  
- Collects 
compensation data 
on the top 
management team of 
S&P 1500 firms, that 
includes data on 
CEO age and tenure 
from ExecuComp; 
- Data on M&A 
transactions from 
Thomson’s SDC 
Platinum database  
- Sample of 
acquisitions is 
extracted from the 
Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC) 
U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Database  
 
- CEO compensation 
data for Continental 
European firms from 
BoardEx  
- Ownership data from 
the Thomson One Banker 
Ownership module  
- Financial data from 
Datastream/Worldscope  
Mergerstat 
Annual Reports 
 
Characteristics or 
factors that lead to 
a CEO's higher 
resistance 
regarding a 
takeover attempt 
Age 
Tenure 
Academic 
Background 
Nationality 
Gender 
Figure 6. Hypotheses Analyzed in this Dissertation 
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Besides the conclusions, trends and behaviors found out by other studies, it is important to 
consider, the kind of methods they have used.  
The methodologies taken in practice are of quite relevance to the present dissertation. In 
fact, to find out the empirical tendencies that the present research study tries to find, it is 
essential to understand the methodological differences and steps of analysis taken by 
similar studies (see table 5). In addition, one other reason to choose this topic has to do 
with the sentiment of the necessity to compare the results that are reached in this 
dissertation, with other research studies (that analyze different markets on different periods 
of time), thus making sense to differentiate methodologies. This will also allow this 
dissertation to create new knowledge by validating different hypothesis that result from 
assuming new assumptions and from testing different variables, comparing to previous 
works. 
3.3. Methodology 
A linear regression model is used when the objective is to study the relationship between a 
dependent variable (in this case, the target firms’ CEOs resistance to takeover attempts) 
and one or more independent variables (age, tenure, academic background, nationality and 
gender). In other words, the theory specifies a set of precise, deterministic relationships 
among variables, based in fundamental assumptions like linearity, full rank, exogeneity of 
the independent variables, homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation, exogenously generated 
data and normal distribution (Greene, 2012).  
In this case, and because the dependent variable only has one of two results (“0” if the 
target firm’s CEO did not resisted the takeover attempt; “1” if the target firm’s CEO 
resisted the takeover attempt), there will be used, like in other studies, a logistic or binomial 
regression model. A logistic or binomial regression is one where the log-odds of the 
probability of an event are a linear combination of independent or predictor variables. It 
can be generalized to more than two levels of the dependent variable: categorical outputs 
(that are used in the academic background and nationalities of the CEOs) and ordered 
outputs. 
Like other studies, and adopting a suitable approach, this dissertation examines the capacity 
of our independent variables to explain any changes in the value of the dependent variable: 
the takeover resistance from the part of the CEOs of companies that are the aim of a 
takeover attempt.  
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The regressions were performed using the statistical software SPSS. The following variables 
were used in our binomial regression: 
• 𝑇𝐴𝑅!  = dependent variable regarding resistance of the target firm’s CEO to the 
takeover attempt, with , [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i 
= 1,...,223]; 
• 𝐴𝐺𝐸! = independent variable regarding the age of the target firm’s CEO, [Scenario 1: i 
= 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝑇𝐸𝑁! = independent variable regarding the tenure of the target firm’s CEO, [Scenario 
1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝐴𝐶𝐵! = independent variable regarding the academic background of the target firm’s 
CEO, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝑁𝐴𝑇!  = independent variable regarding the nationality of the target firm’s CEO, 
[Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝐺𝐸𝑁! = independent variable regarding the gender of the target firm’s CEO, [Scenario 
1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸! = control variable regarding the value (in euros) of the potential deal, 
[Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223];  
• 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐷! = control variable regarding the stock acquired (in percentage) 
of the potential deal, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 
1,...,223]; 
• 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃! = control variable regarding the market capitalization (in euros) of the 
target firm on the moment the potential deal could go ahead, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; 
Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆! = control variable regarding the total assets (in euros) of the target 
firm on the moment the potential deal could go ahead, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; 
Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸! = control variable regarding the stock price (in euros) of the target 
firm 3 months prior to the moment the potential deal could go ahead, [Scenario 1: i = 
1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
 31 
• !"#$_!"#$%!!"!#$_!""#$"! = RATIO Q = control variable which evaluates the height that the deal 
value as on the total assets of the target firm, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 
1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]; 
• 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸! −𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃! = RATIO P = control variable which represents 
the premium offered to the target company, [Scenario 1: i = 1,...,378; Scenario 2: i = 
1,...,323; Scenario 2: i = 1,...,223]. 
The majority of the previous studies have used regression models in order to test their 
assumptions and variables. An example is the one regarding the research study lead by 
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), who recurred to a logistic regression analyses (Norusis, 
1990). In fact, the present research study will adapt the methodology used by the last 
authors cited, considering the existing similarities: the same dependent (dichotomous) 
variable – takeover resistance of the target firm CEOs - and similar independent variables, 
namely, CEO age and tenure. Moreover, the authors consider seven control variables (firm 
size, firm performance, premium, stock concentration, institutional stock ownership, 
proportion of outsider on a board, and directors ownership), which are the basis of the 
control variables used in this work. 
Nevertheless, this dissertation, despite adapting the methodology used by Buchholtz and 
Ribbens, will not be assuming any compensation values if the target firms’ CEOs do not 
resist a takeover attempt, being only assumed individual characteristics of the CEOs 
themselves as independent or explanatory variables.  
3.3.1. Dependent Variable  
The resistance by the CEO of the target firm to a takeover attempt is considered in this 
dissertation as the dependent variable. This variable is being analyzed as the one that is 
influenced by explanatory variables, and hence changes in these variables can explain a 
higher or lower resistance from the target firms’ CEOs to any takeover attempt. The 
resistance to a takeover attempt is a dichotomous variable: values for the dichotomous 
dependent variable were stipulated as “0” when the transactions were concluded, meaning 
that the target firm’s CEO did not resist the takeover attempt; “1” were stipulated when 
the target firm’s CEO resisted the takeover attempt.  
Finally, in order to evaluate the explanatory capability of the independent variables on the 
value of the dependent variable, the analysis is made according to the transactions and not 
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solely on the CEO. Considering that the data has more transactions then CEOs, this means 
that there are transactions with the same CEO. It is acceptable to test two transactions with 
the same CEO if the values of at least one control variable differ, and/or certain individual 
characteristics (like age and tenure) of the CEO have changed (the same firm could be 
target of a takeover attempt in different years). The objective in allowing the same CEO 
among different transactions, but showing a different age and tenure, is to study the impact 
of the individual characteristics, and not the CEO by itself. 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
Our independent variables are considered in order to explain how variations in their values 
explain changes in the dependent variable values.  
The first considered explanatory variable of interest represents the age of the CEO at the 
moment the takeover attempt occurred. Analyzing previous studies, like the ones from 
Jenter and Lewellen (2015) or Yim (2013), CEO’s age will be tested, on the one hand, as a 
linear variable and, on the other, as grouped into differently defined categories. Regarding 
the CEO’s age groups, this dissertation adapts the same methodology used by Levi et al. 
(2010), but limited by the number of observations according to the age. Considering the 
subjectivity that would be placed when categorizing the data observations in this 
dissertation, it is more suitable to categorized in five-year age groups, instead of “younger”, 
“medium” and “old”, as Yim (2013) did in his research study. Thus, there will be seven age 
groups: “Between 25 and 40 years”, “Between 41 and 45 years”, “Between 46 and 50 
years”, “Between 51 and 55 years”, “Between 56 and 60 years”, “Between 61 and 65 years”, 
and “More then 65 years”. Additionally, like Buchholtz and Ribbens defended, it is 
included CEO age squared in the analysis to model a curvilinear effect of CEO age and the 
resistance to a takeover attempt, for each one of the data scenarios. 
In terms of CEOs tenure, this variable is measured as the number of years the CEO holds 
in his/her position until the year of the potential or effective takeover attempt. Taking in 
consideration similar works, Kilian and Schindler (2014), following the study lead by Fung 
et al. (2009), defined CEOs tenure as a measure of CEOs commitment to the firm and as a 
signal for experience. In turn, Yim (2013) used CEOs tenure as a control variable to 
explain de degree of power of CEOs in the companies they manage. Like CEO’s age, 
CEOs tenure will be tested as a linear variable and grouped into different defined 
categories, namely, “Between 0 and 5 years”, “Between 6 and 10 years”, “Between 11 and 
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15 years”, “Between 16 and 20 years”, and “More then 20 years” 
The other variables - academic background, nationality and gender - were only categorized 
into groups. In the case of academic background, and contrary to previous studies, that 
only grouped between CEO, with none academic background and those with academic 
background, it will be divided between educational groups, considering the extensive 
number of degrees that the CEOs have: “Economics and Business” (with value “1”), 
“Engineering” (with value “2”), “Law” (with value “3”), “Mathematics and Statistic” (with 
value “4”), “Medicine and related” (with value “5”), “Natural Sciences” (with value “6”), 
“Social Science” (with value “7”), and “No qualifications” (with value “0”). Yet, and it is 
important to underline, a CEO with no qualifications is a CEO with no high education 
formation, and all of the educational groups refer to high education degrees (bachelors, 
masters or doctoral programs). 
The nationalities of the target firms’ CEOs on the data are also categorized into groups, 
considering the large number of nationalities. They were grouped based on cultural and 
historical ties between the many countries from which the CEOs are from: “Anglo 
American” (with value “0” because it is the largest group in terms of observations), 
“African” (with value “1”), “Arabian” (with value “2”), “Asian” (with value “3”), “Balkan 
and Slavic” (with value “4”), “Francophone” (with value “5”), “German” (with value “6”), 
“Latin” (with value “7”), and “Scandinavian” (with value “8”). Nevertheless, when 
analyzing the data of “Scenario 3” there will be less nationality groups, considering the 
number of observations: “Anglo American” (with value “0”), “Balkan and Slavic” (with 
value “1”), “Francophone” (with value “2”), “German” (with value “3”), “Latin” (with 
value “4”), “Scandinavian” (with value “5”), and “Other nationalities” (with value “6”). 
Finally, the Gender variable is categorized between “Female” (with value “0”) and “Male” 
(with value “1”). 
3.3.3. Control Variables 
Target firm’s values (market capitalization, total assets, stock price three months prior to 
the acquisition) and deal-specific variables (deal value, stock acquired, premium of the 
offer, and ratio between the deal value and target firm’s total assets) were included as 
control variables to capture the effect of different characteristics of the target firm’s as well 
as the transaction values on the different value regarding the dependent variables. 
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This dissertation neither assumes any kind of compensation variable when the target firm’s 
CEO leaves it, due to the acquisition of the company, nor assumes any stock ownership by 
the target firm’s CEO. This is the main justification to the use of control variables 
regarding deal values and firm size: to understand if the individual characteristics of the 
target firm’s CEO have, in fact, relevance in explaining an higher or lower resistance to 
takeover attempts, not being influenced by financial incentives or compensations offered 
to the CEO if he/she resists. 
3.4. Data 
The period of time, from which data should be taken for analysis, must respect two 
assumptions. Firstly, it must respect the need of available information for each transaction 
collected. Then, and only if the first assumption is respected, it must have in account a 
stable period of time.  
The first assumption is assumed in order to secure a period of time with the relevant and 
required information regarding the target firms’ CEOs profiles in a takeover attempt.  
The second assumption is assumed with the purpose to use a period of time (maximum of 
10 years, but not less than 5 years) in which, preferentially, there are no major economical 
occurrences that can lead to skewed results. For example, collected observations between 
the period of 2007 and 2009 can lead to abnormal results due to the occurrence of the 
global financial crisis which started with the one in the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States of America. 
Furthermore, and in order to depth the literature presented in this work (or fill the 
literature gap), the observations in the data must belong to European companies as the 
subjects to be studied, because the majority of similar studies centers their attention on the 
North American market. 
The chosen observations were not simply acquired. The most difficult task was related with 
the information regarding the CEOs profiles because there was not a complete database 
with that information. Due to that reason, many sources were consulted in order to obtain 
the information needed, namely: 
• The transactions, (i.e., the acquisitions) were collected from “Bureau Van Dijk - 
Zephyr”; 
• The Management Board and the CEOs from the companies that engaged in an M&A 
deal were withdrawal from “Bureau Van Dijk - Amadeus”; 
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• The individual profile of each CEO retrieved from annual reports (if available) and 
other sources (companies websites, “Bloomberg Business”, “Reuters Business”, 
“Yahoo Finance”, “LinkedIn”, among others). 
 
Table 5. Search Strategy Regarding our Research Study 
Step Step - Description Step - Result7 Search Result8 
1 Time period: on and after 01/01/2006 and up to and including 31/12/2016 (rumoured, completed-confirmed, completed-assumed, announced) 1.239.693 1.239.693 
2 
Country (primary addresses): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy 
(IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain 
(ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (GB) (Acquiror OR Target 
OR Vendor ) 
601.404 375.334 
3 Deal value (EUR): all deals with known value (including estimates) 1.076.547 188.676 
4 Deal type: Acquisition 650.663 7.108 
5 
Percentage of stake: Percentage of initial stake (min: 0 % max: 50 %); Percentage of 
acquired stake (min: 0 % max: 100 %); Percentage of final stake (min: 51 % max: 
100 %) 
581.439 33.885 
6 Listed/Unlisted/Delisted companies: listed acquiror, listed target 70.177 728 
  
 728 
 
The initial search strategy compressed specific transactions between the years of 2006 and 
2016, within a limited selection of countries from where the firms have their social address. 
Nonetheless, and in order to use a more proper data for the present research study, the 
initial sample was reduced according to the following criteria: 
• All deal values, in euros, must be known (including the estimate values) in order to 
confirm that, although some deals were not made official there was willingness by the 
acquirers to accomplish the deal; 
• The M&A deal type selected was “Acquisitions deals”, thus excluding “Mergers”, 
“IPOs”, “Management Buy-Out”, “Management Buy-in”, among others deal types; 
• The acquirer, after an acquisition attempt, should have a higher value then 50% of final 
stake in the target firm, meaning that the buyer will have control of the firm and a 
higher possibility of exchanging the CEO in office (thus giving more reasons to the 
target firm’s CEO to resist the takeover attempt); 
                                                
7 Number of total deals for each specific step 
8 Number of observations and combining steps  
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• In order to allow or smooth the search of all the information needed, only the deals 
with listed companies were selected. 
This initial search strategy was implemented with the objective to enlarge the data in order 
to widen the possibilities of statistical analysis. Thus, the initial selected data presented a 
total of 728 observations (see Table 4). From those 728 observations it was decided to 
create different “scenarios” of analysis, each one of them with samples that are different in 
terms of scale. 
Scenario 1 
The first scenario adds new criteria in order to avoid the existence of duplicated 
transactions (with identical deal values or equal dates), namely: 
• If a same firm received multiple offers, it was only assumed the first offer; 
• If a same firm was the target for more then one takeover attempt in the same year, it 
was only considered one of the offers if the profile of the CEO did not change; 
• If a company shows more then one takeover attempt in the same year, and does not 
present any exchange in his/her CEO profile, in the deal value and in the percentage of 
stock acquired, it was assumed only the last entry deal; 
• If a company does not present the necessary information regarding the target firm’s 
CEO profile (age, tenure, academic background, nationality and gender), some 
important target firm financial values (market capitalization, total assets and stock price 
3 months prior to the deal), the deal value and the percentage of stock acquired, then 
the acquisition is not taken into consideration. 
With these additional criteria it were reached a total number of 378 observations. These 
transactions respect the period chosen above and the selected markets. 
Scenario 2 
Starting from the 378 observations that are compressed in “Scenario 1”, “Scenario 2” will 
consist on a sample that will focus only on target firms from the European market. Thus, it 
will represent a mix between Eastern and Western Europe countries (particularly those that 
are part of the European Economic Area), namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Norway, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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With this sample – a total of 323 observations - it will be possible to carry out an 
evaluation of the probability to resist a takeover attempt by the CEOs of companies that 
have their major presence in the European market. This will allow the comparison of our 
results with the conclusions reached by other studies that refer to the North American 
market. 
Scenario 3 
Between the years of 2007 and 2011, the western world overpassed the most difficult 
financial crisis of the last hundred years. The European countries, particularly, went 
through a sovereign debt crisis. In fact, several Eurozone member states (e.g., Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail 
out over-indebted banks under their national supervision without the assistance of third 
parties like other Eurozone countries, the European Central Bank, or the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). This lead to the implementation of austerity governmental plans 
among almost all European countries, with significant adverse economic effects. 
Thus, and in order to repeal the negative effects that result from the financial crisis (2007-
2009), and considering that there is no existence of remarkable or complicated legislation 
made in that time that can affect M&A activity, the present scenario will only compress the 
observations between January 1st of 2012 and December 31st of 2016. Starting from the 323 
observations from “Scenario 2”, it was reached 211 final observations.   
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4. Results 
 
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the data, which are the basis of the research 
made in this dissertation, in order to give a general description of the CEOs profiles and 
transactions studied here. In addition, it is also present in this section a descriptive analysis 
for each of the three scenarios already referred in Section 3. 
4.1. Quantitative Analysis of the Data 
The following tables present a quantitative analysis of the data. This will allow us to see an 
overview regarding each one of the scenarios discussed in the last section, and then to 
proceed to an analysis and an evaluation of the statistical significance of the different 
hypotheses formulated in Section 2. 
Scenario 1 
The present scenario has a wide range of ages and tenure regarding the target firms’ CEOs 
(see Table 6 and Table 7). 
 
Table 6. Statistical Values Regarding the Acquisitions Deals of “Scenario 1” 
Deals Number 
Value (in thousand euros) % of acquisition 
Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2006 11 103.104,00 19.643.171,00 3.113.391,61 1.264.753,00 5% 100% 76% 91% 
2007 22 2.068,00 64.590.599,98 9.284.105,87 2.992.666,50 27% 100% 89% 100% 
2008 19 14.672,95 83.875.250,00 8.611.041,48 698.762,73 23% 100% 86% 100% 
2009 18 20.391,29 35.192.161,92 5.208.384,97 335.559,06 10% 100% 87% 100% 
2010 23 2.225,69 21.645.909,00 3.002.135,53 1.613.019,00 21% 100% 91% 100% 
2011 27 39,99 19.182.177,55 3.054.209,17 932.623,00 26% 100% 85% 100% 
2012 27 791,00 13.271.496,85 1.666.267,22 648.794,00 2% 100% 81% 100% 
2013 45 791,00 21.045.426,00 3.192.240,63 1.180.478,00 15% 100% 87% 100% 
2014 87 1.018,82 116.616.040,47 12.328.431,19 2.197.458,00 18% 100% 95% 100% 
2015 50 834,18 72.237.987,00 6.649.443,41 1.321.694,00 14% 100% 92% 100% 
2016 49 175,15 14.134.848,00 2.091.792,79 644.523,00 39% 100% 91% 100% 
Total 378 39,99 116.616.040,47 5.953.984,74 1.099.694,92 2% 100% 89% 100% 
 
It is interesting to point out that according Table 7, the minimum age of the target firms’ 
CEOs registered in our data belongs to a male Indian CEO without a high academic 
qualification, who established a technological firm, and did not resist the takeover attempt. 
On the other hand, the oldest CEO is a Japanese man, with the age of eighty-one, who 
resisted when his firm faced a takeover attempt. Additionally, regarding the tenure of the 
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target firms’ CEOs that faced a takeover attempt, there are (in the data) many CEOs with 
less than one year in this position when the firm they manage faced a takeover attempt, and 
one CEO that was thirty-nine years in office when resisted a takeover attempt.  
 
Table 7. Statistical Values Regarding the CEOs in “Scenario 1” 
Deals 
Number Age Tenure 
Male Female Total Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2006 11 0 11 41 64 52 49 0 6 3 3 
2007 21 1 22 32 66 54 57 0 20 6 4 
2008 19 0 19 37 74 56 56 0 22 7 3 
2009 18 0 18 37 68 52 51 0 25 8 3 
2010 23 0 23 42 76 54 52 0 18 6 3 
2011 27 0 27 43 81 57 55 0 33 7 5 
2012 26 1 27 41 67 55 55 0 18 6 5 
2013 44 1 45 39 69 52 50 0 19 7 5 
2014 84 3 87 37 70 53 52 0 39 7 5 
2015 48 2 50 28 71 54 55 0 20 5 3 
2016 46 3 49 39 78 56 55 0 30 6 4 
Total 367 11 378 28 81 54 53 0 39 6 4 
 
 
In Figures 7 and 8 it is present a synthetic analysis of the data in terms of age and tenure 
intervals (according to the groups that were stipulated in Section 3), and it is also present 
the percentage of target firms’ CEOs that resisted a takeover attempt.  
In fact, on the one hand, our data seems to show a curvilinear pattern between the age of a 
CEO and his/her resistance to a takeover attempt. On the other, CEOs tenure seems to 
present a non-curvilinear behavior, with the probability to resist a takeover attempt 
decreasing as the years a CEO in that position increase. 
Curiously, Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), when analyzing the acquisitions made in the 
North American market during the years of 1987 and 1989, conclude about curvilinear 
behavior between the CEOs’ age and its effect on a higher or a lower probability of a 
takeover resistance. They affirmed that at the age of fifty-five years a target firm’s CEO is 
more willing to resist a takeover attempt, decreasing from that point forward. Additionally, 
they have stressed out that there was no evidence that the length of a CEO's tenure in that 
position has any consequence in a higher or lower takeover resistance.  
Consequently, it can be said that when statistically analyzing our data, there will be similar 
conclusions like the ones reached by the authors cited (whose work was based on a 
different period of time in a different market). 
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Figure 7. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Age and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 1”) 
 
 
Figure 8. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Tenure and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 1”) 
 
 
Nevertheless, these results can be also explained by other reasons, not exactly the 
youngness of CEOs to stay in their position: recently appointed to office as CEOs, a 
longer tenure which, among other aspects, can mean a higher attachment to the position. 
These are some of these other aspects: 
• Existence of interim CEOs (ex., Orient-Express Hotels Ltd.) or CEOs who were 
appointed by legal entities due to bankruptcy matters (ex., Ssangyong Corporation), 
who could have nothing to loose in the case of a successful occurrence of a takeover 
attempt, and so their action is different from the others; 
• Existence of CEOs who are founders or co-founders of the target firm they manage 
(ex., Ubisoft Entertainment S.A., Yoox SPA., Minera Irl Ltd.); CEOs that are part of 
the family that controls the target firm they manage (ex., Laurent-Perrier SA., Suzuki 
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Motor Corporation); CEOs, who are so important, that they have an almost 
untouchable position; 
• Existence of companies that are part of a bigger group, and whose CEOs must comply 
with the decisions from the part of the general management board (ex., Bank 
Millennium S.A., Fromageries Paul Renard S.A., Ceylon Leather Products PLC., 
National Societe general Bank SAE.); 
• Existence of companies that, when successfully acquired in a takeover process, 
approved on a pre-agreement with the acquirer in order to maintain the same CEO in 
office (ex., Thyssenkrupp AG., Bank Zachodni WBK S.A.).  
Regarding the possibility of different academic backgrounds leading to different 
percentages on the likelihood to resist takeover attempts, among the 378 CEOs observed, 
we obtained a wide difference between the academic classifications of each of them. In this 
sense, due to the small number of observations for each higher education formation – 
unless in Economics and Management, that represents 48%, and Engineering, that 
represents 29% - the academics background were grouped into fields of study (see “Section 
3.3. Methodology”). The present hypothesis will be statistically tested in categories, because 
it is an ordinal qualitative variable: a broad category for any variable that cannot be counted 
(it has no numerical value). Analyzing the data in the present dissertation, it can be seen 
that there is no apparent evidence of any relation between the academic backgrounds and 
the willingness in resisting an attempt of acquisition. Nevertheless, on the one hand, there 
is a difference between a CEO who has qualifications on practical fields (Economics and 
Management, Engineering or Natural Sciences) being less receptive to a takeover attempt, 
and on the other, those who are graduated in more theoretical fields (like Law or any Social 
Science) or even have no qualifications at all (have a lower sensibility on firm’s evaluation 
techniques), who are more receptive to acquisition attempts. 
Regarding the dependet variable nationality, the data show a wide set of nationalities, which 
lead us to categorize them in nine cultural groups: Anglo American cultural group 
(Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States of America) whose 
nationalities have in common language, historical ties and political-economical agreements 
(in fact, and just as an example, United Kingdom is composed by English, North Irish and 
Scottish people, and all belong to the Commonwealth of Nations); African cultural group 
(Senegal, South Africa and Zimbabwe), countries that have economic ties; Arabian cultural 
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group (Morocco, Syria, Turkey), countries that have religious ties and thus very close 
cultural similarities; Asian cultural group (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand), countries with cultural ties and economic similarities, 
especially considering that they belong to a growing economic area; Balkan and Slavic 
(Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania), Francophone (Belgium, France 
and Switzerland); (vii) Germanic (Austria, Germany and Netherlands), Latin (Brazil, Italy, 
México, Portugal, Spain) and (ix) Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) 
cultural group, all groups with countries that have cultural ties and historical connections.  
 
Figure 9. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Academic Background and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt 
(“Scenario 1”) 
 
 
The executives that belong to the Anglo American and African culture groups show a 
higher willingness to resist takeover attempts. In fact, and this is perhaps the most 
interesting aspect, two of the three nationalities that belong to the African cultural group 
were in the past British colonies, meaning, thus, a cultural closeness and an explanation to 
similar results with the Anglo American culture. The remaining cultures show a very similar 
behavior booth in terms of resistance and non-resistance to the attempts of takeovers. 
However, the countries in the Arabian, Asian or Balkan and Slavic cultural groups seem to 
be less prompt to resist a takeover attempt. If analyzed in a historical perspective, the 
countries that belong to this cultural group need more foreign investment in order to 
accomplish economic goals. Additionally, there are also countries that emerged from the 
later soviet sphere of influence, meaning that they started, a fewer years ago, to open in a 
more broader way in terms of economic and diplomatic relations with other countries. 
Nonetheless, the Balkan and Slavic countries have higher resistance to takeover attempts, 
0.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
60.00% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Economics 
and Business 
Engineering Law Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Medicine and 
related 
Natural 
Sciences 
Social 
Sciences 
No 
qualifications 
85.16% 
14.84% 
86.49% 
13.51% 
73.08% 
26.92% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
87.50% 
12.50% 
94.44% 
5.56% 
75.00% 
25.00% 
78.26% 
21.74% 
CEOs Academic Background (by fields)  
 43 
but they had a sooner opening to the western world – the majority of them are now part of 
the European Union. Nonetheless, the observations in each one of the cultural groups that 
did not allow us to conclude about the existence of a pattern between nationality or culture 
and target firms’s CEOs willingness to resist a takeover attempt. There is no clear evidence 
that different nationalities or cultures will lead to different percentages/behaviors in the 
likelihood to resist takeover attempts. 
 
Figure 10. Target Firms' CEOs’ Nationalities (Grouped in Cultures) and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover 
Attempt (“Scenario 1”) 
 
 
Finally, the influence of target firms’ CEOs gender in the likelihood to resist a takeover 
attempt represents a major obstacle that can skew any statistical results. Unfortunately, the 
CEOs world still is a “men’s world”. In the 378 eligible CEOs, only ten are female and 
represent eleven effective or potential M&A transactions.  
Scenario 2 
This scenario stresses very similar results to the ones present in “Scenario 1”, especially 
those that refer to the nationality and academic background of the target firms’ CEOs. 
Nevertheless, there is a slightly different behavior when analyzing the variables of target 
firms’ CEOs’ age and tenure. In this scenario, target firms’ CEOs' age and the likelihood to 
resist a takeover attempt have shown two peaks of age which exhibit a higher resistance, 
compared to “Scenario 1”, where there was slight but almost continuous growth until the 
interval of age between sixty-one and sixty-five years. Regarding tenure, a more stable 
behavior is observed, with higher resistance between less than one-year and ten years, 
decreasing from this point forward. 
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Table 8. Statistical Values Regarding the Acquisitions of “Scenario 2” 
Deals Number 
Value (in thousand euros) % of acquisition 
Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2006 11 49.000,00 12.242.993,00 3.113.391,61 954.644,37 5% 100% 76% 91% 
2007 20 2.068,00 64.590.599,98 10.137.213,00 3.578.908,38 27% 100% 88% 100% 
2008 16 19.784,19 83.875.250,00 10.168.508,75 1.391.062,87 23% 100% 87% 100% 
2009 13 21.993,00 35.192.161,92 7.074.868,42 1.154.244,00 34% 100% 93% 100% 
2010 19 20.916,19 21.645.909,00 3.379.819,32 1.726.695,18 82% 100% 98% 100% 
2011 22 39,99 19.182.177,55 2.675.625,52 889.262,59 26% 100% 85% 100% 
2012 22 791,00 13.271.496,85 1.914.068,00 927.562,47 9% 100% 86% 100% 
2013 38 791,00 21.045.426,00 2.813.197,92 940.470,67 23% 100% 88% 100% 
2014 78 4.500,00 116.616.040,47 13.439.328,71 2.222.998,41 18% 100% 96% 100% 
2015 43 834,18 72.237.987,00 7.282.043,60 1.650.548,02 14% 100% 94% 100% 
2016 41 175,15 14.134.848,00 2.161.008,69 622.572,00 39% 100% 91% 100% 
Total 323 39,99 116 616 040,47 6 539 912,91 1 264 753,00 5% 100% 91% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Statistical Values Regarding the Target Firms’ CEOs of “Scenario 2” 
Deals 
Number Age Tenure 
Male Female Total Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2006 11 0 11 41 64 52 49 0 6 3 3 
2007 19 1 20 32 66 54 57 0 15 5 4 
2008 16 0 16 37 74 56 57 0 17 5 3 
2009 13 0 13 37 64 50 50 0 21 6 3 
2010 19 0 19 42 76 54 52 0 18 5 3 
2011 22 0 22 43 67 54 55 0 15 6 5 
2012 21 1 22 41 67 55 55 0 18 6 6 
2013 37 1 38 39 69 52 51 0 19 7 5 
2014 76 2 78 37 70 53 53 0 37 7 6 
2015 41 2 43 28 69 53 54 0 20 5 3 
2016 38 3 41 39 78 56 55 0 30 6 4 
Total 313 10 323 28 78 54 53 0 37 6 4 
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Figure 11. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Age and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 2”) 
 
 
Figure 12. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Tenure and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 2”) 
 
 
Figure 13. Target firms’ CEOs’ Academic Background and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt 
(“Scenario 2”) 
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Figure 14. Target Firms' CEOs’ Nationalities (Grouped in Cultures) and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover 
Attempt (“Scenario 2”) 
 
 
Scenario 3 
The higher or lower resistance of the target firms’ CEOs to any takeover attempt, based on 
its nationality and academic background, is very similar to the observed results in the other 
two scenarios. In relation to the variables age and tenure, these ones present more 
attenuated observations, even in comparison with “Scenario 2” (which presented a 
different behavior when compared to “Scenario 1”).  
In fact, “Scenario 2” shows that younger target firms’ CEOs have a higher resistance to 
takeover attempts, with a peak in the ages between forty-six and fifty years, even higher 
than the percentage between sixty and sixty-five years. On the other hand, “Scenario 3” 
shows an increasing resistance behavior from the target firms’ CEOs until the ages 
between forty-six and fifty, starting then to decrease continuously from that point forward. 
Regarding target firms’ CEOs tenure, it is shown lower percentages of CEOs that have 
resisted a takeover attempt on higher age intervals, and higher percentages on the younger 
CEOs. 
When comparing the quantitative statistical data of this scenario with the others, it is 
possible to verify that the addition of new criteria from one scenario to another, namely the 
single analysis of CEOs that run an European target firm, during a period of time that does 
not include the years of the international financial crisis, allows us to obtain more 
attenuated results. 
In fact, considering the age and the tenure of the target firms’ CEOs, it is possible to verify 
similar results to the ones pointed out in this dissertation. In fact, the inclusion of 
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additional criteria on “Scenario 1”, which lead to the construction of “Scenario 2” and 
“Scenario 3”, have a logical explanation. The great objective is to reach results that are 
statistically significant and may answer to the initial problem of this dissertation: will some 
individual characteristics of the target firms’ CEOs increase or lower their likelihood to 
resist a takeover attempt? 
In “Scenario 1” we have European companies, both in the acquirer and target side, in 
order to increase the number of observations. In “Scenario 2” it is only tested observations 
with European target firms in order to compare to previous studies (that analyzed other 
markets). Finally, in “Scenario 3” only are present acquisitions with European target firm’s 
during the period between 2012 and 2016 in order to understand if there are skewed 
results, and which are consequence of the financial crisis years. 
 
 
Table 10. Statistical Values Regarding the Acquisitions of “Scenario 3” 
Deals Number 
Value (in thousand euros) % of acquisition 
Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2012 22 791,00 13.271.496,85 1.914.068,00 927.562,47 9% 100% 86% 100% 
2013 38 791,00 21.045.426,00 2.813.197,92 940.470,67 23% 100% 88% 100% 
2014 79 4.500,00 116.616.040,47 12.966.990,59 2.244.996,81 18% 100% 96% 100% 
2015 43 834,18 72.237.987,00 7.282.043,60 1.650.548,02 14% 100% 94% 100% 
2016 41 175,15 14.134.848,00 2.161.008,69 622.572,00 39% 100% 91% 100% 
Total 323 175,15 116.616.040,47 6.739.979,86 1 257 404,22 9% 100% 92% 100% 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Statistical Values Regarding the Target Firms’ CEOs of “Scenario 3” 
Deals 
Number Age Tenure 
Male Female Total Min Max Ave Med Min Max Ave Med 
2012 21 1 22 41 67 55 55 0 18 6 5 
2013 37 1 38 39 69 52 51 0 19 7 5 
2014 77 2 79 37 70 53 53 0 37 7 6 
2015 41 2 43 28 69 53 54 0 20 5 3 
2016 38 3 41 39 78 56 55 0 30 6 4 
Total 214 9 223 28 78 53 53 0 37 6 5 
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Figure 15. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Age and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 3”) 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Tenure and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt (“Scenario 3”) 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Target Firms’ CEOs’ Academic Background and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover Attempt 
(“Scenario 3”) 
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Figure 18. Target Firms' CEOs’ Nationalities (Grouped in Cultures) and the Percentage to Resist a Takeover 
Attempt (“Scenario 3”) 
 
 
 
4.2. Results of the Binomial Regression Model 
In this section it is presented a descriptive statistics for the variables of study in this 
dissertation (age, tenure, academic background, nationality and gender), and their influence 
on a higher or lower resistance to the takeover attempts from the target firms’ CEOs. 
The first step is to analyze “Table 12”. It is possible to understand the values referring 
to Cox and Snell R Square (“Cox & Snell R2”) and Nagelkerke R Square (“Nagelkerke R2”) 
values, which are both methods to calculate the variation of the dependent variable values, 
and sometimes are referred as pseudo R Square (“R2”) values (and will have lower values 
than in multiple regression). However, they are interpreted in the same way, but with more 
caution. Nevertheless, we have to consider that Nagelkerke R2 is a modification of Cox & 
Snell R2, but the latter cannot achieve a value of 1, and, thus, it is preferable to report the 
Nagelkerke R2 value. After this analysis, the necessaries observations, regarding the 
statistical significance of the model for each data scenario, will be calculated. 
 
Table 12. Model Summary and Homer and Lemeshow Test (source: own calculations) 
Scenario 
Model Summary Homer and Lemeshow Test 
-2 log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square Chi-square df Sig. 
Scenario 1 (AGE and TENURE as linear variable) 160.230 .346 .605 5.663 8 .685 
Scenario 2 (AGE and TENURE as linear variable) 118.326 .334 .621 6.129 8 .633 
Scenario 3 (AGE and TENURE as linear variable) 73.583 .324 .629 9.411 8 .309 
Scenario 1 (AGE and TENURE categorized in groups) 151.545 .361 .631 4.059 8 .852 
Scenario 2 (AGE and TENURE categorized in groups) 111.378 .348 .647 2.213 8 .974 
Scenario 3 (AGE and TENURE categorized in groups) 64.177 .352 .684 6.896 7 .440 
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Table 13. Results of Binomial Regression Analysis with all Variables, and Age and Tenure as Linear Variables 
(source: own calculations) 
Independent variable 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B Wald Sig. B Wald Sig B Wald Sig 
AGE .046 2.687 .101 .051 2.359 .125 .023 .284 .594 
TEN -.047 2.157 .142 -.068 3.149 .076 -.072 2.274 .132 
ACB  7.998 .333  4.972 .663  2.052 .957 
ACB [1] .331 .164 .685 .389 .156 .693 1.074 .831 .362 
ACB [2] 1.234 1.902 .168 .768 .593 .441 1.461 1.237 .266 
ACB [3] -.184 .029 .865 -.518 .191 .662 .235 .026 .871 
ACB [4] 19.472 .000 .999 18.377 .000 .999 18.268 .000 .999 
ACB [5] 1.855 1.100 .294 17.868 .000 .999 18.440 .000 .999 
ACB [6] 1.873 .911 .340 .832 .144 .704 16.614 .000 .999 
ACB [7] -1.983 1.637 .201 -2.247 1.650 .199 -16.883 .000 .997 
NAT  8.635 .374  4.485 .774  3.542 .738 
NAT [1] 20.658 .000 .999 -.600 .000 1.000 12.754 .000 .999 
NAT [2] -3.116 3.551 .059 -.197 .000 1.000 -19.129 .000 .999 
NAT [3] -1.708 2.986 .084 -20.494 .000 .996 -16.751 .000 .999 
NAT [4] -3.044 7.200 .007 -19.785 .000 .996 -18.583 .000 .999 
NAT [5] -1.842 3.384 .066 -18.055 .000 .996 -17.590 .000 .999 
NAT [6] -1.688 3.559 .059 -18.553 .000 .996 -18.201 .000 .999 
NAT [7] 1.223 1.422 .233 -18.067 .000 .996 - - - 
NAT [8] -1.615 2.673 .102 -18.544 .000 .996 - - - 
GEN [1] -2.352 3.926 .048 -1.522 1.543 .214 1.152 .665 .415 
DEAL_VALUE .000 .018 .894 .000 .308 .579 .000 .000 .995 
STOCK_ACQUIRED 8169.00 53.460 .000 8.024 38.813 .000 7.015 16.524 .000 
MARKET_CAP .000 1.431 .232 .000 1.487 .223 .000 .116 .734 
TOTAL_ASSETS .000 .411 .521 .000 .237 .627 .000 .850 .356 
STOCK_PRICE .005 .501 .479 .003 .187 .665 .027 .849 .357 
RATIO Q .000 .004 .947 .000 .004 .948 .000 .002 .964 
Constant -4.272 3.998 .046 11.293 .000 .998 11.315 .000 .999 
 
Table 14. Results of Binomial Regression Analysis with all Variables, and Age and Tenure as Five-Year 
Period Groups (source: own calculations) 
Independent variable 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B Wald Sig. B Wald Sig B Wald Sig 
AGE   6.680 .351  5.923 .432  5.025 .541 
AGE [1] 2.538 4.834 .028 2.180 2.961 .085 3.913 2.537 .111 
AGE [2] 1.654 2.770 .096 1.797 2.465 .116 3.293 3.139 .076 
AGE [3] 1.574 2.622 .105 1.087 .953 .329 2.248 1.532 .216 
AGE [4] 2.044 3.749 .053 2.131 3.098 .078 3.908 3.195 .074 
AGE [5] 2.666 4.887 .027 2.989 4.428 .039 5.959 2.618 .106 
AGE [6] 2.087 2.852 .091 2.058 1.816 .178 3.059 1.975 .160 
TEN   5.916 .206  5.937 .204  6.448 .168 
TEN [1] -.140 .040 .842 .221 .094 .759 -1.044 .643 .423 
TEN [2] -1.122 2.736 .098 -1.410 3.489 .062 -2.095 4.066 .044 
TEN [3] 1.103 1.124 .289 .270 .053 .818 2.643 1.060 .303 
TEN [4] -1.673 2.551 .110 -2.371 2.581 .108 -4.250 3.565 .059 
ACB   12.081 .098  7.395 .389  2.184 .949 
ACB [1] .312 .135 .713 -.151 .018 .894 .716 .291 .590 
ACB [2] 1.432 2.373 .123 .877 .624 .430 1.515 1.053 .305 
ACB [3] .173 .023 .878 -.464 .124 .725 -.217 .018 .893 
ACB [4] 19.039 .000 .999 17.183 .000 .999 16.090 .000 .999 
ACB [5] 2.265 1.044 .307 17.648 .000 .999 18.346 .000 .999 
ACB [6] 2.302 1.382 .240 .961 .203 .652 14.189 .000 .999 
ACB [7] -3.150 3.890 .049 -3.649 3.016 .082 -23.594 .000 .995 
NAT   8.389 .396  5.049 .752  4.510 .608 
NAT [1] 21.725 .000 .999 -1.502 .000 1.000 19.546 .000 .999 
NAT [2] -3.552 3.060 .080 -2.005 .000 1.000 -18.696 .000 .999 
NAT [3] -1.897 3.379 .066 -22.260 .000 .995 -15.748 .000 .999 
NAT [4] -3.259 7.011 .008 -21.326 .000 .995 -18.327 .000 .999 
NAT [5] -1.914 3.321 .068 -19.040 .000 995 -17.534 .000 .999 
NAT [6] -2.071 5.030 .025 -19.945 .000 .995 -17.710 .000 .999 
NAT [7] -1.795 2.745 .098 -18.742 .000 .995 - - - 
NAT [8] -1.902 3.502 .061 -19.822 .000 .995 - - - 
GEN [1] -2.164 2.535 .111 -1.733 1.736 .188 1.817 1.029 .310 
DEAL_VALUE .000 .094 .760 .000 .862 .353 .000 .001 .969 
STOCK_ACQUIRED 8.703 52.185 .000 8.740 35.507 .000 8.677 14.398 .000 
MARKET_CAP .000 2.225 .136 .000 2.032 .154 .000 .089 .766 
TOTAL_ASSETS .000 .449 .503 .000 .263 .608 .000 .095 .758 
STOCK_PRICE .005 .399 .528 .001 .017 .896 .033 .955 .328 
RATIO Q .000 .007 .934 .000 .005 .946 .000 .001 .971 
Constant -4.280 4.357 .037 13.709 .000 .997 8.014 .000 1.000 
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Scenario 1 
The model explained 60.5%, when age and tenure are used as linear variables, and 63,1% 
when age and tenure are categorized into groups, of the variance in takeover attempts 
resistance from the target firms’ CEOs, and correctly classified 92.3% and 92,9% of cases, 
respectively. Gender (p=.048) and the nationality group “Balkan and Slavic” (p=.007) add 
statistical significance to the model, when age is used as a linear variable. For example, the 
odd of resistance to a takeover attempt is .095 times greater for males CEOs when 
opposed to females CEOs. 
When age and tenure are categorized into groups, the periods of age between forty-one and 
forty-five (p=.028), and the period of age between sixty-one and sixty-five (p=.027) add 
statistical significance to the model, with the odds of resistance to a takeover attempt being, 
respectively, 12.654 times and 14.377 times greater when opposed to younger CEOs. In 
addition, the national/cultural groups “German” (p=.029) and “Balkan and Slavic” 
(p=.011) add statistical significance, with the odds of resistance to a takeover attempt 
being, respectively, .038 times and .126 times greater when opposed to Anglo American 
CEOs. Finally, the CEOs with academic background in “Social Sciences” brings statistical 
significance to the model, with the odds of resistance to a takeover attempt being .043 
times greater when opposed to CEOs with none high education qualifications. 
Scenario 2 
The model explained 62,1%, when age and tenure are used as linear variables, and 64,7%, 
when age and tenure are categorized into groups, of the variance in takeover attempts 
resistance from the target firms’ CEOs, and correctly classified 93,5% of cases. When age 
and tenure are categorized into groups, the period of age between sixty-one and sixty-five 
(p=.039) add statistical significance to the model, with the odds of resistance to a takeover 
attempt being 19.808 times greater when opposed to younger CEOs. 
Scenario 3 
The model explained 62.9%, when age and tenure are used as linear variables, and 68,4%, 
when age and tenure are categorized into groups, of the variance in takeover attempts 
resistance from the target firms’ CEOs, and correctly classified 94,6% and 94,1% of cases, 
respectively. The only dependent variable that brings statistical significance to the model is 
the one referring to the years in that position between eleven and fifteen (p=.044), with the 
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odds of resistance to a takeover attempt being .123 times greater when opposed to CEOs 
with less than five years in office. 
4.3. Discussion of the Results 
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Jenter and Lewellen (2015) concluded about the 
influence the age of the target firm’s CEOs has in a higher or lower willingness to resist a 
takeover attempt. Moreover, as it was already stated, the first authors were able, on the one 
hand, to reach a curvilinear behavior between the age of a CEO and his/her likelihood to 
resist a takeover attempt, with the maximum being reached at the age of around fifty-six. 
However, the authors could not found, on the other, any evidence that the length of a 
CEO’s tenure in a position affects takeover resistance.  
Yim (2013) concluded that the age of the CEO becomes an important determinant of a 
firm acquisition activity over the years he/she is on that position, thus meaning that CEO’s 
tenure plays an important role in the decision-making process when regarding M&A 
activity. Kilian and Schindler (2014) show that age has a significant and strong positive 
influence on short-term abnormal stock returns around acquisitions’ announcement. 
This research concluded that for each one of the scenarios studied there is a curvilinear 
behavior between the age of a target firm’s CEO and his/her willingness to resist a 
takeover attempt, reaching its maximum between the ages of fifty-three and fifty-eight. 
These conclusions are, in fact, very similar to previous ones. However, despite this 
curvilinear behavior, it is not possible to accept or refute Hypothesis 1, considering the lack 
of statistical significance in all the scenarios when age is a linear variable (the best scenario, 
“Scenario 1”, shows a p=.101). Nevertheless, regarding the results when age is categorized 
into groups, we also cannot reject Hypothesis 1 in “Scenario 2” and “Scenario 3”. Yet, in 
“Scenario 1” there is statistical significance that validates Hypothesis 1 when the age is in 
the intervals between forty-one and fifty-five or sixty-one and sixty-five (p=.028 and 
p=.027 respectively). 
Regarding the tenure of the target firm’s CEOs, we found a declining pattern, which is 
distinguished from the curvilinear effect that age shows in every scenario. In fact, as many 
years a CEO stays in this position, his/her willingness to resist a takeover attempt declines. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to state that tenure plays an important role on a higher or 
lower resistance to a takeover attempt, meaning that we cannot support or reject 
Hypothesis 2, do to the lack of statistical significance in all the scenarios (the best scenario 
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is “Scenario 2” with p=.076). However, and showing the same behavior as the variable age, 
when categorizing tenure in groups, “Scenario 3” allows to validate Hypothesis 2 
considering that tenure between eleven and fifteen years has statistical significance 
(p=.044). This shows a different conclusion to the ones of previous studies, due to the fact 
that CEOs with tenure between eleven and fifteen years are less willing to resist a takeover 
attempt in comparison to CEOs with lower tenures. In fact, Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) 
did not reach to a visible conclusion, stating that, according to the data they have used, 
there was “...no evidence that the length of a CEO’s tenure in a position affects takeover 
resistance” (567). Our conclusions here are consistent with those achieved in previous 
studies. CEOs with higher tenures have a different behavior, which is opposite to a more 
quite and assertive one: CEOs with higher tenures are more willing to pursue an higher 
acquisition activity (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Yim, 2013) and likely to suffer from 
overconfidence, building up an illusion of control (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Shefrin, 
2005). 
Nationality and academic background are not, in fact, studied before in any previous study. 
Thus, we cannot assert any comparison with other works. Both variables did not, in 
“Scenario 2” and “Scenario 3”, show statistic significance, meaning that we cannot validate 
or reject Hypotheses 3 and 4. Nevertheless, the results, which consider “Balkan and Slavic” 
national/cultural group in “Scenario 1”, when age and tenure are used as linear variables, 
are better, showing statistical significance, allowing the validation, in this particular case, of 
Hypothesis 4. 
Regarding now the hypothesis that the gender of the CEOs can affect their desirability to 
resist a takeover attempt of any acquirer firm, there is statistical significance in “Scenario 
1”, when age and tenure are used as linear variables, meaning that we can accept, in this 
case, Hypothesis 5.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this research study was to find evidence that a target firm’s CEO profile can 
influence the success of a takeover attempt. In other words, our objective here has been to 
problematize around the question of whether different individual characteristics (age, 
tenure, academic background, nationality and gender) of a target firm’s CEO imply that 
he/she has a greater of lesser resistance to a takeover attempt. To reach the evidences we 
have looked for, it was used data with the following criteria: acquisitions limited to a period 
of years between 2006 and 2016; both the acquirer and the target firm are listed; and the 
target and acquirer firm’s are from a specific geographical area (European countries). From 
this initial search, three data scenarios were constructed. 
Regarding this data division into three scenarios, the explanation about why this was done 
is quite simple. The initial problem that regarded the topic of study in this dissertation was 
due to the lack of information available. Indeed, and contrary to previous studies, to find 
the needed information about European firms was not as simple and as feasible as the one 
referring to North-American companies. In consequence, only acquisitions with listed 
target firms were selected, considering that the search for information of unlisted target 
firms’ CEOs would be quite problematic. The initial criteria search, allowed the 
achievement of the scenario that was called “Scenario 1”, with 378 observations. The data 
size of this first scenario allowed us, when it is submitted to statistical analysis on our 
regression model, to reach significant conclusions. 
Nonetheless, our major objective was to analyze target firms from European countries, 
which lead to “Scenario 2”, with 323 observations. Moreover, in this scenario we had 
observations whose target firm’s are from European countries that were not part of the 
initial selection (see table 4 in Section 3.1.), but they brought valid information to the 
research here. Additionally, returning to the first two assumptions assumed in “Section 
3.1.”, we looked for acquisitions in a period of time with no relevant economic problems, 
leading, thus, to “Scenario 3”. This division allowed the comparison, with statistical 
significance, of the correlation between target firm’s CEO profile and his/her resistance to 
a takeover attempt among different realities. Indeed, this allowed us both to achieve close 
answers to our questions, which informed this dissertation, and ultimately contrast them 
with conclusions of previous studies about the similar preoccupations. 
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In fact, when analyzing the results obtained after submitting the data to the binomial 
regression model, we conclude that we reached peculiar and important conclusions, and we 
were able to validate some of the hypotheses stipulated here. We mean, according to the 
different chosen scenario, that the target firms’ CEOs age, tenure, academic background, 
nationality and gender may play an important role on their greater or lesser resistance to a 
takeover attempt.  
Although it has been impossible to fully accept or reject all the hypotheses formulated in all 
scenarios, this does not mean that there is o relationship between psychological aspects and 
the greater or lesser resistance from the part of the target firms’ CEOs to a takeover 
attempt. In fact, it can be stated, with high certainty, that this dissertation represents a great 
contribution to the topic of study. This is due to five reasons, which can be also seen as a 
support for future research: 
1) To test and use a wide number of variables. In fact, and just by analyzing our data, there 
are acquisitions in which the target firm’s CEO belongs to the family controlling the 
firm. Many of the previous studies found evidence that those CEOs who own stock 
from the firm they manage may play an important role in the success of a takeover 
attempt. If a CEO belongs to the family who controls the target firm and, 
simultaneously, his/her family funded that specific firm, it is highly plausible that this 
aspect could represent an even greater influence on the higher or lower likelihood of 
target firms’ CEOs to resist takeover attempts. The psychological attachment between a 
CEOs and the family firm they control is, logically, special and intense, thus leading us 
to believe that in different periods of time (i.e., with different age and tenure) the answer 
can be different, and can even present a different behavior if compared to target firms’ 
CEOs that do not belong or are not managing a family controlled company; 
2) To study and analyze a larger and more complete data. In fact, it should be interesting if 
there was the possibility to study data whose observations include unlisted companies, 
meaning this the entrance of smaller firms. However, this means a more intense 
research considering the lack of information regarding these smaller firms, which can be 
controlled by a family; 
3) To enhance the problematization of CEOs gender influence on M&A. In fact, we 
reached statistical significance, which allowed us to validate the hypothesis that gender 
has influence on a higher or lower resistance of the target firm’s CEO to a takeover 
attempt. In one of the scenarios, we found evidence that male CEOs are 0.095 times 
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more likely to resist a takeover attempt than female CEOs. Nevertheless, there was no 
statistical significance to validate that European CEOs gender has influence on the 
lower or higher resistance to takeover attempts, on the data of the other two scenarios 
studied in this dissertation. There are still few female CEOs to consider the results as 
definitive. However, time changes, and everyday European governments and European 
firms governance enhance the willingness to offer opportunities to women to assume 
higher positions in any company, where we include the CEO position. It would be 
interesting to analyze in a further research this aspect; 
4) To nullify the economic consequences, which resulted from the financial crisis. In fact, 
“Scenario 3” only incorporated the years between 2012 and 2016, after the higher years 
of the subprime crisis in North America. Nonetheless, the debt crisis in Europe started 
in 2011, and the following years suffered the consequences. It was only in the year of 
2018 that, countries like Greece, ended their economic assistance programs. This means 
that there are still major problems in the European economies and in European firms. 
Thus, we conclude that the CEOs, both from the target and the acquirer firms, behaved 
in a different way, when compared with a stable period of time; 
5) To study other subjects instead of the CEO. If possible, and being at disposable the 
necessary information, we believe that it could be interesting to use as a subject of study 
not the CEO but instead the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of the target firms that 
face a takeover attempt. This is due to the fact that, in recent years, the role of the CFO 
has expanded significantly from traditionally being viewed as a financial gatekeeper to a 
strategic partner and advisor of the CEO. In fact, a report released by McKinsey 
(Chappuis et al., 2008), where 88% of 164 CFOs surveyed, reported that CEOs expect 
the CFOs to be more active participants in shaping the strategy of their organizations. 
Notwithstanding the stated conclusions, this work represents an increment on the 
knowledge regarding the topic of the present study, as well as it suggests further researches. 
In fact, which is more relevant are not the conclusions themselves, but the suggestions they 
bring to encourage possible ways to pursue a future research.  
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 I 
Annexes 
 
Annex 1 
The following table presents the entire data (belonging to Scenario 1, and from which the other two scenarios are based upon) used to test the 
hypotheses stated and that allowed an analysis of the results reached. 
 
N.º ACQUIRER COMPANY TARGET COMPANY 
TARGET FIRM INFORMATION TRANSACTION INFORMATION CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 ROCHE HOLDING AG GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC United 
Kingdom 
73 870 950,14 63 519 754,39 19,92 2014 116 616 040,47 100% Yes Andrew Witty 1964 2008 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
2 EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION BP PLC United 
Kingdom 
116 692 051,23 230 563 737,30 5,91 2014 113 605 563,61 100% Yes Robert Warren Dudley 1955 2010 United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
3 AT&T CORPORATION VODAFONE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
64 526 759,94 180 170 343,07 5,05 2014 96 702 169,40 100% Yes Vittorio Amedeo Colao 1961 2004 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
4 
CHINA MINMETALS 
CORPORATION 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
24 520 223,83 45 494 053,02 18,34 2014 28 376 879,89 100% Yes Mark Cutifani 1958 2007 Australia Engineering Male 
5 CREDITT SUISSE GROUP AG JULIUS BAER GRUPPE AG Switzerland 11 561 467,05 68 391 387,23 33,16 2014 9 739 628,10 100% Yes Boris F.J.Collardi 1974 2009 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
6 FIAT SPA PEUGEOT SA France 15 341 362,28 21 289 000,00 10,09 2014 7 227 908,00 100% Yes Philippe Varin 1952 2008 France Engineering Male 
                                                
1 Market capitalization (in thousand euros); 
2 Total assets (in thousand euros); 
3 Stock price 3 months prior to rumor (in euros); 
4 Year in each the transaction or presumable transaction was attempted; 
5 Value of the effective or presumable deal (in million euros); 
6 Percentage (%) pretended to be acquired or that was acquired if the deal was accepted (not resisted); 
7 CEO of the target firm resisted (“Yes”) or did not resisted (“No”) to the takeover attempt; 
8 Name of the target firm CEO; 
9 Year of birth of the target firm CEO; 
10 Year in each the target firm CEO was appointed to office; 
11 Nationality of the target firm CEO at the moment the takeover attempt occurred; 
12 Academic Background of the target firm CEO at the moment the takeover attempt occurred; 
13 Gender of the CEO of the target firm CEO at the moment the takeover attempt occurred. 
 II 
7 OPHIR ENERGY PLC. PREMIER OIL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
451 037,93 5 116 819,81 3,37 2014 2 087 908,37 100% Yes Simon Lockett 1964 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
8 EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION GENEL ENERGY PLC 
United 
Kingdom 338 702,87 1 756 775,36 7,22 2015 1 650 548,02 100% Yes Murat Özgül 1972 2015 Turkey Engineering Male 
9 AMAZON.COM INC AO WORLD PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
743 310,31 0,00 2,44 2014 1 600 248,17 100% Yes John Roberts 1974 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
10 VONTOBEL HOLDING AG BB BIOTECH AG Switzerland 2 330 791,34 2 941 868,99 11,75 2012 953 434,70 100% Yes Thomas Szucs 1960 2004 Switzerland Medicine Male 
11 KESKO OYJ AKTIA PANKKI OYJ Finland 667 000,00 2 232 138,00 0,00 2014 900 000,00 100% Yes Jussi Laitinen 1956 2008 Finland Economics 
and Business 
Male 
12 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG DEUTSCHE BANK AG Germany 32 768 687,05 1 232 245 000,00 35,14 2014 16 759 548,00 100% Yes Anshu Jain 1960 2012 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
13 UNDISCLOSED ACQUIROR(S) LONMIN PLC United 
Kingdom 
292 059,83 1 407 627,05 344,31 2014 263 422,15 100% Yes Bennetor Magara 1968 2013 Zimbabwe Engineering Male 
14 UNDISCLOSED INVESTOR GOLDBACH GROUP AG Switzerland 185 269,43 161 864,36 16,59 2014 103 439,97 100% Yes Michi Frank 1967 2014 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
15 PORR AG UBM REALITATENENWICKLUNG AG Austria 245 208,00 780 602,91 15,86 2014 36 000,00 25% No Karl Bier 1954 1998 Austria Law Male 
16 REHACT AB AB FASTATOR Sweden 40 209,71 61 337,28 0,00 2015 3 088 054,00 100% No Daniel Hummel 1971 2015 Sweden 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
17 LIFCO AB NOTE AB Sweden 51 383,01 32 734,92 0,78 2012 26 594,02 100% Yes Peter Laveson 1971 2010 Sweden Economics 
and Business 
Male 
18 ALLGEIER SE EASY SOFTWARE AG Germany 35 124,90 26 244,41 3,27 2012 21 600,00 100% Yes Manfred Wagner 1948 2002 Germany Engineering Male 
19 
ARENDALS FOSSEKOMPANI 
ASA 
GLAMOX AS Norway 65 989,00 155 036,93 1,53 2012 12 353,61 9% No Kjell Stamnes 1948 2001 Norway 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
20 TRAKM8 HOLDINGS PLC BELGRAVIUM TECHNOLOGIES PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
7 767,65 12 615,94 0,00 2014 6 368,51 100% Yes John Kembery 1944 1997 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
21 NEURON BIOPHARMA SA NEOL BIOSOLUTIONS SA Spain 9 001,00 8 820,00 0,00 2014 4 500,00 50% No Javier Velasco 1977 2012 Spain Engineering Male 
22 CLASS EDITORI SPA TELESIA SPA Italy 0,00 9 501,00 0,00 2011 2 430,00 26% No Paolo Andrea Panerai 1944 2003 Italy Law Male 
23 BRIGHTER AB DIVISION BY ZERO AB Sweden 0,00 2 867,43 0,00 2015 834,18 100% No Swapnil Sansare 1987 2013 India N.a. Male 
24 KINEXIA SPA INNOVATEC SPA Italy 3 025,11 37 925,55 0,00 2013 791,00 71% No Roberto Maggio  1967 2012 Italy Law Male 
25 VODAFONE GROUP PLC LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 5 918 652,24 22 511 191,77 32,78 2014 108 638 574,97 100% Yes Michael Thomas Fries 1963 2005 
United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business Male 
26 ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE SA E.ON AG Germany 20 007 990,25 77 068 200,00 42,25 2008 83 875 250,00 100% Yes Giuliano Zuccoli 1943 2008 Italy Engineering Male 
27 NOVARTIS AG ASTRAZENECA PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
81 546 046,45 22 714 556,45 45,97 2014 74 984 486,93 100% Yes Pascal Soriot 1959 2012 France Veterinary Male 
28 
FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES 
NV 
VOLKSWAGEN AG Germany 34 322 895,69 156 693 000,00 184,35 2015 72 237 987,00 100% Yes Martin Winterkorn 1947 2007 Germany Physics Male 
29 BHP BILLITON LTD RIO TINTO PLC United 
Kingdom 
60 015 008,30 79 818 253,32 41,44 2007 64 590 599,98 100% Yes Tom Albanese 1957 2007 United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
30 GLENCORE PLC RIO TINTO PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
60 015 008,30 79 818 253,32 37,95 2014 58 131 895,77 100% Yes 
Sam Maurice Cossart 
Walsh 
1949 2013 Australia 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
 III 
31 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG BT GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
36 916 160,63 49 353 377,06 6,35 2015 53 543 904,00 100% Yes Gavin Patterson 1968 2013 United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
32 ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI SPA AXA SA France 59 986 282,88 74 181 000,00 22,12 2008 51 498 230,00 100% Yes Henri de Castrie 1954 2000 France Law Male 
33 GLENCORE PLC RIO TINTO PLC United 
Kingdom 
60 015 008,30 79 818 253,32 42,35 2014 40 987 225,16 100% Yes Sam Maurice Cossart 
Walsh 
1949 2013 Australia Economics 
and Business 
Male 
34 VODAFONE GROUP PLC SKY PLC United 
Kingdom 
25 343 550,39 3 441 033,05 11,31 2014 36 146 718,23 100% Yes David Jeremy Darroch 1962 2007 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
35 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 
PLC 
IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC United 
Kingdom 
34 473 281,21 35 132 142,51 28,75 2014 35 489 478,20 100% Yes Alison Jane Cooper 1966 2009 United 
Kingdom 
Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Female 
36 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC ASTRAZENECA PLC 
United 
Kingdom 81 546 046,45 22 714 556,45 30,12 2009 35 192 161,92 100% Yes David R. Brennan 1954 2006 
United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business Male 
37 ACCIONA SA ENDESA SA Spain 18 904 018,56 15 400 000,00 35,30 2007 32 155 000,00 46% No Rafael Miranda Robredo 1949 1997 Spain Engineering Male 
38 PEUGEOT SA FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES NV Netherlands 22 909 371,52 96 299 000,00 9,22 2015 30 327 361,84 100% Yes Sergio Marchionne 1952 2004 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
39 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND BANKING GROUP 
LTD 
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
28 970 501,15 52 363 062,18 17,56 2014 28 696 654,88 100% Yes Peter Sands 1962 2006 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
40 POSCO CO., LTD THYSSENKRUPP AG Germany 15 616 208,15 37 370 000,00 37,92 2007 27 782 408,00 100% Yes Ekkehard Schulz 1941 1999 Poland Engineering Male 
41 
TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR 
MANUFACTURING CO., LTD INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG Germany 24 067 037,30 10 792 000,00 11,98 2015 23 899 403,00 100% Yes Reinhard Ploss 1955 2012 Germany Engineering Male 
42 UNILEVER NV BEIERSDORF AG Germany 24 666 011,17 5 725 000,00 74,38 2015 22 281 840,00 100% Yes Stefan F. Heidenreich 1962 2012 Germany 
Economics 
and Business Male 
43 ENI SPA REPSOL-YPF SA Spain 22 521 454,63 22 612 000,00 17,05 2010 21 645 909,00 100% Yes Antonio Brufau 1948 2004 Spain 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
44 NESTLE SA L'OREAL SA France 103 668 003,62 15 066 900,00 78,22 2009 21 489 270,00 70% Yes Jean-Paul Agon 1956 2006 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
45 CARREFOUR SA METRO AG Germany 3 237 854,46 1 783 000,00 61,51 2007 21 313 445,00 100% Yes Hans-Joachim Körber 1946 2001 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
46 NOVARTIS AG ROCHE HOLDING AG Switzerland 148 059 437,84 65 553 145,00 179,28 2013 21 045 426,00 67% Yes Severin Schwan 1967 2008 Austria 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
47 TELEFONICA SA TIM PARTICIPACOES SA Brazil 9 233 632,17 5 077 263,70 2,84 2013 20 000 000,00 100% Yes Rodrigo Abreu 1969 2013 Brazil Engineering Male 
48 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG KONINKLIJKE KPN NV Netherlands 12 221 871,49 13 530 000,00 3,23 2015 19 643 171,00 100% Yes Eelco Blok 1957 2011 Netherlands Economics 
and Business 
Male 
49 ASTRAZENECA PLC SHIRE PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
39 974 070,12 56 497 058,36 20,82 2011 19 182 177,55 100% Yes Angus C. Russell 1956 2008 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
50 TIM PARTICIPACOES SA OI SA Brazil 570 424,24 14 008 612,82 7,32 2014 17 349 392,17 100% Yes 
José Mauro Mettrau 
Carneiro da Cunha 
1949 2009 Brazil Engineering Male 
51 SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA 
BANKEN AB 
DANSKE BANK A/S Denmark 30 401 727,49 308 080 217,10 13,15 2013 16 482 370,28 100% Yes Thomas F. Borgen 1964 2013 Norway Economics 
and Business 
Male 
52 ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE SA CENTRICA PLC United 
Kingdom 
10 902 918,54 12 266 722,34 3,87 2014 16 152 376,03 100% Yes Sam Laidlaw 1956 2006 United 
Kingdom 
Law Male 
53 VOLKSWAGEN AG PORSCHE AUTOMOBIL HOLDING SE Germany 7 950 249,72 23 307 947,00 41,04 2009 15 515 875,00 100% Yes Wendelin Wiedeking 1952 1993 Germany Engineering Male 
 IV 
54 SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD Ireland 33 658 586,48 52 620 000,00 34,94 2011 15 445 089,37 100% Yes Edward D. Breen 1956 2002 United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
55 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG KONINKLIJKE KPN NV Netherlands 12 221 871,49 13 530 000,00 2,42 2014 14 565 839,00 100% Yes Eelco Blok 1957 2011 Netherlands Economics 
and Business 
Male 
56 SOCIETE GENERALE SA COMMERZBANK AG Germany 15 635 684,63 367 584 000,00 12,44 2014 14 299 647,00 100% Yes Martin Blessing 1963 2008 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
57 SOCIETE GENERALE SA UNICREDIT SPA Italy 34 676 293,75 404 979 901,00 10,58 2016 14 134 848,00 100% Yes Jean Pierre Mustier 1961 2016 France Engineering Male 
58 HITACHI LTD RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION Japan 16 166 900,05 6 948 630,48 6,57 2015 14 026 294,49 100% Yes Hisao Sakuta 1944 2013 Japan Engineering Male 
59 VONOVIA SE DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG Germany 12 894 531,10 8 052 618,77 21,72 2015 14 000 000,00 100% Yes Michael Zahn  1963 2014 Germany Economics 
and Business 
Male 
60 ORANGE SA KONINKLIJKE KPN NV Netherlands 12 221 871,49 13 530 000,00 1,89 2013 13 891 138,00 100% Yes Eelco Blok 1957 2011 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
61 SACYR VALLEHERMOSO SA EIFFAGE SA France 8 951 663,63 6 732 937,00 79,10 2007 13 862 373,00 67% Yes Jean-François Roverato 1944 1992 France Engineering Male 
62 EADS NV BAE SYSTEMS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
20 568 597,90 25 295 916,09 3,49 2012 13 271 496,85 100% Yes Ian King 1956 2007 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
63 PUBLICIS GROUPE SA CAP GEMINI SA France 16 661 357,14 19 517 618,00 86,16 2016 13 042 315,00 100% Yes Paul Hermelin 1952 2002 France Engineering Male 
64 RIO TINTO PLC IVANHOE MINES LTD Canada 5 718 323,38 10 700 678,05 18,39 2011 12 491 251,28 100% Yes Lars-Eric Johansson 1945 2007 Sweden 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
65 SONAECOM SGPS SA PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA Portugal 224 128,13 257 498,82 7,55 2006 12 242 993,00 100% Yes Henrique Granadeiro 1943 2003 Portugal 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
66 COLOPLAST A/S SMITH & NEPHEW PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
12 700 144,75 6 558 828,12 10,99 2014 12 235 138,54 100% Yes Olivier Bohuon 1959 2011 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
67 OMV AG MOL MAGYAR OLAJ- ES GAZIPARI NYRT Hungary 7 953 949,06 9 631 185,71 111,01 2007 11 523 443,76 80% Yes Zsolt Hernadi Thomas 1960 2001 Hungary 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
68 J SAINSBURY PLC MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
6 440 636,17 9 754 471,34 4,24 2012 10 187 338,58 100% Yes Marc Bolland 1959 2010 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
69 IBERDROLA SA EDP ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL SA Portugal 10 549 111,27 22 795 868,00 2,83 2006 10 016 000,00 91% Yes António Mexia 1957 2005 Portugal 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
70 AJINOMOTO CO., INC. SYMRISE AG Germany 9 266 800,61 4 422 432,42 35,74 2014 10 000 000,00 100% Yes Heinz-Jürgen Bertram 1956 2009 Germany Chemestry Male 
71 ORANGE SA PROXIMUS SA Belgium 9 244 987,57 16 509 410,00 33,38 2015 9 626 956,00 100% Yes Dominique Leroy 1964 2014 Belgium Economics 
and Business 
Male 
72 TELECOM ITALIA SPA TELEKOM AUSTRIA AG Austria 5 135 920,56 8 055 558,90 10,61 2009 9 533 070,00 100% Yes Johannes Ametsreiter 1967 2009 Austria Journalism Male 
73 SIEMENS AG ALSTOM SA France 8 133 268,77 8 113 000,00 21,61 2014 9 407 210,37 100% Yes Patrick Kron 1953 2003 France Engineering Male 
74 IRIDE SPA A2A SPA Italy 4 830 940,11 7 499 593,00 2,85 2008 9 179 412,00 100% Yes Wulf Bernotat 1948 2003 Germany Law Male 
75 SIEMENS AG GKN PLC United 
Kingdom 
5 654 804,05 9 984 073,77 3,69 2016 9 145 254,47 100% Yes Nigel Stein 1955 2012 United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
76 SOCIETE GENERALE SA COMMERZBANK AG Germany 15 635 684,63 367 584 000,00 7,77 2013 9 104 640,00 100% Yes Martin Blessing 1963 2008 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
77 WOLTERS KLUWER NV REED ELSEVIER NV Netherlands 19 487 198,75 10 474 000,19 5,84 2010 8 322 886,00 100% Yes Erik Engstrom 1963 2009 Sweden 
Economics 
and Business Male 
78 IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP 
PLC 
SWEDISH MATCH AB Sweden 6 151 060,18 5 551 658,39 26,14 2013 8 108 798,46 100% Yes Lars Dahlgren 1970 2008 Sweden Economics 
and Business 
Male 
 V 
79 ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LTD WIRECARD AG Germany 11 489 128,60 1 331 422,25 34,95 2016 7 893 370,00 100% Yes Markus Braun 1970 2002 Austria 
Computer 
Science 
Male 
80 
MUNCHENER 
RUCKVERSICHERUNGS-
GESELLSCHAFT AG 
AEGON NV Netherlands 11 138 370,54 396 291 000,00 4,65 2010 7 690 698,00 100% Yes Alexander R. Wynaendts  1960 2008 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
81 DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG LEG IMMOBILIEN AG Germany 6 016 652,75 1 266 599,10 63,19 2015 7 600 000,00 95% Yes Thomas Hegel 1956 2013 Germany Law Male 
82 SCHLUMBERGER NV PETROFAC LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
1 987 525,78 6 306 180,66 16,76 2011 7 543 763,31 100% Yes Ayman Asfari 1958 2002 Syria Engineering Male 
83 LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC KABEL DEUTSCHLAND HOLDING AG Germany 10 180 137,99 1 604 153,30 54,26 2013 7 524 450,00 100% Yes Adrian von Hammerstein 1953 2007 
United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
84 DEUTSCHE BANK AG COMMERZBANK AG Germany 15 635 684,63 367 584 000,00 11,81 2015 7 439 004,00 100% Yes Martin Blessing 1963 2008 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
85 BANCO SANTANDER SA BANKIA SA Spain 11 479 897,19 215 043 906,00 4,29 2014 7 028 358,00 61% Yes José Sevilla Álvarez 1964 2014 Spain 
Economics 
and Business Male 
86 MTN GROUP LTD 
MILLICOM INTERNATIONAL CELLULAR 
SA Luxembourg 6 187 144,21 2 778 092,00 71,30 2014 6 889 716,80 100% Yes Hans-Holger Albrecht 1963 2012 Germany Law Male 
87 VOLKSWAGEN AG SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION Japan 18 944 412,95 14 605 166,18 14,79 2011 6 832 633,97 80% Yes Osamu Suzuki 1930 1978 Japan 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
88 EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION OIL SEARCH LTD 
Papua New 
Guinea 
7 719 413,71 8 765 531,08 5,61 2014 6 710 584,05 100% Yes Peter Robert Botten 1955 1994 
United 
Kingdom 
Geology Male 
89 ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS PLC WARTSILA OYJ Finland 10 374 893,51 3 436 000,00 10,83 2014 6 706 198,00 100% Yes Björn Rosengren 1959 2011 Denmark Engineering Male 
90 TOTAL SA OIL SEARCH LTD 
Papua New 
Guinea 
7 719 413,71 8 765 531,08 4,19 2016 6 588 032,93 100% Yes Peter Robert Botten 1955 1994 
United 
Kingdom 
Geology Male 
91 
NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA 
LUKOIL OAO 
NESTE OIL OYJ Finland 13 679 136,26 7 013 000,00 24,84 2008 6 366 500,00 100% Yes Risto Rinne 1949 2004 Finland Engineering Male 
92 OUTOKUMPU OYJ ACERINOX SA Spain 3 289 344,76 2 668 132,00 17,90 2007 6 228 000,00 100% Yes Rafael Naranjo Olmedo 1944 2007 Spain Engineering Male 
93 UNICREDIT SPA MEDIOBANCA SPA Italy 7 613 677,67 57 908 908,25 8,64 2009 6 076 612,00 100% Yes Alberto Nagel 1965 2007 Italy Economics 
and Business 
Male 
94 TELENOR ASA TDC A/S Denmark 4 158 765,51 8 372 854,63 6,68 2014 6 055 069,47 100% Yes Carsten Dilling  1962 2012 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
95 AVIVA PLC RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 9 758 511,10 6 864 847,87 7,40 2013 6 046 099,02 100% Yes Simon Lee 1961 2011 
United 
Kingdom 
English and 
French Male 
96 TELEFONICA SA PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA Portugal 224 128,13 257 498,82 7,72 2010 5 954 633,00 90% Yes Zeinal Bava 1965 2008 Portugal Engineering Male 
97 WOLSELEY PLC TRAVIS PERKINS PLC United 
Kingdom 
5 356 312,67 6 577 283,70 25,58 2016 5 653 025,05 100% Yes John Carter 1961 2014 United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
98 ALLIANZ SE VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP AG WIENER 
VERSICHERUNG GRUPPE 
Austria 3 297 919,92 6 739 236,00 48,65 2007 5 641 650,00 100% Yes Günter Geyer 1943 2001 Austria Economics 
and Business 
Male 
99 MOBISTAR SA TELENET GROUP HOLDING NV Belgium 6 832 630,05 5 335 662,00 46,06 2015 5 585 422,00 100% Yes John C. Porter 1957 2013 
United States 
of America 
History Male 
100 CONTINENTAL AG AUTOLIV INC. 
United States 
of America 
9 215 804,26 7 129 077,62 73,65 2014 5 364 964,95 100% Yes Jan Carlson 1960 2007 Sweden Engineering Male 
101 THALES SA SAFRAN SA France 35 827 013,17 20 221 000,00 17,17 2007 5 262 913,00 100% Yes Jean-Paul Béchat 1942 2005 France Engineering Male 
102 SOLVAY SA CRODA INTERNATIONAL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
6 548 814,94 1 857 452,32 28,39 2014 4 990 574,64 100% Yes Steve Foots 1968 2012 
United 
Kingdom 
Chemestry Male 
 VI 
103 VIVENDI SA UBISOFT ENTERTAINMENT SA France 4 567 227,79 2 183 581,00 26,76 2016 4 949 849,00 73% Yes Yves Guillemot 1960 1986 France Computer 
Science 
Male 
104 NOVARTIS AG STADA ARZNEIMITTEL AG Germany 5 483 952,51 2 709 977,74 39,94 2014 4 949 304,00 100% Yes Hartmut Ulrich Retzlaff 1951 1994 Germany Economics 
and Business 
Male 
105 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC NEDBANK GROUP LTD South Africa 7 570 512,07 51 815 665,15 13,92 2010 4 776 328,39 70% Yes Michael Brown 1967 2010 South Africa 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
106 PROSIEBENSAT1 MEDIA AG AXEL SPRINGER SE Germany 3 706 785,69 6 077 600,00 56,09 2015 4 712 512,00 100% Yes Mathias Dopfner 1963 2002 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
107 BANCO DE SABADELL SA BANKINTER SA Spain 7 104 637,91 71 103 670,00 6,83 2006 4 703 000,00 100% Yes Jaime Echegoyen 
Enríquez 
1957 2002 Spain Law Male 
108 SINGAPORE EXCHANGE LTD LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 13 711 323,06 71,72 13,14 2012 4 664 545,81 100% Yes Xavier R. Rolet 1959 2009 France 
Economics 
and Business Male 
109 COBHAM PLC MEGGITT PLC 
United 
Kingdom 4 217 851,94 5 437 613,64 5,65 2014 4 446 122,96 100% Yes Stephen Gareth Young 1955 2013 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
110 WEIR GROUP PLC, THE METSO OYJ Finland 4 280 414,75 2 185 464,84 24,53 2014 4 420 239,00 100% Yes Matti Kähkönen 1956 2011 Finland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
111 NORDEA BANK AB ABN AMRO GROUP NV Netherlands 12 668 285,85 393 171 000,00 16,56 2016 4 384 536,00 100% Yes Gerrit Zalm 1952 2010 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business Male 
112 
DEUTSCHE ANNINGTON 
IMMOBILIEN SE GAGFAH SA Luxembourg 4 462 581,97 2 012 370,00 10,91 2014 4 300 000,00 100% No Thomas Zinnöcker 1961 2013 Germany 
Economics 
and Business Male 
113 DANAHER CORPORATION QIAGEN NV Netherlands 6 975 309,69 110 005,00 15,74 2014 4 265 348,08 100% Yes Peer Michael Schatz 1965 2004 Germany 
Economics 
and Business Male 
114 TELEFONICA SA GRUPO TELEVISA SAB DE CV Mexico 11 687 924,73 12 947 782,53 3,56 2013 4 260 314,87 100% Yes 
Emilio Fernando 
Azcárraga Jean 1968 1997 Mexico 
Economics 
and Business Male 
115 ABB LTD KUKA AG Germany 4 828 742,12 1 122 745,00 81,24 2016 4 115 785,00 100% Yes Till Reuter 1968 2010 Germany 
Economics 
and Business Male 
116 MAN AG ISUZU MOTORS LTD Japan 10 428 870,77 8 556 866,74 7,39 2011 4 094 247,51 100% Yes Susumu Osoi 1949 2007 Japan 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
117 BHP BILLITON PLC K+S AG Germany 3 968 679,12 7 489 823,00 37,85 2015 4 013 658,00 100% Yes Norbert Steiner 1954 2007 Germany Law Male 
118 BANCO SANTANDER SA BANK ZACHODNI WBK SA Polonia 9 427 483,65 31 822 609,41 42,10 2010 3 941 925,17 96% No Mateusz Morawiecki 1968 2007 Poland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
119 BASF AG LONZA GROUP AG Switzerland 16 763 279,97 11 789 580,44 67,93 2007 3 901 583,75 100% Yes Stefan Borgas 1964 2004 Germany 
Economics 
and Business Male 
120 CARLSBERG A/S TSINGTAO BREWERY CO., LTD China 2 362 864,08 1 511 425,68 6,04 2013 3 844 840,49 100% Yes Ke Xing Huang 1962 2012 China Engineering Male 
121 COMPASS GROUP PLC EDENRED SA France 5 692 050,42 4 556 000,00 13,76 2010 3 744 249,00 100% Yes Jacques Stern 1964 2010 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
122 VIVENDI SA MEDIASET SPA Italy 3 815 365,05 3 732 839,00 2,71 2016 3 532 343,00 71% Yes Pier Silvio Berlusconi 1969 2015 Italy N.a. Male 
123 NESTLE SA 
CHOCOLADEFABRIKEN LINDT & 
SPRUNGLI AG 
Switzerland 8 200 694,23 5 963 698,14 43 774,27 2014 3 475 886,80 100% Yes Ernst Tanner 1946 1993 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
124 ADECCO SA HAYS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
2 724 148,29 1 489 139,26 1,40 2014 3 308 558,08 100% Yes Alistair R. Cox 1961 2007 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
125 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ELEKTA AB Sweden 3 537 761,29 1 188 245,89 8,36 2015 3 284 198,26 100% Yes Tomas Puusepp 1955 2015 Sweden Engineering Male 
126 HERA SPA ACEA SPA Italy 3 279 659,38 4 407 078,00 12,87 2007 3 256 233,00 100% Yes Andrea Mangoni 1963 2003 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
 VII 
127 INTESA SANPAOLO SPA PARMALAT SPA Italy 5 750 963,82 4 059 660,00 1,81 2008 3 076 197,00 98% Yes Enrico Bondi 1934 2008 Italy Chemestry Male 
128 VF CORPORATION PUMA SE Germany 5 505 099,36 1 157 600,00 220,80 2014 3 001 410,00 100% Yes Bjørn Gulden 1965 2013 Switzerland Economics 
and Business 
Male 
129 CP ALL PCL SIAM MAKRO PCL Thailand 4 745 601,25 1 504 712,10 0,55 2013 2 995 453,20 64% No Suchada Ithijaruku 1953 2010 Thailand 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
130 
EI DU PONT DE NEMOURS & 
COMPANY 
ARKEMA SA France 7 704 650,12 7 034 000,00 50,63 2011 2 973 340,00 100% Yes Thierry Le Hénaff 1964 2006 France Engineering Male 
131 CARLYLE GROUP LP SOCIETE ANONYME MAROCAINE DE 
L'INDUSTRIE DU RAFFINAGE 
Morocco 261 221,31 3 609 323,44 12,41 2016 2 963 932,88 100% Yes Jamal Mohamed Ba-Amer 1961 1999 Morocco Engineering Male 
132 IDEMITSU KOSAN CO., LTD SHOWA SHELL SEKIYU KK Japan 4 258 324,74 6 791 268,18 8,38 2015 2 888 979,81 67% Yes Tsuyoshi Kameoka 1960 2015 Japan 
Economics 
and Business Male 
133 STATOIL ASA LUNDIN PETROLEUM AB Sweden 6 691 948,36 1 285 584,95 13,28 2016 2 849 479,44 88% Yes Alex Schneiter 1960 2015 Switzerland Geology Male 
134 ADECCO SA HAYS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
2 724 148,29 1 489 139,26 1,91 2016 2 810 781,42 100% Yes Alistair R. Cox 1961 2007 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
135 SONAE SGPS SA PT MULTIMEDIA SGPS SA Portugal 2 823 599,50 2 328 908,43 9,08 2006 2 791 144,00 100% Yes Zeinal Bava 1965 2003 Portugal Engineering Male 
136 
ACS ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCION Y SERVICIOS 
SA 
HOCHTIEF AG Germany 9 372 625,69 3 609 099,00 52,78 2007 2 729 100,00 70% Yes Hans-Peter Keitel  1947 1992 Germany Engineering Male 
137 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC. PARMALAT SPA Italy 5 750 963,82 4 059 660,00 1,87 2010 2 637 367,00 82% Yes Enrico Bondi 1934 2008 Italy Chemestry Male 
138 CARILLION PLC BALFOUR BEATTY PLC 
United 
Kingdom 2 307 903,59 5 494 507,76 3,60 2014 2 602 579,35 100% Yes  Ian Tyler 1961 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
139 GAZPROM OAO OMV PETROM SA Romenia 3 571 392,20 9 091 168,04 0,07 2012 2 600 000,00 51% Yes Mariana Gheorghe 1956 2006 Romania 
Economics 
and Business 
Female 
140 CANON INC. AXIS AB Sweden 2 471 601,67 239 467,09 22,26 2014 2 565 313,35 85% No Ray Mauritsson 1962 2003 Sweden Engineering Male 
141 BPOST NV POSTNL NV Netherlands 1 848 589,17 2 080 000,00 3,41 2015 2 546 129,00 100% Yes Herna Verhagen 1966 2012 Netherlands Law Female 
142 SOLVAY SA NV UMICORE SA Belgium 8 837 920,41 4 600 597,00 7,51 2009 2 527 200,00 100% Yes Marc Grynberg 1965 2008 Belgium Engineering Male 
143 VODAFONE GROUP PLC TALKTALK TELECOM GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
2 035 389,17 1 109,36 3,00 2013 2 514 226,69 100% Yes Diana Mary Harding 1967 2010 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Female 
144 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 
INC. 
JUPITER FUND MANAGEMENT PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
3 686 685,16 275 798,70 4,89 2014 2 500 365,48 100% Yes Maarten F. Slendebroek 1961 2014 Netherlands Law Male 
145 IBERDROLA SA 
SOLARIA ENERGIA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE 
SA Spain 178 657,83 142 714,00 21,18 2008 2 500 000,00 100% Yes 
Enrique Díaz-Tejeiro 
Gutiérrez 1944 2007 Spain Engineering Male 
146 OMV AG 
ÖSTERREICHISCHE 
ELEKTRIZITÄTSWIRTSCHAFTS-AG 
Austria 6 998 689,15 4 690 708,20 34,80 2006 2 499 000,00 51% Yes Hans Haider 1942 2003 Austria Engineering Male 
147 OI SA PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA Portugal 224 128,13 257 498,82 4,08 2013 2 495 399,00 100% Yes Zeinal Bava 1965 2008 Portugal Engineering Male 
148 ADECCO SA HAYS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 2 724 148,29 1 489 139,26 1,44 2011 2 489 448,02 100% Yes Alistair R. Cox 1961 2007 
United 
Kingdom Engineering Male 
149 UNILEVER PLC HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD India 28 405 172,75 2 127 989,17 6,59 2013 2 464 045,04 15% No Nitin Paranjpe 1963 2008 India Engineering Male 
 VIII 
150 TOKYO ELECTRON LTD ASM INTERNATIONAL NV Netherlands 3 511 704,03 2 177 202,00 42,68 2015 2 424 620,00 100% Yes Chuck del Prado 1961 2008 Netherlands Engineering Male 
151 TDC A/S COM HEM HOLDING AB Sweden 2 386 197,70 1 051 142,74 5,83 2014 2 423 554,76 100% Yes Anders Nilsson 1967 2014 Sweden Law Male 
152 FINMECCANICA SPA QINETIQ GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
1 843 358,97 1 133 315,30 2,79 2007 2 361 038,96 100% Yes Graham Love 1954 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
153 CENTRICA PLC DRAX GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
1 240 894,87 3 962 985,55 9,46 2008 2 353 497,66 100% Yes 
Dorothy Carrington 
Thompson 
1961 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
154 HARMONY GOLD MINING 
COMPANY LTD 
ACACIA MINING PLC United 
Kingdom 
914 934,51 1 853 930,49 4,12 2016 2 312 120,07 100% Yes Brad Gordon 1962 2013 Australia Engineering Male 
155 
CHINA PETROLEUM & 
CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
MAUREL & PROM SA France 703 225,11 466 069,00 10,71 2011 2 304 641,00 100% Yes Jean-François Hénin 1944 2007 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
156 CARLSBERG A/S BEIJING YANJING BREWERY CO., LTD China 2 165 819,85 2 317 448,36 0,77 2013 2 289 705,36 100% Yes Xiaodong Zhao 1972 2012 China Engineering Male 
157 ACTAVIS PLC ALMIRALL SA Spain 1 444 141,92 2 148 677,00 11,42 2014 2 276 035,00 100% Yes 
Eduardo Javier Sanchiz 
Yrazu 1956 2011 Spain 
Economics 
and Business Male 
158 FOSUN INTERNATIONAL LTD THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
2 416 281,36 5 174 805,23 1,92 2015 2 270 241,20 95% Yes Peter Fankhauser 1960 2014 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
159 EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION TULLOW OIL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
3 227 359,28 9 195 783,87 11,55 2014 2 244 996,81 100% Yes Aidan Heavey 1953 1985 Ireland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
160 ROYAL MAIL PLC POSTNL NV Netherlands 1 848 589,17 2 080 000,00 3,41 2015 2 207 853,00 100% Yes Herna Verhagen 1966 2012 Netherlands Law Female 
161 KONINKLIJKE BOSKALIS 
WESTMINSTER NV 
FUGRO NV Netherlands 1 098 597,08 1 898 304,00 28,32 2014 2 201 000,00 100% Yes Paul van Riel 1956 2012 Netherlands Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Male 
162 WEIR GROUP PLC, THE OUTOTEC OYJ Finland 1 300 162,58 899 600,00 7,79 2014 2 197 458,00 100% Yes Pertti Korhonen 1961 2010 Sweden Engineering Male 
163 DEBENHAMS PLC STOCKMANN OYJ ABP Finland 180 685,54 1 504 007,59 20,50 2010 2 129 264,00 100% Yes Hannu Penttilä 1953 2001 Finland Law Male 
164 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC MORPHOSYS AG Germany 2 268 805,06 399 779,19 56,60 2013 2 096 425,00 100% Yes Simon Moroney 1959 1998 New Zealand Chemestry Male 
165 VOLKSWAGEN AG MAN AG Germany 13 437 815,90 5 958 651,00 110,25 2008 2 083 363,00 23% No Håkan Samuelsson 1951 2005 Sweden Engineering Male 
166 AMS AG DIALOG SEMICONDUCTOR PLC United 
Kingdom 
1 983 033,08 1 314 755,70 17,30 2014 2 076 351,43 100% Yes Jalal Bagherli 1956 2005 United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
167 FRESENIUS SE & CO. KGAA RHON-KLINIKUM AG Germany 2 009 342,84 1 150 500,00 21,15 2012 2 023 025,00 100% Yes Wolfgang Pföhler 1953 2005 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
168 
BANCO COMERCIAL 
PORTUGUES SA BANCO BPI SA Portugal 1 708 972,10 32 638 695,00 1,17 2014 1 966 848,00 100% Yes Fernando Ulrich 1952 2004 Portugal N.a. Male 
169 BNP PARIBAS SA BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES SA Portugal 4 111 005,49 53 781 865,00 41,77 2011 1 960 349,00 100% Yes Carlos Ferreira 1949 2008 Portugal Law Male 
170 SOLVAY SA SYMRISE AG Germany 9 266 800,61 4 422 432,42 15,64 2010 1 934 492,00 100% Yes Heinz-Jürgen Bertram 1958 2009 Germany Chemestry Male 
171 C&C GROUP PLC MITCHELLS & BUTLERS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 1 572 135,75 3 869 722,79 4,79 2014 1 920 878,69 100% Yes Alistair Darby 1966 2012 
United 
Kingdom Chemestry Male 
172 IMMOFINANZ AG CA IMMOBILIEN ANLAGEN AG Austria 2 420 724,14 3 460 025,77 16,88 2016 1 907 611,00 74% Yes Frank Nickel 1959 2016 Austria 
Economics 
and Business Male 
 IX 
173 SALZGITTER AG AURUBIS AG Germany 3 078 007,15 3 742 813,00 53,94 2015 1 892 903,00 75% Yes Bernd Drouven 1955 2014 Germany Engineering Male 
174 QATAR NATIONAL BANK SAQ NATIONAL SOCIETE GENERAL BANK SAE Egypt 1 780 877,66 10 356 521,33 2,88 2012 1 886 332,88 97% No Frédéric Oudéa 1963 2008 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
175 HEXAGON AB AVEVA GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
1 453 077,29 370 050,16 19,32 2015 1 850 000,00 100% Yes Richard Longdon 1956 1999 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
176 
BANCO DE GALICIA Y BUENOS 
AIRES SA 
BANCO PATAGONIA SA Argentina 1 841 854,98 4 201 288,23 2,20 2016 1 845 006,31 100% Yes 
João Carlos de Nóbrega 
Pecego 
1964 2014 Brazil 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
177 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC GENMAB A/S Denmark 8 453 698,40 966 600,97 13,67 2013 1 839 528,06 90% Yes Jan G. J. van de Winke 1962 2010 Netherlands Pharmacy Male 
178 
LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS 
VUITTON SA TREASURY WINE ESTATES LTD Australia 6 547 408,19 3 558 866,01 2,50 2014 1 825 151,42 100% Yes Michael Anthony Clarke 1965 2014 South Africa 
Economics 
and Business Male 
179 DEUTSCHE BORSE AG 
BOLSAS Y MERCADOS ESPANOLES 
HOLDING DE MERCADOS Y SISTEMAS 
FINANCIEROS SA 
Spain 2 219 993,00 506 480,00 19,05 2011 1 802 333,00 100% Yes 
Antonio J. Zoido 
Martínez 1945 2002 Spain Law Male 
180 
BAYERISCHE MOTOREN 
WERKE AG 
SGL CARBON SE Germany 1 388 575,82 1 686 150,00 22,43 2013 1 795 189,00 84% Yes Robert J. Koehler 1947 1994 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
181 THYSSENKRUPP AG SALZGITTER AG Germany 2 869 631,75 867 665,00 33,91 2016 1 770 518,00 100% Yes Heinz Jörg Fuhrmann 1956 2011 Germany Engineering Male 
182 BANK POLSKA KASA OPIEKI SA BANK MILLENNIUM SA Polonia 2 597 592,16 16 918 556,77 1,29 2010 1 726 695,18 100% Yes Bogusław Kott 1947 2003 Poland Economics and Business Male 
183 DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG GSW IMMOBILIEN AG Germany 5 270 957,28 2 871 884,00 33,38 2013 1 697 470,00 100% No Thomas Zinnöcker 1961 2005 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
184 SAP AG TEMENOS GROUP AG Switzerland 7 569 094,13 1 063 356,47 15,69 2010 1 613 019,00 100% Yes Andreas Andreades 1965 2003 Cyprus Engineering Male 
185 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, 
THE 
ELEMENTIS PLC United 
Kingdom 
1 505 841,72 1 117 068,65 3,17 2014 1 547 323,64 100% Yes David Dutro 1954 2007 United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
186 
SUN PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRIES LTD 
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL AG Germany 5 483 952,51 2 709 977,74 31,90 2010 1 516 796,00 100% Yes Hartmut Ulrich Retzlaff 1951 1994 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
187 RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC AIR BERLIN PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
69 379,50 1 382 553,00 0,70 2016 1 500 000,00 100% Yes Stefan Pichler 1957 2015 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
188 AG BARR PLC BRITVIC PLC United 
Kingdom 
2 924 531,16 630,35 5,16 2013 1 463 509,41 100% Yes Simon Litherland 1964 2013 Zimbabwe Economics 
and Business 
Male 
189 NOVARTIS AG GENFIT SA France 745 501,18 165 268,00 37,76 2015 1 418 055,00 100% Yes Jean-François Mouney 1956 1995 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
190 CARLYLE GROUP LP FAURECIA SA France 8 990 271,34 6 635 591,00 12,79 2013 1 414 975,00 57% Yes Yann Delabrière 1950 2007 France 
Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Male 
191 PUBLICIS GROUPE SA CRITEO SA France 1 629 635,30 817 765,59 23,39 2014 1 352 128,11 100% Yes Jean-Baptiste Rudelle 1969 2005 France Engineering Male 
192 TRAVIS PERKINS PLC SIG PLC United 
Kingdom 
1 174 281,16 1 504 934,07 2,23 2014 1 349 553,98 100% Yes Stuart Mitchell 1960 2013 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
193 SUN PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRIES LTD 
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL AG Germany 5 483 952,51 2 709 977,74 22,65 2012 1 349 216,00 100% Yes Hartmut Ulrich Retzlaff 1951 1994 Germany Economics 
and Business 
Male 
194 
MITSUBISHI HEAVY 
INDUSTRIES LTD VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS A/S Denmark 12 411 877,29 9 897 999,96 8,18 2012 1 340 461,96 100% Yes Ditlev Engel 1964 2005 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business Male 
195 DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG GAGFAH SA Luxembourg 4 462 581,97 2 012 370,00 8,32 2013 1 264 753,00 66% Yes Stephen Charlton 1958 2012 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
 X 
196 ASTRAZENECA PLC AMARIN CORPORATION PLC United 
Kingdom 
905 716,01 134 743,64 9,99 2012 1 257 404,22 100% Yes Joseph S. Zakrzewski 1963 2010 United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
197 EI TOWERS SPA RAI WAY SPA Italy 1 380 399,95 366 940,00 3,15 2015 1 225 333,00 100% Yes Stefano Ciccotti 1960 2000 Italy Engineering Male 
198 CARLSBERG A/S C&C GROUP PLC Ireland 1 224 576,71 1 088 100,00 3,52 2012 1 208 885,00 100% Yes Stephen Glancey 1960 2012 Ireland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
199 
LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS 
VUITTON SA 
YOOX SPA Italy 2 654 670,95 2 437 883,00 13,65 2013 1 180 478,00 100% Yes Federico Marchetti 1969 2000 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
200 WM MORRISON SUPERMARKETS 
PLC 
OCADO GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
2 596 645,57 1 013 124,58 1,22 2013 1 173 324,23 100% Yes Timothy Steiner 1970 2000 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
201 TELEFONICA SA UNITED INTERNET AG Germany 11 767 000,31 5 833 969,00 4,87 2009 1 154 244,00 100% Yes Ralph Dommermuth 1963 1988 Germany N.a. Male 
202 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC ASPEN PHARMACARE HOLDINGS LTD South Africa 9 930 017,13 3 441 922,32 2,91 2009 1 113 527,84 100% Yes Stephen Saad 1964 1997 South Africa Economics 
and Business 
Male 
203 
GROUPE BRUXELLES LAMBERT 
SA IMERYS SA France 6 283 484,23 6 531 181,00 50,60 2011 1 085 862,00 26% Yes Gilles Michel 1956 2010 France Engineering Male 
204 CAIXABANK SA BANCO BPI SA Portugal 1 708 972,10 32 638 695,00 1,17 2014 1 082 420,00 56% Yes Fernando Ulrich 1952 2004 Portugal N.a. Male 
205 SIEMENS AG NORDEX SE Germany 860 331,32 1 664 990,06 20,24 2015 1 046 441,00 100% Yes Lars Bondo Krogsgaard 1966 2015 Denmark Law Male 
206 VESUVIUS PLC MORGAN ADVANCED MATERIALS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
1 084 427,85 1 047 415,19 4,04 2014 1 045 963,10 100% Yes Mark Robertshaw 1968 2006 
United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
207 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC KATANGA MINING LTD Canada 2 337 354,72 4 919 034,37 12,34 2007 1 032 329,38 100% Yes Arthur Ditto 1944 2005 United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
208 CAIXABANK SA LIBERBANK SA Spain 1 293 677,65 25 838 210,00 2,01 2015 1 018 359,00 100% Yes 
Manuel Menéndez 
Menéndez 1959 2011 Spain 
Economics 
and Business Male 
209 
COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN 
SA 
GERRESHEIMER AG Germany 2 094 819,50 1 436 334,76 28,62 2011 1 008 568,00 100% Yes Uwe Röhrhoff 1962 2010 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
210 AG BARR PLC BRITVIC PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
2 924 531,16 630,35 4,01 2012 996 083,31 100% Yes Paul Moody 1957 2003 
United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
211 HEINEKEN NV UNITED BREWERIES LTD India 2 697 794,42 546 877,78 14,10 2015 991 463,92 29% Yes Shekhar Ramamurthy  1960 2015 India Engineering Male 
212 BAE SYSTEMS PLC BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
5 194 103,79 7 141 051,15 3,50 2006 954 644,37 100% Yes Archibald Bethel 1948 2003 United 
Kingdom 
Law Male 
213 BNP PARIBAS SA BANK GOSPODARKI ZYWNOSCIOWEJ SA Polonia 1 298 166,26 15 976 292,93 11,75 2013 954 192,33 89% No Jacek Bartkiewicz 1954 2002 Poland 
Economics 
and Business Male 
214 NOVARTIS AG THROMBOGENICS NV Belgium 122 107,18 123 710,95 18,18 2014 938 453,00 100% Yes Patrik De Haes  1958 2008 Belgium Medicine Male 
215 RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC NORWEGIAN AIR SHUTTLE ASA Norway 692 654,88 3 258 498,59 31,12 2015 934 056,39 100% Yes Bjorn Kjos 1946 2002 Norway Law Male 
216 DRILLISCH AG FREENET AG Germany 3 942 358,36 3 070 516,66 7,65 2011 932 623,00 78% Yes Christoph Vilanek 1968 2009 Austria 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
217 COMPUGROUP MEDICAL SE AGFA GEVAERT NV Belgium 667 985,01 3 597 032,00 3,20 2016 930 000,00 100% Yes Christian Reinaudo 1954 2010 France Physics Male 
218 CARLYLE GROUP LP CHEMRING GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 547 417,79 797 365,07 3,63 2013 926 749,01 100% Yes Mark Papworth 1964 2012 
United 
Kingdom Engineering Male 
 XI 
219 INDIAN HOTELS CO., LTD, THE ORIENT-EXPRESS HOTELS LTD United 
Kingdom 
1 045 324,80 1 378 835,60 7,14 2012 901 690,23 93% Yes Philip Mengel 1945 2012 United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
220 BANCO DE SABADELL SA LIBERBANK SA Spain 1 293 677,65 25 838 210,00 1,22 2016 900 000,00 100% Yes 
Manuel Menéndez 
Menéndez 
1959 2011 Spain 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
221 ASTELLAS PHARMA INC. BASILEA PHARMACEUTICA AG Switzerland 769 270,82 300 223,93 47,61 2013 898 072,93 100% Yes Ronald Scott 1955 2013 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
222 GLENCORE XSTRATA PLC OZ MINERALS LTD Australia 1 878 003,35 1 805 396,83 2,92 2013 894 948,57 90% Yes Terry Burgess  1950 2009 Australia Engineering Male 
223 CAIRO COMMUNICATION SPA RCS MEDIAGROUP SPA Italy 637 718,98 1 561 482,00 0,57 2016 876 468,00 100% Yes Laura Cioli 1963 2015 Italy 
Economics 
and Business Female 
224 TELEFONICA SA OI SA Brazil 570 424,24 14 008 612,82 0,30 2016 857 412,48 100% Yes 
José Mauro Mettrau 
Carneiro da Cunha 1949 2009 Brazil Engineering Male 
225 GENEL ENERGY PLC DNO INTERNATIONAL ASA Norway 1 133 155,56 668 579,17 0,79 2011 845 902,17 100% Yes Helge Eide 1954 2000 Norway Engineering Male 
226 
COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN 
SA VIDRALA SA Spain 2 098 841,00 1 200 494,00 36,41 2014 836 658,00 100% Yes Carlos Delclaux Zulueta 1956 2002 Spain 
Economics 
and Business Male 
227 GILDEMEISTER AG KUKA AG Germany 4 828 742,12 1 122 745,00 26,90 2007 809 704,00 100% Yes Gerhard Wiedemann 1946 2007 Germany Engineering Male 
228 ISS A/S SPOTLESS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD Australia 851 407,83 1 288 740,87 0,73 2016 808 532,68 100% Yes Martin Sheppard 1967 2015 Australia 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
229 EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION GULF KEYSTONE PETROLEUM LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
277 218,82 548 065,72 121,09 2014 769 533,40 100% Yes Todd Francis Kozel 1967 2001 
United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
230 CELESIO AG ORIOLA-KD OYJ Finland 352 945,43 908 306,30 3,77 2015 767 356,00 100% Yes Eero Hautaniemi 1965 2006 Finland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
231 
KBC GROEP NV/ KBC GROUPE 
SA 
PERMANENT TSB GROUP HOLDINGS PLC Ireland 1 023 064,86 978 000,00 2,80 2016 762 752,00 100% Yes Jeremy John Masding 1966 2012 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
232 TULLETT PREBON PLC GFI GROUP INC. United States 
of America 
572 281,99 1 121 770,34 7,56 2008 755 915,72 100% Yes Michael Adrian Gooch 1959 1987 United States 
of America 
N.a. Male 
233 BNP PARIBAS SA BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA SPA Italy 114 761,60 129 498 962,29 2 782,00 2014 747 387,00 100% Yes Fabrizio Viola 1956 2012 Italy 
Economics 
and Business Male 
234 NOVARTIS AG MORPHOSYS AG Germany 2 268 805,06 399 779,19 25,15 2013 722 816,00 94% Yes Simon Moroney 1959 1998 New Zealand Chemestry Male 
235 ROCHE HOLDING AG FOUNDATION MEDICINE INC. United States 
of America 
2 077 384,30 140 918,08 15,36 2015 713 585,71 47% No Michael J. Pellini 1965 2011 United States 
of America 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
236 COLONIA REAL ESTATE AG DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG Germany 12 894 531,10 8 052 618,77 40,00 2007 706 853,00 96% Yes Andreas Lehner 1955 2004 Germany Engineering Male 
237 TRAVIS PERKINS PLC GALIFORM PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
3 262 613,19 910 295,81 1,19 2008 698 762,73 100% Yes Matthew Ingle 1952 2005 
United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
238 ASTRAZENECA PLC EVOTEC AG Germany 1 980 248,64 482 753,93 3,56 2014 658 025,00 100% Yes Werner Lanthaler 1968 2009 Austria Economics 
and Business 
Male 
239 SONAECOM SGPS SA 
ZON MULTIMÉDIA - SERVIÇOS DE 
TELECOMUNICAÇÕES E MULTIMÉDIA 
SGPS SA 
Portugal 2 823 599,50 2 328 908,43 2,42 2012 648 794,00 100% Yes Rodrigo Costa 1959 2007 Portugal N.a. Male 
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240 CAIXABANK SA BANCO BPI SA Portugal 1 708 972,10 32 638 695,00 1,14 2016 644 523,00 39% No Fernando Ulrich 1952 2004 Portugal N.a. Male 
241 CARLYLE GROUP LP CLEARVIEW WEALTH LTD Australia 373 298,80 1 499 338,12 0,58 2015 625 243,27 100% Yes Simon Swanson 1957 2010 Australia 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
242 GILEAD SCIENCES INC. GENFIT SA France 745 501,18 165 268,00 37,95 2016 622 572,00 100% Yes Jean-François Mouney 1956 1995 France 
Economics 
and Business Male 
243 TENARIS SA HUNTING PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
1 124 464,85 1 067 789,89 8,90 2015 597 384,82 100% Yes Dennis L. Proctor 1954 2001 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
244 CAIRO COMMUNICATION SPA RCS MEDIAGROUP SPA Italy 637 718,98 1 561 482,00 0,57 2016 596 930,00 60% No Laura Cioli 1963 2015 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Female 
245 HERA SPA ASCOPIAVE SPA Italy 831 223,45 541 924,00 2,86 2016 576 184,00 100% Yes Zugno Fulvio 1955 2011 Italy 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
246 TAG IMMOBILIEN AG ADLER REAL ESTATE AG Germany 744 092,30 1 836 020,00 10,15 2016 573 985,00 100% Yes Arndt Krienen 1966 2016 Germany Law Male 
247 ING GROEP NV BINCKBANK NV Netherlands 299 295,00 3 924 061,00 7,15 2015 570 130,00 100% Yes Binckbank NV 1973 2015 Belgium 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
248 CARLYLE GROUP LP OZFOREX GROUP LTD Australia 253 107,72 135 618,55 1,72 2015 567 862,75 100% Yes Richard Kimber 1969 2015 Australia 
Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Male 
249 DANONE SA SOCIETE CENTRALE LAITIERE SA Morocco 532 915,71 298 098,20 118,98 2012 550 000,00 38% No Hassan Bouhemou 1968 2001 Morocco Engineering Male 
250 TULLETT PREBON PLC COMPAGNIE FINANCIERE TRADITION SA Switzerland 580 835,20 926 472,08 87,59 2011 516 358,75 100% Yes Patrick Combes 1953 1996 France 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
251 OLAM INTERNATIONAL LTD AMSTERDAM COMMODITIES NV Netherlands 592 936,23 345 964,00 23,98 2015 508 316,00 100% Yes Erik Rietkerk 1960 2013 Netherlands Engineering Male 
252 BOUYGUES SA IMPLENIA AG Switzerland 1 040 718,87 2 476 747,19 20,56 2007 485 618,45 100% Yes Christian Bubb 1943 2004 Switzerland Engineering Male 
253 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., 
LTD 
FINGERPRINT CARDS AB Sweden 509 708,35 365 246,19 1,19 2013 480 473,40 100% Yes Johan Carlström, 1963 2009 Sweden Economics 
and Business 
Male 
254 TULLETT PREBON PLC GFI GROUP INC. 
United States 
of America 572 281,99 1 121 770,34 13,23 2007 473 739,83 100% Yes Michael Adrian Gooch 1959 1987 
United States 
of America N.a. Male 
255 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG NETIA SA Polonia 449 154,75 623 202,67 1,06 2013 472 190,60 100% Yes Miroslaw Godlewski 1967 2007 Poland Engineering Male 
256 
FORTESCUE METALS GROUP 
LTD ATLAS IRON LTD Australia 93 633,90 384 354,83 0,54 2014 436 651,83 100% Yes 
Kenneth Edward 
Brinsden 1970 2012 Australia Engineering Male 
257 SANOFI SA ADOCIA SAS France 99 169,31 78 459,00 79,35 2016 410 272,00 100% Yes Gérard Soula 1943 2011 France Chemestry Male 
258 ADLER REAL ESTATE AG WESTGRUND AG Germany 556 568,49 238 564,30 3,33 2015 408 653,00 94% No Arndt Krienen 1966 2014 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
259 BANCA PROFILO SPA PIRELLI & C REAL ESTATE SPA Italy 106 200,40 155 790,00 4,20 2010 400 000,00 100% Yes Marco Tronchetti Provera 1948 1992 Italy 
Economics 
and Business Male 
260 ENI SPA SNAM RETE GAS SPA Italy 14 282 603,97 16 653 410,00 3,63 2006 392 164,00 5% No Carlo Malacarne 1953 2006 Italy Engineering Male 
261 BLACKSTONE GROUP LP, THE ESTIA HEALTH LTD Australia 535 743,04 1 212 256,93 3,23 2016 388 714,83 100% Yes Paul Gregersen 1965 2014 
United 
Kingdom Engineering Male 
262 TUBOS REUNIDOS SA TUBACEX SA Spain 445 478,91 560 012,27 6,63 2008 376 198,00 82% Yes Alvaro Videgain Muro 1951 1992 Spain 
Economics 
and Business Male 
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263 SPARKLE ROLL GROUP LTD BANG & OLUFSEN A/S Denmark 598 049,79 292 899,67 9,25 2016 375 787,99 87% Yes Tue Mantoni 1975 2011 Denmark Economics 
and Business 
Male 
264 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., 
LTD 
AIXTRON SE Germany 1 302 210,55 337 711,00 10,76 2014 375 359,00 100% Yes Martin Goetzeler 1962 2013 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
265 MORI SEIKI CO., LTD GILDEMEISTER AG Germany 3 608 524,29 1 531 219,51 9,43 2010 370 669,00 95% Yes Ruediger Kapitza 1951 1996 Germany Engineering Male 
266 NATIONAL BANK of GREECE SA EUROBANK PROPERTIES REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY SA 
Greece 931 591,98 1 003 297,00 4,96 2013 362 950,00 100% Yes Fokion C. Karavias 1964 2005 Greece Engineering Male 
267 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 
PLC 
BENTOEL INTERNASIONAL INVESTAMA 
TBK, PT Indonesia 921 019,06 843 440,82 0,03 2009 359 130,65 85% No 
Nicolaas Bernadus 
Tirtadinata 1958 2007 Indonesia 
Economics 
and Business Male 
268 
COMPAGNIE GENERALE DES 
ETABLISSEMENTS MICHELIN 
SCA 
JK TYRE & INDUSTRIES LTD India 394 641,12 841 292,58 0,44 2014 334 045,73 100% Yes Raghupati Singhania 1945 1975 India 
Natural 
Sciences 
Male 
269 PENDRAGON PLC LOOKERS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 460 183,84 2 135 613,88 1,22 2006 312 453,38 100% Yes Henry Kenneth Surgenor 1944 2001 
United 
Kingdom N.a. Male 
270 NATIONAL BANK of GREECE SA BANCA TRANSILVANIA SA Romenia 1 981 383,96 12 706 477,24 0,15 2009 311 987,47 100% Yes Robert C. Rekkers 1959 2002 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
271 ASAHI GLASS CO., LTD VINYTHAI PCL Thailand 625 947,49 507 191,62 0,25 2016 283 049,67 59% No Vincent De Cuyper 1961 2014 Belgium Engineering Male 
272 TESCO PLC MOTHERCARE PLC United 
Kingdom 
229 440,60 401 742,16 4,06 2011 282 551,29 100% Yes Ben Gordon 1960 2002 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
273 DIC ASSET AG WCM BETEILIGUNGS & GRUNDBESITZ AG Germany 516 429,65 261 710,76 2,19 2016 280 192,00 80% Yes Stavros Efremidis 1968 2014 Germany Economics 
and Business 
Male 
274 UNITED INTERNET AG QSC AG Germany 239 012,78 374 430,69 2,61 2013 275 268,00 100% Yes Bernd Schlobohm 1960 1999 Germany Engineering Male 
275 DNO INTERNATIONAL ASA GULF KEYSTONE PETROLEUM LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
277 218,82 548 065,72 6,50 2016 270 817,52 100% Yes Jón Ferrier 1956 2015 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
276 TULLOW OIL PLC BOWLEVEN PLC 
United 
Kingdom 94 204,72 344 542,29 1,09 2012 262 758,34 100% Yes Kevin Hart 1969 2006 
United 
Kingdom 
Mathematics 
and Statistics Male 
277 JCDECAUX SA AFFICHAGE HOLDING SA Switzerland 1 167 630,13 202 721,79 107,84 2011 257 336,22 70% Yes Daniel Hofer 1963 2010 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
278 REMY COINTREAU SA LAURENT-PERRIER SA France 410 858,99 188 260,00 70,80 2016 248 692,00 60% Yes Stéphanie Meneux de 
Nonancourt  
1963 1999 France Economics 
and Business 
Female 
279 GJENSIDIGE FORSIKRING ASA ALM BRAND A/S Denmark 1 887 670,05 704 778,51 0,97 2012 235 695,53 100% Yes Søren Boe Mortensen 1955 2001 Denmark Economics 
and Business 
Male 
280 RIO TINTO PLC IVANHOE MINES LTD Canada 5 718 323,38 10 700 678,05 13,04 2012 230 118,17 2% No Lars-Eric Johansson 1945 2007 Sweden 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
281 SONOVA HOLDING AG AMPLIFON SPA Italy 2 906 080,41 917 908,00 1,69 2008 226 199,00 100% Yes Franco Moscetti 1951 2004 Italy N.a. Male 
282 GAZIT-GLOBE LTD ATRIUM EUROPEAN REAL ESTATE LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
1 564 197,28 3 122 039,00 4,06 2015 218 692,00 14% No Josip Kardun 1974 2014 Germany Law Male 
283 FRANCE TÉLÉCOM SA SOCIETE NATIONALE DE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DU SENEGAL 
Senegal 3 582 553,08 2 432 574,88 194,69 2009 209 000,00 10% Yes Cheikh Tidiane Mbaye  1956 1988 Senegal Engineering Male 
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284 SPORTS DIRECT 
INTERNATIONAL PLC 
FINDEL PLC United 
Kingdom 
202 377,14 442 932,93 2,81 2016 204 773,90 83% Yes David Sugden 1952 2015 United 
Kingdom 
Mathematics 
and Statistics 
Male 
285 CONTAGIOUS GAMING INC. SPORTECH PLC United 
Kingdom 
229 253,31 248,57 0,93 2015 200 687,09 100% Yes Ian Penrose 1965 2005 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
286 DEUTSCHE BANK AG VIVANCO GRUPPE AG Germany 10 191,15 40 542,86 28,42 2006 195 500,00 64% No Paul Jähn 1961 2004 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
287 TKH GROUP NV 
NEDERLANDSCHE APPARATENFABRIEK 
NEDAP NV 
Netherlands 297 860,91 113 782,00 31,71 2013 193 716,00 95% Yes Ruben M. Wegman 1967 2009 Netherlands Engineering Male 
288 HARGREAVES SERVICES PLC UK COAL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
392 990,81 559 880,99 6,75 2010 190 752,32 100% Yes Jonathan Lloyd 1956 2007 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
289 KINGFISHER PLC MR BRICOLAGE SA France 151 972,86 420 605,00 10,10 2014 187 275,00 68% Yes Jean-François Boucher 1970 1999 France Economics 
and Business 
Male 
290 SUNCORP GROUP LTD CLEARVIEW WEALTH LTD Australia 373 298,80 1 499 338,12 0,35 2012 173 301,13 100% Yes Simon Swanson 1957 2010 Australia 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
291 WPP PLC STW COMMUNICATIONS GROUP LTD Australia 509 884,54 1 355 827,79 0,81 2015 163 465,76 76% Yes Michael Connaghan 1966 2008 Australia 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
292 
SMARTONE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
HOLDINGS LTD 
I-CABLE COMMUNICATIONS LTD China 167 423,38 325 537,88 0,07 2016 161 808,74 74% Yes Stephen Ng Tin-hoi 1953 1999 China 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
293 POLYTEC HOLDING AG GRAMMER AG Germany 654 347,40 704 553,00 9,24 2010 161 801,94 90% Yes Hartmut Mueller 1963 2010 Denmark Engineering Male 
294 AXEL SPRINGER AG TRADEDOUBLER AB Sweden 21 734,31 52 843,24 5,33 2010 159 904,20 100% Yes 
Urban Gillström 
1964 2009 Sweden Engineering Male 
295 BRICORAMA SA MR BRICOLAGE SA France 151 972,86 420 605,00 12,90 2015 155 816,00 100% Yes Guy Beghin 1953 2015 France 
Economics 
and Business Male 
296 POLYTEC HOLDING AG GRAMMER AG Germany 654 347,40 704 553,00 21,43 2008 152 198,00 90% Yes Rolf-Dieter Kempis 1953 2007 Germany Engineering Male 
297 
PICTON PROPERTY INCOME 
LTD 
INVISTA FOUNDATION PROPERTY TRUST 
LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
372 936,48 570 450,12 0,42 2011 146 645,75 100% Yes Duncan Owen 1968 2006 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
298 JYSKE BANK A/S VESTJYSK BANK A/S Denmark 327 347,89 2 941 936,49 1,27 2013 144 804,80 100% Yes Vagn Thorsager 1948 2012 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
299 THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC THOMAS COOK (INDIA) LTD India 1 122 327,41 304 201,88 1,29 2008 143 059,44 56% No Madhavan Menon 1955 2006 India 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
300 
ACKERMANS & VAN HAAREN 
NV 
COMPAGNIE D'ENTREPRISES CFE SA Belgium 3 080 772,38 1 559 927,90 45,10 2013 137 990,00 23% No Renaud Bentegeat  1953 2003 France Law Male 
301 ATLANTIA SPA STALEXPORT AUTOSTRADY SA Polonia 246 366,46 100 473,24 0,81 2016 134 856,50 61% No Emil Wąsacz 1945 2011 Poland Engineering Male 
302 SPAR NORD BANK A/S NORDJYSKE BANK A/S Denmark 296 007,21 2 757 243,42 16,90 2014 129 620,73 100% Yes Claus Andersen 1966 2010 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business Male 
303 A2A SPA ACSM-AGAM SPA Italy 122 590,57 266 352,00 1,08 2015 128 720,00 100% Yes Paolo Soldani 1972 2015 Italy Engineering Male 
304 ECKOH PLC NETCALL PLC 
United 
Kingdom 105 276,61 34 356,88 0,71 2015 123 322,61 100% Yes Henrik Peter Bang 
1948 2004 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business Male 
305 TAWA PLC CHARLES TAYLOR CONSULTING PLC 
United 
Kingdom 220 743,38 1 656 649,86 1,59 2012 119 598,67 100% Yes David Marock 1970 2011 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
306 SPEEDY HIRE PLC HSS HIRE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 52 221,20 483 526,39 0,90 2015 113 388,89 100% Yes Chris Davis 1952 2006 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
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307 AUSTEVOLL SEAFOOD ASA LEROY SEAFOOD GROUP ASA Norway 2 883 683,81 1 109 961,88 1,25 2008 112 015,18 32% No Ole-Eirik Lerøy 1959 1991 Norway Economics 
and Business 
Male 
308 KONICA MINOLTA INC. MOBOTIX AG Germany 199 841,37 57 971,00 12,28 2015 110 073,00 65% Yes Klaus Gesmann 1967 2013 Germany Engineering Male 
309 JASTRZEBSKA SPOLKA 
WEGLOWA SA 
NEW WORLD RESOURCES PLC United 
Kingdom 
18 136,42 319 461,00 0,91 2014 110 046,64 100% Yes Gareth Penny 1962 2012 South Africa Economics 
and Business 
Male 
310 ARQUES INDUSTRIES AG AURELIUS AG Germany 1 729 167,63 557 634,00 6,03 2008 103 104,00 100% Yes Dirk Markus 1971 2006 Germany Economics 
and Business 
Male 
311 BAYWA AG TURNERS AND GROWERS LTD New Zealand 242 937,94 472 665,28 0,97 2011 98 517,99 73% No Jeffery Wesley 1947 2005 Australia N.a. Male 
312 
HEADER COMPRESSION 
SWEDEN HOLDING AB 
STENDORREN FASTIGHETER AB Sweden 180 133,59 274 170,19 7,22 2014 92 441,90 100% Yes Aniruddha Kulkarni 1973 2013 India Engineering Male 
313 AKTIESELSKABET BORGESTAD 
ASA 
WILSON ASA Norway 56 682,37 106 921,00 2,43 2006 91 409,00 73% Yes Øyvind Fjerde 1962 2000 Norway Economics 
and Business 
Male 
314 SPAREBANK 1 SR-BANK ASA SANDNES SPAREBANK Norway 127 389,84 2 022 177,62 11,45 2014 88 263,11 100% Yes 
Trine Karin Lise 
Stangeland 1973 2005 Norway 
Economics 
and Business Female 
315 
DEMIRE DEUTSCHE 
MITTELSTAND REAL ESTATE 
AG 
FAIR VALUE REIT-AG Germany 117 045,13 117 401,01 7,86 2015 87 711,00 72% No Frank Schaich 1959 2007 Germany N.a. Male 
316 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC PROMOPHARM SA Morocco 125 124,39 39 982,25 73,22 2011 83 235,35 64% No Mohamed Kamal Mernissi 1942 1985 Morocco Pharmacy Male 
317 AF AB ETTEPLAN OYJ Finland 192 722,21 118 036,00 4,20 2015 81 727,00 100% Yes Juha Näkki 1973 2012 Finland Engineering Male 
318 AMADEUS IT HOLDING SA I:FAO AG Germany 145 917,87 25 227,68 13,05 2014 79 471,00 100% No Louis Arnitz 1956 1977 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
319 AXEL SPRINGER AG AUFEMININ.COM SA France 362 446,95 155 594,00 24,40 2007 76 686,00 27% No Anne-Sophie Pastel 1969 1999 France Engineering Female 
320 GS HOLDINGS CORPORATION SSANGYONG CORPORATION South Korea 179 679,74 866 872,43 3,08 2009 75 590,15 70% Yes Lee Yoo-il 1943 2009 South Korea Engineering Male 
321 POLO RESOURCES LTD GCM RESOURCES PLC 
United 
Kingdom 27 313,19 45 988,86 1,77 2008 75 429,29 70% Yes Steve Bywater 1952 2006 Australia Engineering Male 
322 SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB ROTTNEROS AB Sweden 114 815,05 123 423,69 0,28 2014 64 087,64 100% Yes Carl-Johan Jonsson 1966 2013 Sweden 
Economics 
and Business Male 
323 AXFOOD AB MATSE HOLDING AB Sweden 19 748,84 35 587,79 0,91 2016 56 800,95 100% Yes Måns Danielson 1964 2011 Sweden N.a. Male 
324 CANCOM SE PIRONET NDH AG Germany 59 818,59 38 814,00 3,63 2013 56 693,00 86% Yes Felix Hoeger 1974 1995 Germany Engineering Male 
325 CONSORT MEDICAL PLC ADVANCED MEDICAL SOLUTIONS GROUP 
PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
761 240,97 190 080,45 0,31 2010 54 590,17 100% Yes Donald W. Evans 1949 2000 Australia Engineering Male 
326 PRUDENTIAL PLC PACIFIC & ORIENT BHD Malasya 70 169,40 81 652,46 0,13 2010 49 574,10 100% Yes Thye Seng Chan 1957 1995 Malaysia Law Male 
327 ACCIONA SA MOSTOSTAL WARSZAWA SA Polonia 22 226,90 203 132,52 4,12 2006 49 000,00 50% No 
Juan Ignacio Entrecanales 
Franco 
1965 2001 Spain Engineering Male 
328 ADLER REAL ESTATE AG ESTAVIS AG Germany 210 162,44 169 509,00 2,00 2014 47 453,00 93% No Thomas Ernst 1967 2002 Switzerland Engineering Male 
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329 SANTHERA PHARMACEUTICALS 
HOLDING AG 
NEWRON PHARMACEUTICALS SPA Italy 192 987,41 54 747,32 3,96 2011 42 655,99 100% Yes Luca Benatti 1961 1998 Italy Biology Male 
330 VIDEOCON INDUSTRIES LTD DR DATSONS LABS LTD India 7 063,77 152 402,17 0,86 2014 41 934,21 100% Yes Kannan Vishwanath 1975 2013 India Engineering Male 
331 AVANQUEST SOFTWARE SA EMME SA France 287 903,56 129 906,08 13,75 2007 40 817,00 100% No Olivier Wright 1961 1996 France 
Economics 
and Business Male 
332 CARPETRIGHT PLC TOPPS TILES PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
164 676,78 112 654,12 0,73 2009 40 061,70 100% Yes Matthew Williams 1972 2007 
United 
Kingdom 
Psichology Male 
333 NEOPOST SA FRANCOTYP-POSTALIA HOLDING AG Germany 75 255,46 116 671,00 0,87 2009 40 000,00 100% Yes Hans Szymanski 1963 2009 Germany 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
334 STORA ENSO OYJ SUPARMA TBK, PT Indonesia 29 848,89 145 517,00 0,02 2012 39 966,78 55% Yes Welly Welly 1949 1994 Indonesia N.a. Male 
335 TIETO OYJ SYGNITY SA Polonia 8 546,43 95 402,86 3,63 2009 37 668,33 100% Yes Piotr Kardach 1958 2007 Poland Engineering Male 
336 CANCOM SE PIRONET NDH AG Germany 59 818,59 38 814,00 3,63 2013 37 591,00 54% No Felix Hoeger 1974 1995 Germany Engineering Male 
337 PRODWARE SA QURIUS NV Netherlands 4 073,46 986,00 111,20 2011 34 938,00 91% Yes  Frank van der Woude 1967 2006 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
338 NOVARTIS AG 
SANTHERA PHARMACEUTICALS 
HOLDING AG 
Switzerland 193 042,04 93 854,98 3,15 2014 34 697,55 100% Yes Thomas Meier 1962 2011 Switzerland Medicine Male 
339 
FOXCONN TECHNOLOGY CO., 
LTD S&T AG Austria 97 718,50 266 829,39 9,12 2016 33 667,00 71% Yes Hannes Niederhauser 1962 2011 Austria Engineering Male 
340 TOPPS TILES PLC NORCROS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 155 506,59 424 861,80 1,42 2009 33 146,07 100% Yes Joe Matthews 1945 1996 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business Male 
341 DPA GROUP NV ICT AUTOMATISERING NV Netherlands 126 864,33 81 575,00 3,30 2013 32 002,00 80% Yes Jos Blejie 1959 2013 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
342 LIONGOLD CORPORATION LTD MINERA IRL LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
16 381,63 141 651,01 0,15 2013 29 476,43 100% Yes 
Courtney Charles 
Chamberlain 
1944 2000 
United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
343 TIETO OYJ NIXU OYJ Finland 79 653,18 34 948,58 4,29 2016 27 871,00 100% Yes Petri Kairinen 1977 2014 Finland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
344 ARCTIC PAPER SA ROTTNEROS AB Sweden 114 815,05 123 423,69 0,23 2012 22 825,12 54% No Ole Terland 1958 2008 Sweden Engineering Male 
345 AFH FINANCIAL GROUP PLC LIGHTHOUSE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
28 054,50 27 487,18 0,14 2016 22 090,33 100% Yes Malcolm Streatfield 1957 2003 
United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
346 
ECKERT & ZIEGLER STRAHLEN 
UND MEDIZINTECHNIK AG 
INTERNATIONAL BRACHYTHERAPY SA Belgium 20 972,33 50 673,38 25,00 2009 21 993,00 34% No John L. Carden 1948 1996 Belgium Chemestry Male 
347 SEADRILL LTD TRANSOCEAN LTD Switzerland 3 484 045,64 18 685 906,20 39,60 2010 20 916,19 100% Yes Steven L. Newman 1964 2010 United States 
of America 
Engineering Male 
348 LANXESS AG GWALIOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD India 39 303,94 57 049,82 0,59 2009 20 391,29 100% Yes Ashwin Kumar Kothari 1941 1984 India Chemestry Male 
349 FORNIX BIOSCIENCES NV SNOWWORLD NV Netherlands 30 359,26 1 407,00 8,00 2013 20 000,00 100% No Jim Hendricks 1948 1996 Netherlands Social Sciences Male 
350 BARTRONICS INDIA LTD INTERCEDE GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
25 424,49 10 326,80 0,34 2008 19 784,19 100% Yes Richard Parris 1956 1992 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
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351 EUROFINS SCIENTIFIC SE VIMTA LABS LTD India 29 507,10 17 984,21 0,59 2014 18 413,89 37% Yes Harita Vasireddi 1973 2013 India Pharmacy Female 
352 PROLOGUE SA O2I SA France 12 297,51 22 594,67 2,15 2014 16 750,00 100% Yes Jean-Thomas Olano 1968 2004 France Economics 
and Business 
Male 
353 JYSKE BANK A/S OSTJYDSK BANK A/S Denmark 11 484,12 398 807,25 4,15 2014 16 065,45 100% Yes Max Hovedskov 1963 2013 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
354 PZ CORMAY SA ORPHEE SA Switzerland 14 871,41 34 340,07 0,29 2016 15 570,11 100% Yes Janusz Płocica 1967 2015 Poland Economics and Business Male 
355 MICROGEN PLC ELEKTRON TECHNOLOGY PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
22 426,95 10 171,81 0,09 2014 14 965,49 100% Yes John Frederick Wilson  1976 2010 
United 
Kingdom 
Engineering Male 
356 ALTARÉA SA FROMAGERIES PAUL RENARD SA France 481 401,45 848 997,00 150,00 2007 14 725,00 100% No Alex Bongrain 1952 2003 France Engineering Male 
357 RENOLD PLC LG BALAKRISHNAN & BROS LTD India 140 412,06 118 886,37 1,76 2008 14 672,95 75% No B. Vijayakumar 1952 1986 India 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
358 FYNSKE BANK A/S TOTALBANKEN A/S Denmark 23 882,15 394 183,41 5,09 2014 14 329,89 100% Yes Ivan Moelgaard Sloek 1966 2003 Denmark 
Economics 
and Business Male 
359 CENTRICA PLC CLUFF NATURAL RESOURCES PLC United 
Kingdom 
9 610,57 2 875,78 0,01 2016 12 814,87 100% Yes John Gordon Cluff 1938 2012 United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
360 BONHEUR ASA NHST MEDIA GROUP AS Norway 37 755,90 57 671,75 50,81 2014 11 087,43 18% No Gunnar Bjørkavåg  1960 2000 Norway 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
361 BMR GROUP PLC METAL TIGER PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
634,34 2 202,20 0,01 2016 10 518,26 100% Yes Paul Johnson 1969 2016 
United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
362 
PUNCH INTERNATIONAL 
SA/NV 
ACCENTIS NV Belgium 48 934,97 79 424,50 0,01 2013 8 305,00 52% Yes Bruno Holthof 1961 2011 Belgium 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
363 COMS PLC PINNACLE TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
15 858,16 8 791,47 0,30 2013 7 939,19 100% Yes Alan Bonner 1965 2007 United 
Kingdom 
N.a. Male 
364 VODAFONE GROUP PLC OUTSOURCERY PLC United 
Kingdom 
16 405,39 11 753,88 0,19 2016 7 327,14 100% Yes Simon Newton 1966 2009 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
365 DEUTSCHE POST AG DOCDATA NV Netherlands 3 542,00 619,00 16,32 2014 5 943,00 100% Yes Michiel F. P. M. Alting 
von Geusau 
1963 2002 Netherlands Economics 
and Business 
Male 
366 INNOVATEC SPA GRUPPO GREEN POWER SPA Italy 9 039,34 11 339,15 6,00 2015 5 010,00 51% Yes David Barzazi 1972 2010 Italy Economics 
and Business 
Male 
367 DEUTSCHE BALATON AG PANDATEL AG Germany 2 140,08 635,00 0,91 2012 4 904,00 62% No Manfred Wissmann 1945 2007 Germany Law Male 
368 
HIGHLIGHT 
COMMUNICATIONS AG 
ESCOR CASINOS & ENTERTAINMENT SA Switzerland 24 346,38 41 991,10 15,09 2011 4 729,05 27% No Fredy Haas 1952 2011 Switzerland 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
369 LANKEM CEYLON PLC CW MACKIE PLC Sri Lanka 12 135,19 24 763,92 0,18 2010 4 421,94 57% No William T. Ellawala 1942 2002 Sri Lanka 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
370 CADOGAN PETROLEUM PLC ASCENT RESOURCES PLC United 
Kingdom 
21 068,04 50 257,23 0,01 2016 3 880,02 100% Yes Colin Hutchinson 1976 2015 United 
Kingdom 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
371 ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 
INVESTMENT PLC 
CEYLON LEATHER PRODUCTS PLC Sri Lanka 11 395,86 18 579,19 0,54 2010 2 225,69 21% No Sitendra Senaratne 1960 2004 Sri Lanka Economics 
and Business 
Male 
372 
SOCIETE CENTRALE DES BOIS 
ET SCIERIES DE LA MANCHE SA FONCIERE VOLTA SA France 44 843,68 86 059,12 6,49 2007 2 068,00 71% No Jean Edouard Mazery 1975 2006 France 
Economics 
and Business Male 
373 VALUE8 NV WITTE MOLEN NV Netherlands 3 831,95 3 562,00 5,00 2011 1 980,00 51% No F.A.M.J. Faas 1956 2008 Netherlands N.a. Male 
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374 VALUE8 NV 1STE NEDERLANDSCHE 
ONROERENDGOED MAATSCHAPPIJ 
Netherlands 18 096,45 25,27 1,90 2013 1 301,00 51% No Peter Paul de Vries 1967 2008 Netherlands Economics 
and Business 
Male 
375 HAYLEYS PLC ALUFAB PLC Sri Lanka 2 081,30 2 853,14 0,10 2014 1 018,82 61% No Sarojin Johann Wijesinghe 1964 2014 Sri Lanka 
Economics 
and Business Male 
376 VALUE8 NV FORNIX BIOSCIENCES NV Netherlands 30 359,26 1 407,00 15,65 2012 791,00 15% No Cess Bergman 1956 2003 Netherlands 
Economics 
and Business 
Male 
377 EUROINVESTOR.COM A/S VICTORIA PROPERTIES A/S Denmark 1 885,82 1 676,18 0,51 2016 175,15 65% No Frank Hansen 1965 2013 Denmark Law Male 
378 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC MAKPETROL AD Macedonia 48 759,46 122 169,15 430,76 2011 39,99 100% Yes Andreja Josifovski 1952 2004 Macedonia N.a. Male 
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Annex 2 
The following table shows the number of observations in terms of CEOs age and tenure that resisted or did not resisted the takeover attempt. 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
CEOs Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEOs Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEOs Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
Between 25 and 
40 
Yes 9 64,29% 
Between 25 and 
40 
Yes 8 61,54% 
Between 25 and 
40 
Yes 6 66,67% 
No 5 35,71% No 5 38,46% No 3 33,33% 
Total 14   Total 13   Total 9   
Between 41 and 
44 
Yes 30 85,71% 
Between 41 and 
44 
Yes 28 84,85% 
Between 41 and 
44 
Yes 16 88,89% 
No 5 14,29% No 5 15,15% No 2 11,11% 
Total 35   Total 33   Total 18   
Between 45 and 
48 
Yes 45 90,00% 
Between 45 and 
48 
Yes 67 91,78% 
Between 45 and 
48 
Yes 48 92,31% 
No 5 10,00% No 6 8,22% No 4 7,69% 
Total 50   Total 73   Total 52   
Between 49 and 
52 
Yes 62 84,93% 
Between 49 and 
52 
Yes 67 87,01% 
Between 49 and 
52 
Yes 53 88,33% 
No 11 15,07% No 10 12,99% No 7 11,67% 
Total 73   Total 77   Total 60   
Between 53 and 
56 
Yes 58 82,86% 
Between 53 and 
56 
Yes 55 85,94% 
Between 53 and 
56 
Yes 40 86,96% 
No 12 17,14% No 9 14,06% No 6 13,04% 
Total 70   Total 64   Total 46   
Between 57 and 
60 
Yes 47 85,45% 
Between 57 and 
60 
Yes 41 91,11% 
Between 57 and 
60 
Yes 23 88,46% 
No 8 14,55% No 4 8,89% No 3 11,54% 
Total 55   Total 45   Total 26   
Between 61 and 
64 
Yes 42 91,30% 
Between 61 and 
64 
Yes 15 83,33% 
Between 61 and 
64 
Yes 10 83,33% 
No 4 8,70% No 3 16,67% No 2 16,67% 
Total 46   Total 18   Total 12   
More then 65 
Yes 28 80,00% 
More then 65 
Yes 8 61,54% 
More then 65 
Yes 6 66,67% 
No 7 20,00% No 5 38,46% No 3 33,33% 
Total 35   Total 13   Total 9   
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
CEOs Tenure 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEOs Tenure 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEOs Tenure 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
Between 0 and 5 
Yes 192 86,10% 
Between 0 and 5 
Yes 169 88,48% 
Between 0 and 5 
Yes 113 89,68% 
No 31 13,90% No 22 11,52% No 13 10,32% 
Total 223   Total 191   Total 126   
Between 6 and 10 
Yes 68 87,18% 
Between 6 and 10 
Yes 65 90,28% 
Between 6 and 10 
Yes 49 92,45% 
No 10 12,82% No 7 9,72% No 4 7,55% 
Total 78   Total 72   Total 53   
Between 11 and 
15 
Yes 31 77,50% 
Between 11 and 
15 
Yes 29 78,38% 
Between 11 and 
15 
Yes 22 78,57% 
No 9 22,50% No 8 21,62% No 6 21,43% 
Total 40   Total 37   Total 28   
Between 16 and 
20 
Yes 19 82,61% 
Between 16 and 
20 
Yes 13 76,47% 
Between 16 and 
20 
Yes 8 72,73% 
No 4 17,39% No 4 23,53% No 3 27,27% 
Total 23   Total 17   Total 11   
More then 20 
Yes 11 78,57% 
More then 20 
Yes 5 83,33% 
More then 20 
Yes 4 80,00% 
No 3 21,43% No 1 16,67% No 1 20,00% 
Total 14   Total 6   Total 5   
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Annex 3 
The following table shows the number of observations in terms of CEOs nationality/culture that resisted or did not resisted the takeover 
attempt. 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
African 
Yes 7 100,00% 
African 
Yes 3 100,00% 
African 
Yes 0 0,00% 
No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 7   Total 3   Total 0   
Anglo American 
Yes 94 97,92% 
Anglo American 
Yes 81 100,00% 
Anglo American 
Yes 62 100,00% 
No 2 2,08% No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 96   Total 81   Total 62   
Arabian 
Yes 3 60,00% 
Arabian 
Yes 2 100,00% 
Arabian 
Yes 0 0,00% 
No 2 40,00% No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 5   Total 2   Total 0   
Asian 
Yes 16 64,00% 
Asian 
Yes 1 50,00% 
Asian 
Yes 0 0,00% 
No 9 36,00% No 1 50,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 25   Total 2   Total 0   
Balcans and 
Slavics 
Yes 10 76,92% 
Balcans and 
Slavics 
Yes 10 76,92% 
Balcans and 
Slavics 
Yes 4 66,67% 
No 3 23,08% No 3 23,08% No 2 33,33% 
Total 13   Total 13   Total 6   
Francophone 
Yes 42 80,77% 
Francophone 
Yes 42 84,00% 
Francophone 
Yes 30 93,75% 
No 10 19,23% No 8 16,00% No 2 6,25% 
Total 52   Total 50   Total 32   
German 
Yes 70 83,33% 
German 
Yes 70 83,33% 
German 
Yes 48 80,00% 
No 14 16,67% No 14 16,67% No 12 20,00% 
Total 84   Total 84   Total 60   
Latin 
Yes 43 84,31% 
Latin 
Yes 38 82,61% 
Latin 
Yes 19 82,61% 
No 8 15,69% No 8 17,39% No 4 17,39% 
Total 51   Total 46   Total 23   
Scandinavian 
Yes 36 80,00% 
Scandinavian 
Yes 34 80,95% 
Scandinavian 
Yes 28 82,35% 
No 9 20,00% No 8 19,05% No 6 17,65% 
Total 45   Total 42   Total 34   
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Other 
nationalities 
Yes 0 0,00% 
Other 
nationalities 
Yes 0 0,00% 
Other 
nationalities 
Yes 5 83,33% 
No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% No 1 16,67% 
Total 0   Total 0   Total 6   
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Annex 4 
The following table shows the number of observations in terms of CEOs academic background that resisted or did not resisted the takeover 
attempt. 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
CEO's Age 
(Intervals) Resistance 
Number of 
Observations Weight 
Economics and 
Business 
Yes 155 85,16% 
Economics and 
Business 
Yes 141 89,24% 
Economics and 
Business 
Yes 105 90,52% 
No 27 14,84% No 17 10,76% No 11 9,48% 
Total 182   Total 158   Total 116   
Engineering 
Yes 96 86,49% 
Engineering 
Yes 80 86,96% 
Engineering 
Yes 49 89,09% 
No 15 13,51% No 12 13,04% No 6 10,91% 
Total 111   Total 92   Total 55   
Law 
Yes 19 73,08% 
Law 
Yes 18 72,00% 
Law 
Yes 11 64,71% 
No 7 26,92% No 7 28,00% No 6 35,29% 
Total 26   Total 25   Total 17   
Mathematics and 
Statistics 
Yes 6 100,00% 
Mathematics and 
Statistics 
Yes 5 100,00% 
Mathematics and 
Statistics 
Yes 5 100,00% 
No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 6   Total 5   Total 5   
Medicine and 
related 
Yes 7 87,50% 
Medicine and 
related 
Yes 6 100,00% 
Medicine and 
related 
Yes 5 100,00% 
No 1 12,50% No 0 0,00% No 0 0,00% 
Total 8   Total 6   Total 5   
Natural Sciences 
Yes 17 94,44% 
Natural Sciences 
Yes 13 92,86% 
Natural Sciences 
Yes 9 100,00% 
No 1 5,56% No 1 7,14% No 0 0,00% 
Total 18   Total 14   Total 9   
Social Sciences 
Yes 3 75,00% 
Social Sciences 
Yes 3 75,00% 
Social Sciences 
Yes 2 66,67% 
No 1 25,00% No 1 25,00% No 1 33,33% 
Total 4   Total 4   Total 3   
No qualifications 
Yes 18 78,26% 
No qualifications 
Yes 15 78,95% 
No qualifications 
Yes 10 76,92% 
No 5 21,74% No 4 21,05% No 3 23,08% 
Total 23   Total 19   Total 13   
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Annex 5 
The following table shows the Correlations for the variables in “Scenario 1”. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] 
[1] AGE 1                        
[2] TEN -.380 1                       
[3] ACB (1) -.003 .06 1                      
[4] ACB (2) .023 .05 .803 1                     
[5] ACB (3) -.128 .137 .644 .592 1                    
[6] ACB (4) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1                   
[7] ACB (5) -.012 -.01 .408 .419 .292 .000 1                  
[8] ACB (6) -.089 -.05 .361 .346 .260 .000 .177 1                 
[9] ACB (7) -.040 .05 .460 .410 .352 .000 .190 .174 1                
[10] NAT (1) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1               
[11] NAT (2) .004 -.137 -.073 -.202 -.081 .000 -.362 -.025 -.009 .000 1              
[12] NAT (3) -.005 -.051 -.078 -.056 -.080 .000 -.096 -.032 .021 .000 .400 1             
[13] NAT (4) -.036 .024 -.133 -.202 -.093 .000 -.033 -.057 .001 .000 .377 .549 1            
[14] NAT (5) .095 -.111 -.157 -.194 -.128 .000 -.050 -.140 -.024 .000 .436 .643 .615 1           
[15] NAT (6) .040 -.059 -.087 -.125 -.143 .000 -.041 -.023 -.079 .000 .452 .697 .636 .723 1          
[16] NAT (7) .098 -.057 .034 -.026 -.072 .000 .013 -.001 .069 .000 .382 .625 .565 .628 .679 1         
[17] NAT (8) .069 -.005 -.115 -.141 -.185 .000 -.052 -.040 .003 .000 .403 .642 .585 .662 .725 .626 1        
[18] GEN -.164 .074 .057 -.004 .055 .000 .268 -.024 .055 .000 -.087 .007 .157 .082 .005 -.004 -.002 1       
[19] DEAL_VALUE -.048 .030 -.091 -.104 -.076 .000 -.026 -.036 -.100 .000 -.009 .061 .067 .039 .057 -.035 .069 .052 1      
[20] STOCK_ACQUIRED .201 -.188 -.064 .104 -.073 .000 .062 .037 -.121 .000 -.052 .127 -.097 .054 -.012 .126 -.016 -.298 -.180 1     
[21] MARKET_CAP .007 -.022 -.071 -.160 -.030 .000 -.023 -.024 -.061 .000 .122 -.063 .044 .068 -.007 .060 -.001 -.084 -.446 .182 1    
[22] TOTAL_ASSETS -.127 .040 .173 .258 .169 .000 .114 .115 .078 .000 -.093 .005 -.205 -.091 -.044 -.225 -.051 .008 -.135 -.001 -.296 1   
[23] STOCK_PRICE -.046 -.034 .039 .085 .037 .000 -.041 .046 .058 .000 -.139 .067 -.156 -.185 -.093 .018 -.062 -.042 -.093 .079 -.195 .085 1  
[24] RATIO Q -.003 .000 .016 .018 .014 .000 .008 .009 .012 .000 .019 .037 .031 .030 .036 .032 .034 .008 .003 -.015 -.014 .014 .003 1 
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Annex 6 
Extended results of our Binomial Regression Model and Classification Tables. 
Target Firms’ CEOs Age and Tenure as linear variables 
Independent variable 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp. (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
B S.E. Wald Sig Exp. (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
B S.E. Wald Sig Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
AGE .046 .028 2.687 .101 1.047 .991 1.105 .051 .033 2.359 .125 1.052 .986 1.123 .023 .044 .284 .594 1.023 .940 1.115 
TEN -.047 .032 2.157 .142 .954 .896 1.016 -.068 .039 3.149 .076 .34 .866 1.007 -.072 .047 2.274 .132 .931 .848 1.022 
ACB   7.998 .333      4.972 .663      2.052 .957    
ACB [1] .331 .817 .164 .685 1.392 .281 6.904 .389 .986 .156 .693 1.476 .213 10.202 1.074 1.178 .831 .362 2.928 .291 29.487 
ACB [2] 1.234 .895 1.902 .168 3.435 .595 19.842 .768 .997 .593 .441 2.155 .306 15.195 1.461 1.313 1.237 .266 4.310 .328 56.546 
ACB [3] -.184 1.083 .029 .865 .832 .100 6.951 -.518 1.186 .191 .662 .595 .058 6,087 .235 1.447 .026 .871 1.265 .074 21.568 
ACB [4] 19.472 14101.462 .000 .999 286108549 .000 . 18.377 15265.746 .000 .999 95706562.0 .000 . 18.268 14368.677 .000 .999 85827009.5 .000 . 
ACB [5] 1.855 1.769 1.100 .294 6.393 .200 204.742 17.868 14980.025 .000 .999 57557206.2 .000 . 18.440 15420.938 .000 .999 102000578 .000 . 
ACB [6] 1.873 1.962 .911 .340 6.505 .139 304.273 .832 2.194 .144 .704 2298 .031 169.215 16.614 10351.700 .000 .999 16420488.3 .000 . 
ACB [7] -1.983 1.550 1.637 .201 .138 .007 2.871 -2.247 1.749 1.650 .199 .106 .003 3.259 -16.883 4084.718 .000 .997 .000 .000 . 
NAT   8.635 .374      4.485 .774      3.542 .738    
NAT [1] 20.658 12453.992 .000 .999 937198876 .000 . -.600 23041.139 .000 1.000 .549 .000 . 12.754 17898.887 .000 .999 34818.173 .000 . 
NAT [2] -3.116 1.653 3.551 .059 .044 .002 1.133 -.197 28676.774 .000 1.000 .821 .000 . -19.129 16977.698 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [3] -1.708 .988 2.986 .084 .181 .026 1.258 -20.494 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . -16.751 16977.698 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [4] -3.044 1.134 7.200 .007 .048 .005 .440 -19.785 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . -18.583 16977.698 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [5] -1.842 1.001 3.384 .066 .159 .022 1.128 -18.055 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . -17.590 16977.698 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [6] -1.688 .895 3.559 .059 .185 .032 1.068 -18.553 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . -18.201 16977.698 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [7] 1.223 1.025 1.422 .233 .294 .039 2.197 -18.067 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . - - - - - - - 
NAT [8] -1.615 .988 2.673 .102 .199 .029 1.379 -18.544 3863.509 .000 .996 .000 .000 . - - - - - - - 
GEN [1] -2.352 1.187 3.926 .048 .095 .009 .975 -1.522 1.225 1.543 .214 .218 .020 2.409 1.152 1,413 .665 .415 3.164 .199 50.434 
DEAL_VALUE .000 .000 .018 .894 1,000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .308 .579 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .995 1,000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_ACQUIRED 8169.00 1.117 53.460 .000 3529.467 395.096 31529.405 8.024 1.288 38.813 .000 3052.974 244.583 38108.353 7.015 1.726 16.524 .000 1112.707 37.805 32750.393 
MARKET_CAP .000 .000 1.431 .232 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 1.487 .223 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .116 .734 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TOTAL_ASSETS .000 .000 .411 .521 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .237 .627 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .850 .356 1.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_PRICE .005 .007 .501 .479 1.005 .991 1.020 .003 .007 .187 .665 1.003 .989 1.017 .027 .029 .849 .357 1.027 .970 1.087 
RATIO Q .000 .001 .004 .947 1.000 .998 1.003 .000 .001 .004 .948 1.000 .999 1.001 .000 .001 .002 .964 1.000 .999 1.001 
Constant -4.272 2.137 3.998 .046 .014   11.293 3863.509 .000 .998 150743.090   11.315 16977.699 .000 .999 82082.71   
 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  Predicted Predicted Predicted 
  TAR 
Percentage Correct 
TAR 
Percentage Correct 
TAR 
Percentage Correct 
  .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 
Observed 
TAR 
.00 37 (0) 20 (57) 64,9 (,0) 28 (0) 14 (42) 66,7 (,0) 17 (0) 9 (26) 65,4 (,0) 
1.00 9 (0) 312 (321) 97,2 (100,0) 7 (0) 274 (281) 97,5 (100,0) 3 (0) 193 (196) 98,5 (100,0) 
Overall Percentage   92,3 (84,9)   93,5 (87,0)   94,6 (88,3) 
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Target Firms’ CEOs Age and Tenure as five-year period groups 
Independent variable 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
B S.E. Wald Sig Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
B S.E. Wald Sig Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp. (B) 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
AGE    6.680 .351      5.923 .432      5.025 .541    
AGE [1] 2.538 1,154 4.834 .028 12.654 1.317 121.580 2.180 1.267 2.961 .085 8.848 .739 106.009 3.913 2.457 2.537 .111 50.060 .406 6177.064 
AGE [2] 1.654 .994 2.770 .096 5.226 .746 36.629 1.797 1.144 2.465 .116 6.031 .640 56.817 3.293 1.858 3.139 .076 26.915 .705 1027.836 
AGE [3] 1.574 .972 2.622 .105 4.824 .718 32.401 1.087 1.113 .953 .329 2.965 .334 26.281 2.248 1.816 1.532 .216 9.466 .207 332.503 
AGE [4] 2.044 1.056 3.749 .053 7.722 .975 61.153 2.131 1.211 3.098 .078 8.427 .785 90.471 3.908 2.186 3.195 .074 49.807 .686 3617.100 
AGE [5] 2.666 1.206 4.887 .027 14.377 1.353 152.791 2.989 1.449 4.428 .039 19.808 1.158 338.954 5.959 3.683 2.618 .106 387.357 .284 528448.782 
AGE [6] 2.087 1.236 2.852 .091 8.064 .715 90.945 2.058 1.527 1.816 .178 7.829 .393 152.130 3.059 2.176 1.975 .160 21.300 .299 1516.285 
TEN    5.916 .206      5.937 .204      6.448 .168    
TEN [1] -.140 .703 .040 .842 .869 .219 3.447 .221 .723 .094 .759 1.248 .303 5.142 -1.044 1.302 .643 .423 .352 .027 4.515 
TEN [2] -1.122 .678 2.736 .098 .326 .086 1.231 -1.410 .755 3.489 .062 .244 .056 1.072 -2.095 1.039 4.066 .044 .123 .016 .943 
TEN [3] 1.103 1.040 1.124 .289 3.013 .392 23.152 .270 1.172 .053 .818 1.310 .132 13.025 2.643 2.567 1.060 .303 14.058 .092 2154.431 
TEN [4] -1.673 1.047 2.551 .110 .188 .024 1.462 -2.371 1.476 2.581 .108 .093 .005 1.685 -4.250 2.251 3.565 .059 .014 .000 1.175 
ACB    12.081 .098      7.395 .389      2.184 .949    
ACB [1] .312 .847 .135 .713 1.366 .260 7.185 -.151 1.130 .018 .894 1.163 .127 10.665 .716 1.328 .291 .590 2.047 .152 27.628 
ACB [2] 1.432 .930 2.373 .123 4.189 .677 25.917 .877 1.110 .624 .430 2.404 .273 21.180 1.515 1.477 1.053 .305 4.551 .252 82.268 
ACB [3] .173 1.126 .023 .878 1.188 .131 10.809 -.464 1.319 .124 .725 .629 .047 8.335 -.217 1.614 .018 .893 .805 .034 19.040 
ACB [4] 19.039 14136.267 .000 .999 185625989 .000 . 17.183 14963.099 .000 .999 28992161.2 .000 . 16.090 12749.703 .000 .999 9725383.54 .000 . 
ACB [5] 2.265 2.217 1.044 .307 9.630 .125 741.915 17.648 14338.273 .000 .999 46180923.0 .000 . 18.346 14852.135 .000 .999 92771820.9 .000 . 
ACB [6] 2.302 1.958 1.382 .240 9.992 .215 463.936 .961 2.131 .203 .652 2.614 .040 170.227 14.189 8170.138 .000 .999 1452091.39 .000 . 
ACB [7] -3.150 1.597 3.890 .049 .043 .002 .981 -3.649 2.101 3.016 .082 .026 .000 1.599 -23.594 3573.324 .000 .995 .000 .000 . 
NAT    8.389 .396      5.049 .752      4.510 .608    
NAT [1] 21.725 12212.450 .000 .999 2.722E+9 .000 . -1.502 22874.542 .000 1.000 .223 .000 . 19.546 16961.963 .000 .999 305061605 .000 . 
NAT [2] -3.552 2.030 3.060 .080 .029 .001 1.533 -2.005 28292.115 .000 1.000 .135 .000 . -18.696 16235.618 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [3] -1.897 1.032 3.379 .066 .150 .020 1.134 -22.260 3301.490 .000 .995 .000 .000 . -15.748 16235.618 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [4] -3.259 1.231 7.011 .008 .038 .003 .429 -21.326 3301.490 .000 .995 .000 .000 . -18.327 16235.618 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [5] -1.914 1.050 3.321 .068 .147 .019 1.155 -19.040 3301.490 .000 995 .000 .000 . -17.534 16235.618 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [6] -2.071 .923 5.030 .025 .126 .021 .770 -19.945 3301.490 .000 .995 .000 .000 . -17.710 16235.618 .000 .999 .000 .000 . 
NAT [7] -1.795 1.084 2.745 .098 .166 .020 1.389 -18.742 3301.490 .000 .995 .000 .000 . - - - - - - - 
NAT [8] -1.902 1.016 3.502 .061 .149 020 1.094 -19.822 3301.490 .000 .995 .000 .000 . - - - - - - - 
GEN [1] -2.164 1.359 2.535 .111 .115 .008 1.649 -1.733 1.315 1.736 .188 .177 .023 2.328 1.817 1.791 1.029 .310 6.154 .184 206.018 
DEAL_VALUE .000 .000 .094 .760 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .862 .353 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .001 .969 1.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_ACQUIRED 8.703 1.205 52.185 .000 6021.489 567.822 63855,045 8.740 1.467 35.507 .000 6248.111 352.571 110726.242 8.677 2.287 14.398 .000 5866.335 66.359 518601.139 
MARKET_CAP .000 .000 2.225 .136 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 2.032 .154 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .089 .766 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TOTAL_ASSETS .000 .000 .449 .503 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .263 .608 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .095 .758 1.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_PRICE .005 .007 .399 .528 1.005 .990 1.020 .001 .006 .017 .896 1.001 .989 1.013 .033 .034 .955 .328 1.033 .968 1.104 
RATIO Q .000 .001 .007 .934 1.000 .998 1.002 .000 .000 .005 .946 1.000 .999 1.001 .000 .001 .001 .971 1.000 .999 1.001 
Constant -4.280 2.051 4.357 .037 .014   13.709 3301.490 .000 .997 898652.318   8.014 16235.618 .000 1.000 3021.520   
 
 
 XXVII 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  Predicted Predicted Predicted 
  TAR 
Percentage Correct 
TAR 
Percentage Correct 
TAR 
Percentage Correct 
  .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 
Observed TAR 
.00 37 (0) 20 (57) 64,9 (,0) 28 (0) 14 (42) 66,7 (,0) 18 (0) 8 (26) 69,2 (,0) 
1.00 7 (0) 314 (321) 97,8 (100,0) 7 (0) 274 (281) 97,5 (100,0) 5 (0) 191 (196) 97,4 (100,0) 
Overall Percentage   92,9 (84,9)   93,5 (87,0)   94,1 (88,3) 
  
 XXVIII 
Annex 7 
The following tables and figures show the curve behavior of target firms’ CEOs age and tenure and their likelihood to resist a takeover attempt. 
 
Scenario 
Model Summary – Age variable Model Summary – Tenure variable 
R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate R R square Adjusted R square Std. Error of the estimate 
Scenario 1 .112 .012 .007 .357 .069 .005 .000 .358 
Scenario 2 .166 .028 .022 .333 .110 .020 .006 .336 
Scenario 3 .165 .027 .018 .324 .143 .012 .012 .325 
 
 
ANOVA – Age variable ANOVA – Tenure variable 
Sum of squares df Mean square F sig. Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Scenario 1 
Regression .603 2 .301 2.364 .095 .233 2 .117 .908 .404 
Residual 47.802 375 .127   48.171 375 .128   
Total 48.405 377    48.405 377    
Scenario 2 
Regression 1.001 2 .505 4.551 .011 .440 2 .220 1.950 .144 
Residual 35.528 320 .111   36.099 320 .113   
Total 36.539 322    36.539 322    
Scenario 3 
Regression .644 2 .322 3.066 .049 .485 2 .242 2.293 .103 
Residual 23.087 220 .105   23.246 220 .106   
Total 23.731 222    23.731 222    
 
 
Coefficients – Age variable Coefficients – Tenure variable 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
t sig. 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
t sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
Scenario 1 
Age / Tenure .406 .022 1.032 2.090 .037 -.005 .007 -.092 -.746 .456 
Age square / Tenure square .000 .000 -.996 -2.016 .044 5,539E-5 .000 .026 .209 .834 
Constant -.412 .590  -.699 .485 .877 .032  27.723 .000 
Scenario 2 
Age / Tenure .065 .025 1.515 2.285 .005 -.001 .008 -.025 -.193 .847 
Age square / Tenure square -.001 .000 -1.449 -2.702 .007 .000 .000 -.087 -.678 .498 
Constant -.915 .611  -1.496 .136 .894 .033  27.236 .000 
Scenario 3 
Age / Tenure .067 .027 1.568 2.466 .014 -.001 .008 -.022 -.146 .884 
Age square / Tenure square -.001 .000 -1.545 -2.430 .016 .000 .000 -.122 -.802 .423 
Constant -.934 .733  -1.275 -.204 .907 .038  23.591 .000 
 
 XXIX 
Scenario 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XXX 
Scenario 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XXXI 
Scenario 3 
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